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The Great Recession constituted a breaking point in several aspects of the cultural, economic 
and political life of southern European countries (i.e. Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain). This 
dissertation aims to shed light on the political consequences of the economic crisis in this 
region —with a specific focus on Spain as a paradigmatic case— by analysing different 
aspects of the political transformations that took place during the period of crisis. The 
underlying argument is that, albeit some relevant differences, the four countries experienced a 
common pattern: the incapacity of national politics to offer differentiated recipes to the 
deteriorating economic situation triggered a widespread crisis of representation that 
introduced new issues in the political agenda and drove the political transformations in these 
countries. The combination of a political and economic crisis at the national and European 
levels opened new political spaces that new parties capitalised by appealing to the need for 
democratic renewal and opposition to austerity politics. Furthermore, as illustrated by the 
Spanish case, and in particular the Catalan experience, the political crisis had far-reaching 
consequences beyond economic grievances, leading to the activation of different types of 
conflicts. Overall, the findings suggest that the transformations in the structure of political 
conflict in southern Europe in the aftermath of the Great Recession are not the by-product of a 
growing cultural divide —as is the case in several other continental and north-European 
countries—, but instead respond to the loss of credibility in the political system. 
Methodologically, the dissertation relies on an original dataset of media content as well as on 
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Chapter 1. Crises Dynamics and Political 
Transformations: An Introduction 
Introduction 
In the Great Transformation, Karl Polanyi suggested that there are critical periods when ‘time 
expands’. A detailed analysis of these periods is valuable to understand the dynamics of social 
and political transformations. By all accounts, time ‘expanded’ in southern Europe in the 
shadow of the Great Recession. The multiple crises that unfolded after the fall of Lehman 
Brothers in 2008 constituted a breaking point in several aspects of the cultural, economic and 
political life of these countries (i.e. Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain). The aim of this article-
based dissertation is to shed light on different aspects of the political transformations that 
unfolded in this region in the aftermath of the crisis. 
The underlying argument is that, albeit some relevant differences, the four countries 
experienced a common pattern: the incapacity of national politics to offer differentiated 
recipes to the deteriorating economic situation triggered a widespread crisis of representation 
that introduced new issues in the political agenda and drove the political transformations in 
these countries. The combination of a political and economic crisis at the national and 
European levels opened new political spaces that new parties capitalised by appealing to the 
need for democratic renewal and opposition to austerity politics. Furthermore, as illustrated 
by the Spanish case, and in particular the Catalan experience, the political crisis had far-
reaching consequences beyond economic grievances, leading to the activation of different 
types of conflicts. The findings suggest that the transformations in the structure of political 
conflict in southern Europe in the aftermath of the Great Recession are not the by-product of a 
growing cultural divide —as is the case in several other continental and north-European 
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countries (Kriesi et al. 2008, 2012)—, but instead respond to the loss of credibility in the 
political system, which interacted with pre-existing lines of domestic conflict to produce new 
political configurations. 
In this introductory chapter I briefly introduce the broad theoretical underpinnings that serve 
as a basis for the more detailed theoretical sections in each of the chapters of the dissertation. 
Before that, in the following section, I present the outline and briefly summarise the 
contributions of each of the individual chapters. 
Thesis Outline 
The dissertation is composed of two comparative articles and three case study chapters 
focusing on Spain, which is taken as a paradigmatic case of transformation where two new 
parties emerged in the years following the Great Recession. While some of the chapters speak 
to each other, it should be noted that these are individual pieces of work that tackle different 
specific aspects of the broader political transformations in south European countries. Table 1 
shows the overall structure of the dissertation. 
Table 1.1 Outline of the Dissertation 







Chapter 2. From Boom to Bust: 
A Comparative Analysis of Greece and Spain under Austerity 
with Björn Bremer 
Chapter 3. Old versus new politics: 
The political spaces in Southern Europe in times of crisis 









 Chapter 4. Out with the Old: 
Restructuring Spanish Politics 
with I. Sánchez-Vítores 
Chapter 5. Challenging Business as Usual? 
The Rise of New Parties in Spain in Times of 
Crises 
Supply-side Demand-side 
Chapter 6. Conflict Activation: 
The Case of Catalonia 
 Chapter 7. Conclusion 
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The first article, Chapter 21, reviews the economic and political origins and consequences of 
the crisis that started in 2008 in comparative perspective in Greece and Spain. Since the 
remainder of the dissertation focuses on the political consequences of the crisis, this chapter 
fits well into an introductory role insofar it covers the political economy of the Eurozone in 
the context of the crisis and shows the great economic dislocations suffered by these 
countries. It is contended that prior economic and political developments are fundamental in 
understanding the economic crisis that unfolded in 2008. In particular, irresponsible 
governments in Spain and Greece failed to regulate the pre-crisis boom effectively. Driven by 
incentives that derived from the ill-conceived institutional structure of the EU, they created a 
socio-economic environment, in which the economic crisis could only have the disruptive 
political consequences that we have witnessed. 
Chapter 32 then engages with the changes in the political debate and the position of the 
actors in the elections after the crisis in comparative perspective. It is argued that the 
configuration of conflict in these countries was shaped by an economic crisis that coexisted 
with a political crisis that had both European and domestic dimensions. These changes were 
led by social movements and political parties that forcefully combined opposition to austerity 
and to ‘old politics’. While this pattern emerged everywhere, there are distinct county 
differences. To advance the understanding of those differences, the rest of the dissertation —
chapters 4, 5 and 6— focus on Spain as a paradigmatic case of transformation and aim to 
disentangle the mechanisms behind these political changes. 
                                               
1 Published as: Bremer, Björn, and Guillem Vidal (2018). ‘From Boom to Bust: A Comparative Analysis of Greece and 
Spain under Austerity’, in Evdoxios Doxiadis and Aimee Placas (eds.), Living Under Austerity: Greek Society in 
Crisis, vol. New York: Berghahn Books, 113–140. 
2 Published as: Hutter, Swen, Hanspeter Kriesi, and Guillem Vidal (2018). ‘Old versus new politics: The political spaces in 
Southern Europe in times of crises’, Party Politics, 24:1, 10–22. 
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More concretely, Chapter 43 relies on an original dataset of media content to analyse party’s 
positions and overall transformations in the Spanish political landscape, covering two 
elections before the beginning of the crisis (2004, 2008) and two elections afterward (2011, 
2015). The results suggest that, while the elections before the crisis were characterised by two 
poles identifiable on the left-right scale and cultural and territorial issues dominated during 
this period, the crisis brought about a multipolar structure of conflict in which economic and 
political issues dominated the public debate and structured party competition.  
In this changing political landscape, Chapter 54 explores the collapse of the Spanish 
party system and the reasons behind the emergence of two new parties: Podemos and 
Ciudadanos. Using survey data to map the ideological space and model voting behaviour, it is 
shown that economic voting is only party of the story. The chapter contends that the 
transformations in the Spanish party system are best understood through the prism of the 
crisis of representation that unfolded alongside a severe economic crisis: it is the 
dissatisfaction with the political system which drives the vote for both new parties. The 
results also show that a unidimensional structure and a generational divide cut across these 
critical attitudes: the young and the politically dissatisfied are more likely to vote for new 
parties, each on different sides of the political spectrum. 
While there are common patterns across south European countries in the types of 
conflict that emerged in the shadow of the crisis, it is crucial to keep in mind that the resulting 
configurations of conflict are contingent upon pre-existing structures of conflict. Chapter 65 
                                               
3 Published as: Vidal, G. & Sánchez-Vítores, Irene. 2018 "Out with the Old: Restructuring Spanish Politics" in Restructuring 
European Party Politics in Times of Crisis. eds. Swen Hutter and Hanspeter Kriesi. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press. 
4 Published as: Vidal, Guillem (2018). ‘Challenging business as usual? The rise of new parties in Spain in times of crisis’, 
West European Politics, 41:2, 261–286. 
5 Unpublished manuscript. 
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zooms into the Catalan secessionist challenge to explore the dynamics of conflict activation in 
the aftermath of the crisis related to the territorial dimension of Spanish politics. The article 
traces the Catalan case to show that, following the 2010 elections, a process of ethnic 
polarisation led to an ethnic alignment of the vote in subsequent elections (2012, 2015, 2017). 
This process saw changing positions on fundamental issues by mainstream parties which the 
article analyses, suggesting that conflict-displacement strategies due to adverse economic 
circumstances can account for such dynamics. 
Finally, chapter 7 presents some concluding remarks, speculates about the future of 
south European politics, and raises questions for future research. 
Political Conflict and Party System Change: A Theoretical Framework 
There are two fundamentally distinct yet simultaneous processes that must be accounted for in 
understanding party system change in Europe over the last decades. The first refers to the 
long-term process of cleavage (trans)formation that has reshaped north-western European 
(NWE) party systems with the emergence of a new cultural (or new politics) dimension since 
the 1970s. Political sociologists have devoted significant effort to understanding the 
emergence and consolidation of this new divide and its political translation (Kriesi et al. 
2008, 2012). Essentially, the emergence of the Populist Radical Right (PRR) and the New 
Left are often explained on the basis of this new cultural cleavage deriving from the social 
transformations brought about by globalisation. The second one refers to the growing 
amorphousness of the electorate and the decline of enduring social constituencies that has led 
to increasing disengagement from politics, representing the downfall of traditional party 
politics (Mair 2013). 
While the two processes must be understood as complementary, I argue that each of 
them explains different types of changes in the party systems across Europe’s regions. On the 
one hand, the PRR and the New Left have progressively occupied a ‘niche’ space in a new 
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cultural cleavage opened in NWE due to the social transformations deriving from 
globalisation and technological change. On the other hand, the populist left parties in 
Southern Europe (SE) are the consequence of the heightening of the tensions that stem from 
the constraints on national sovereignty and a perceived decline of representativeness resulting 
from the economic crisis, which mirrors the second process. This distinction is fundamental in 
understanding the regional variation in the transformations in European political spaces.  The 
next part reviews the evolution of cleavage structures in Europe and stresses the shortcomings 
for explaining the current political alignments in certain European regions. The following part 
deals with the role of parties in government, introduces the literature on the crisis of 
representation and develops the argument that economic crisis can act as a heightener of the 
tensions between responsibility and responsiveness, leading to the collapse of party systems. 
Cleavages and Realignment 
No literature on cleavage theory in the last decades can avoid dealing with the seminal work 
of Lipset and Rokkan (1967b). In a historical account of Western Europe, going back as far as 
the Middle Ages, their work inquired about the historical conditions and development of 
cleavages and the transformation of sociocultural conflicts into opposition between parties. 
Borrowing the words of Satori (1969) —who two years later would already describe their 
work as a “landmark” that wold “rebalance the discipline” of political sociology—, Lipset and 
Rokkan dealt with the question of “how are conflicts and cleavages translated into a party 
system?” (Sartori 1969: 207). An in-depth review of this classic work is far beyond the scope 
of the present document (see Bornschier 2010). However, there are a few important aspects to 
highlight for the purpose that concerns us here, which is an overview of the current 
development of contemporary cleavages in western Europe. 
Perhaps the most well-known and cited idea of Lipset and Rokkan’s (1967b) work is 
that of the freezing hypothesis. In short, the authors introduced the idea that party systems in 
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the 1960s displayed a remarkable similarity to the party systems already set in place in the 
1920. Several works have addressed this statement and its empirical validity over the years 
(see Kriesi 1998; Bornschier 2010). Perhaps one of the most influential works in that regard is 
that of Mair and Bartolini (1990) and Mair (1997a) who empirically address the patterns of 
electoral change and party competition until the 1990s and conclude that there is a strong 
persistence of cleavages. In Mair’s own conclusion of Chapter 4 titled the Myths of Electoral 
Change, he argues: “following Rokkan, the party alternatives of the 1960s were older than the 
majority of their national electorates. Thirty years on, these self-same parties still continue to 
dominate mass politics in western Europe. Nowadays, in short, they are even older still” 
(Mair 1997a: 90). 
The two main critical processes that reshaped and later stabilized party systems in the 
1920, according to Rokkan’s (1999) analysis, were the National revolution and the Industrial 
Revolution. These two processes created four types of cleavages, two related to each of the 
revolutions. The National revolution, on the one hand, brought about conflicts over values 
and cultural identities, reflected in the religious/secular and centre/periphery cleavages 
(Rokkan 1999: 284). The Industrial revolution, on the other hand, brought about “conflict 
between the landed interests and the rising class of industrial entrepreneurs; the conflict 
between owners and employers on the one side and tenants, labourers, and workers on the 
other” (Rokkan 1999: 284). In short, the capital/labour and urban/rural cleavages.  
Have these ‘classical’ cleavages maintained the same strength in predicting vote and 
structuring party systems since then? Several works have sought to address this question 
pointing to an attenuation of both the religious and class cleavages —or at least its 
transformation— which were considered the two most important determinants of party choice 
(Lijphart 1979). Given the extensive social transformations that have occurred since the 
1960s, it is no wonder that the class cleavage has transformed. There are a number of factors 
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that have contributed to these social transformations that have rendered a much more 
diversified and complex social structure. The process of deindustrialisation, feminization and 
tersiarisation of the labour market, together with the expansion of the welfare state and 
increasing levels of education are all factors that play a role in the redefinition of class, and 
therefore, its linkage to class voting (see Oesch 2006b; Evans and Graaf 2013). To put it 
bluntly, social class can no longer be approximated dichotomously as in the classical Marxist 
terms of the bourgeois and the proletariat, since the divisions no longer represent the 
amorphousness of the labour market (Evans and Tilley 2017; Wright 2015). However, this 
does not necessarily imply that class voting is no longer relevant. The shrinking sheer size of 
the working class simultaneously saw the emergence of a new middle class (Kriesi 1998). 
Thus, class voting might have not necessarily declined, but rather social classes transformed, 
and a redefinition is needed to understand the new version of the class cleavage voting (Oesch 
2006b)6. To reflect that change, a new strain of literature has followed a more ‘Weberian’ 
approach to the definition of social class, i.e. focused on labour market relations (see 
Connelly et al. 2016).7  
Similarly to the traditional class cleavage, religious affiliation has been argued to have 
become “a less important guide for political choices” due to a process of “secularization and 
individualisation” (Evans and Graaf 2013: 5). Although religion in itself seems to have taken 
a back seat in the structure of political conflict, most literature still refers to the ‘cultural’ 
                                               
6 In that sense, Inglehart and Flanagan’s (1987: 1297) argument that “the rise of postmaterialistic issues […] tends to 
neutralize political polarization based on social class” is somewhat misconceived. For Inglehart, a new ‘value 
cleavage’ had replaced traditional cleavage structures since the end of World War II (Inglehart 1997, 1990, 2015). Yet, 
this new ‘value cleavage’ might have not necessarily replaced the class cleavage but simply overlapped with a 
transforming class structure. 
7 Several works have focused on the empirical relation between voting behaviour and this new type of social class in what 
could be qualified as a renaissance of class voting (see Oesch 2012; Oesch and Rennwald 2017; Rennwald and Evans 
2014). 
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cleavage as the fundamental driver of the contemporary structure of conflict, which is not 
independent from the historical role of religion. As Rovny and Polk (2014) suggest, the socio-
cultural dimension is in fact intrinsically linked to the historical legacies of the religious 
conflict in Europe. Yet, the content of the cultural dimension is no longer solely composed of 
the religious issue but with issues that derive from the most important process that reshaped 
party conflict in the last decades: globalisation. 
While the formation and stabilisation of cleavages described by Rokkan had a lot to 
do with the nation-building process and the nationalisation of politics, much of the 
contemporary literature on cleavages is concerned with the impact of globalisation in opening 
up a new cultural dimension of conflict8. Several authors have theoretically argued and 
showed empirically the emergence of this new cultural cleavage (e.g. Inglehart 1997; 
Kitschelt 1988). Kriesi et al. (2006, 2008, 2012) identify two waves of transformation that 
reshaped North-European party systems – a first wave led by the new left in the 1970s and 
early 1980s, and a second wave driven by the PRR since the 1990s. The new left advocated 
for the protection of the environment, the free choice of lifestyles and other universalistic 
values (e.g., della Porta and Rucht 1991; Kitschelt 1988). The PRR, by contrast, focused on 
immigration and European integration (see Hutter et al. 2016; Hooghe et al. 2002) as threats 
to the homogenous nation-state to be confronted. These two new families of parties would 
occupy opposing spaces in a new cultural dimension (integration-demarcation) that Kriesi et 
al. argue that coexists with a ‘classical’ economic dimension concerning the traditional 
socialist (more redistribution) vs capitalist (more market) dimension. As already pointed out 
by Kriesi (2010: 683), this cultural cleavage has received several names in the literature. 
                                               
8 Paradoxically, while the process of ‘denationalisation’ is argued to be the key driver of this new ‘critical juncture’, “the 
political reactions to […] globalisation are bound to manifest themselves above all at the national level.” (Kriesi et al. 
2008: 3). Thus, while globalisation may very well be the key driver of change in contemporary European societies, the 
conflict itself is integrated into national politics. 
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Hooghe et al. (2002), Marks et al. (2006) called it the ‘new political dimension’, referring to 
the two pols as GAL (Green, Alternative, Libertarian) and TAN (Traditional, Authoritarian, 
Nationalist). Moreover, Bornschier (2010) refers to it as the ‘libertarian-universalistic / 
traditionalist-communitarian cleavage’. Beramendi et al. (2015a) call it the ‘universalism vs 
particularism’ division. 
This process is, however, by no means homogeneous. Although this general 
framework seems to accurately depict the transformations across several western European 
countries, it far from captures the recent transformations across all European countries. In 
fact, most of the above-mentioned literature has focused exclusively on NWE countries. The 
transformations in post-communist countries in CEE (Kitschelt 1995; Marks et al. 2006; see 
Rohrschneider and Whitefield 2012) and SE (Hutter et al. 2018) have undergone different 
transformations altogether. In both of these regions, equivalent transformations (i.e. the two 
waves) did take place in the same way, and as such, did not result in a stable two-dimensional 
structure of conflict. Apart from the belated democratization of CEE and SE countries (with 
the exception of Italy), their party systems were also less institutionalised, arguably producing 
a configuration of parties less rooted in social divides. With the Great Recession (GR) that 
started in 2008, these countries have undergone substantial political and economic 
transformations. Comparative work on the transformations of these three regions argues that, 
while in CEE cultural conflicts —especially related to nationalism— have continued to 
dominate political conflict in rather unstable party systems, changes in SE countries —albeit 
important regional differences— have been dominated by a new dimension of conflict related 
to political renewal and the regeneration of politics (see Chapter 3). 
The transformations of the party systems that took place in the aftermath of the GR in 
2008, suggest that long-term cleavage transformations cannot exclusively account for party 
system change. In the next section I dwell on the concept of a crisis of representation as 
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another approach to understand party system transformations under the impact of an 
economic shock that relates to the dynamics of parties in governments. 
Crisis of Representation and Party System Collapse 
In linking cleavage theory with theories of political realignment, Martin (2000; in Bornschier 
2010: 4) distinguishes between three levels of analysis. The first concerns the “long-term 
evolution of social structure, [in which critical junctures] create structural potentials that 
political actors can mobilize”. The second one —at the intermediate level—, is concerned 
with “the adaptation of the existing structure of conflicts to new potentials, […] and the way 
for the establishment of new links between social groups and political parties. Finally, the last 
level focuses on “everyday politics”, such as corruption scandals, and which “they rarely 
affect the two higher levels of political development.” (Bornschier 2010: 4). So far, the driver 
of party system restructuration discussed above has been that of linking the first and the 
second levels of analysis, that is, how long-term cleavages change the structural potentials of 
conflict that political actors can mobilise. However, this approach can hardly grasp the 
dramatic changes that shook the SE party systems in the aftermath of the GR, where a 
political crisis unfolded alongside the economic crisis. Instead, these transformations might be 
related to another long-term process —and its short-term impact— that concerns the growing 
difficulty of parties in government to effectively represent the demands of the electorate 
during an economic crisis (Mair 2013, 2009). 
Let us begin with the definition and identification of a political crisis or crisis of 
representation, and the link to economic crises. Democratic representation consists of a 
principal-agent relationship between the voters (the principals) and the politicians (the agents) 
that establishes channels for interests to be represented institutionally. Elections are thus the 
mechanism whereby voters put trust in politicians hoping they will defend these interests, 
which might take different forms, such as delivering material advantages (clientelism) or the 
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pursuit of policy programmes (programmatic) (Kitschelt 2000; Kitschelt and Wilkinson 
2007). It is precisely through the failure of these linkages between the electors and parties that 
a crisis of representation occurs and a window of opportunity for new parties opens (Morgan 
2011). From a theoretical standpoint, the failure of linkages between voters and politicians 
will destabilise party competition. But how are we to recognise a crisis of representation?  
Mainwaring (2006) distinguishes two dimensions that constitute a political crisis or 
crisis of representation: an attitudinal dimension, involving citizens’ perceptions; and a 
behavioural dimension, which encompasses ‘actions by citizens rejecting existing 
mechanisms of democratic representation’ (Mainwaring 2006). The attitudinal dimension, 
also referred to as latent political potentials (Kriesi 2015: 3), constitutes the degree to which 
citizens are dissatisfied with the political system and (do not) feel represented by democratic 
institutions. It is therefore an indicator of the extent to which there is fertile ground for a 
political crisis to emerge. The latter only erupts when it is manifested in the behavioural 
dimension ‒ that is, when there is an overt manifestation (Kriesi 2015). The behavioural 
dimension is concerned with the manifestations in both the formal (electoral volatility, 
changes in the party system, emergence of new parties) and informal (protests) political 
arenas. 
But what is it that produces a crisis of representation? As first pointed out by Krastev 
(2002) for the Balkans, and later applied to Southern Europe by Bosco and Verney (2012) —
though it would also apply to several Latin-American cases—, it is the situation of a 
‘democracy without choices’ which produces frustration with the democratic process and 
aggravates the crisis of political representation. This situation is the outcome of what is best 
described by the growing tension that governments face between acting ‘responsible’ versus 
‘responsive’ (Mair 2009), or in other words, in dealing with the gap between democracy and 
efficiency (Scharpf 1999). Under the external constraints of supranational institutions, 
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governments were pressured into adopting a set of fiscal consolidation policies and structural 
reforms with the objective of reducing debt and regaining access to international credit 
markets. Incumbents of all sides of the ideological spectrum introduced these unpopular 
measures to different degrees claiming to act ‘responsibly’ at the cost of being, especially for 
the left, ‘responsive’ to both their constituencies and ideological principles. 
Focusing on the Latin-American experience, Roberts (2013) shows that the 
restructuring of party systems was largely contingent upon the implementation of neoliberal 
market reforms during the regions’ economic shock in the 80s and 90s. The reforms 
introduced, as well as the constraints placed on governments under the so-called Washington 
Consensus, hold suggestive resemblances to the implementation of austerity reforms in 
Southern Europe (Blyth 2013). Roberts distinguishes between three types of critical junctures 
that led to different outcomes: 1) those that aligned party systems programmatically; 2) those 
that dealigned them; and 3) those that had a neutral effect (Roberts 2013: 1436). In the cases 
where the conservative governments implemented reforms with the opposition of the centre-
left, programmatic alignment occurred. This is referred to as a situation of contested 
liberalism. On the contrary, when major political contenders participated in the process of 
market liberalization, that is, when centre-left governments either supported or directly 
introduced reforms in line with the neoliberal orthodoxy, then programmatic dealignment 
occurred, leading to a situation of neoliberal convergence. The dealignment critical junctures, 
thus, would be expected to produce ‘popular resistance […eventually] channelled into 
institutionalized patterns of representation’ (Roberts 2013: 1438). In other words, in those 
countries where centre-left parties partook in the implementation of neoliberal reforms, the 
stability of the party systems is expected to be jeopardized, opening space for protests and 
new populist parties on the left. In those countries where the structure of competition 
remained aligned, it is expected that the conflict over market reforms intensified thus 
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strengthening the position of both main competitors. In a similar fashion, Lupu (2014, 2016) 
fundamentally argues that the situation of neoliberal convergence produces a dilution of the 
brand of the party. It is therefore not the incumbent performance but the blurring of the 
competition of the parties from the left and the right in a context of international economic 
constraints that is responsible for the party breakdown in the region. 
Weather we focus on the EU’s constraints on labour and economic policies in Europe 
or the case of Latin-America’s during the Washington Consensus, the difficulty for parties in 
government to reconcile the preferences of the electorate with the demands of international 
actors (i.e. the so-called the gap between responsibility and responsiveness) is heightened 
during economic crises. This situation arguably destabilises party competition and opens 
structural potentials for the emergence of new parties. There is an important link to be made 
here between the theory of responsibility and responsiveness and theories of international 
political economy, which link it to the process of globalisation. In chapter 9 of The 
Globalisation Paradox, Dani Rodrik (2013) presents a framework to understand the tensions 
that stem from a globalising economy which he calls The Political Trilemma of the World 
Economy (2013: 201). The global economy, according to Rodrick, can be simplified with a 
model dictating a set of impossibilities represented by three poles: 1) deep economic 
integration (or Hyperglobalisation), 2) nation state and 3) democratic politics. Any of these 
two combinations can go together excluding the third option. Thus, global economic 
integration can be integrated with national sovereignty at the cost of democracy, while 
combining democratic politics and national sovereignty would result in giving up global 
financial integration. 
Peter Mair’s work on the growing gap between responsibility and responsiveness 
complements well with this theory to explain why a crisis of representation unfolds. 
Essentially, in times of economic turmoil, the incompatibilities between satisfying the 
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requirements to remain integrated in the global world economy and the demands that would 
satisfy national interests become more accentuated, forcing political parties to adopt one or 
the other. It is no surprise that this situation is particularly accentuated in southern Europe 
where the crisis hit hardest. In these countries, the reforms by the EU pursued an economic 
integration agenda, pushing governments to introduce unpopular reforms and cuts in the 
welfare systems. These neoliberal reforms targeted at efficient economic integration, thus, 
would pursue the economic integration and nation-state duet at the cost of democratic politics 
in Rodrick’s trilemma, and in words of Peter Mair, the parties supporting this strategy would 
be acting responsible towards a set of external actors that would come at the cost of 
responsiveness, or democratic politics. Matthijns (2017) introduces this very framework 
applied to the EMU’s context to understand the political changes in Southern Europe. 
The new parties that benefit from the widening gap between satisfying the interests of 
the external actors and national interests claim that they will be responsive to the “people” as 
opposed to “responsible” to the external, undemocratic, actors. This is, in fact, the key driver 
of a second fundamental process of the transformation of European politics: populism. 
Although often attached to specific cultural issues or values such as anti-immigration, 
national attachment, or opposition to European integration, populism is independent from 
specific issues and is merely concerned with the representativeness gap that emerges from 
party’s incapacity to alleviate the growing constraints placed on governing actors. While this 
process is often framed as a new phenomenon, Dahl’s (1956) Preface to Democratic Theory 
(see also Dahl 2000) already introduced two models of democracy that reside at the core of 
these transformations, namely the populist and Madisonian (or liberal) types or visions of 
democracy. In a context where voters do no longer feel attached to the available political 
choices, the populist version of democracy is bound to be picked up by a new challenger. 
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To summarize, while the transformations in both the NWE party system and SE are 
ultimately linked to globalization and its constraints, the mechanisms and the reasons for 
these transformations are fundamentally different. In essence, PRR parties emerging in the 
80s in NWE respond to a long-term process of transformation of cleavage structures with the 
emergence of a new value divide (and its opposition). Globalisation would have created 
‘winners’ and ‘losers’, eventually taking the shape of a cultural divide in the political supply. 
These parties would have progressively ‘creeped’ into the party systems by exploiting the 
new divide. The story for the populist left parties and the link to globalisation in SE is, 
however, different9. Instead, these parties are the product of the constraints placed on party 
competition during times of economic hardship. The role of globalisation, in this case, is not 
that of having created new social divisions, but that of having heightened the responsiveness-
responsibility gap, opening a structural potential for new parties with a populist discourse. 
The next chapter looks at the economic and political origins and consequences of the Great 
Recession in Greece and Spain in comparative perspective as two illustrative examples. 
                                               
9 The impact of an exogenous shock such as the Great Recession on politics is largely contingent upon a wide array of 
variables and factors on the national level and on the interaction dynamics between the context and the actors, which 
makes the outcomes of the crisis different at the country level. However, there are some common patterns discussed in 
the remainder of the dissertation that are, for the time being, set apart for the sake of simplicity. 
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Chapter 2.  From Boom to Bust: A Comparative 
Analysis of Greece and Spain under Austerity 
Introduction 
The economic crisis in Greece has been mirrored by a crisis of the political system: not only 
has Greece experienced five elections in six years, but in addition a technocratic government 
was installed for six months and the traditionally bipartisan party system underwent a major 
transformation. Although the economic crisis has been the deepest in Greece, it has also 
reshaped political competition in other crisis-ridden countries. In Italy a technocratic 
government under the leadership of Mario Monti replaced the Berlusconi government in 
November 2011 and the political establishment has been undermined by the rise of the 
populist Five Star Movement in the past few years. In Portugal, the Left Block obtained an 
unprecedented 10 percent of the vote-share in the 2015 elections and anti-austerity parties 
were able to form a coalition government.10 Even in Ireland, which is often viewed as a poster 
child for austerity, the populist party Sinn Fein dramatically gained in popularity and led large 
protests in 2014 and 2015 against new municipal water charges. Finally, in Spain, large-scale 
protests have also swept across the country in response to the economic crisis. Two new 
parties, Podemos and Ciudadanos, have dramatically gained popular support, uprooting the 
previously stable bipartisan party system. 
However, in the context of the economic turmoil in the eurozone, the political 
transformations in Greece and the other crisis-ridden countries are still ill understood (Hopkin 
2015: 163). To analyse these transformations more rigorously, we compare the experiences of 
living under austerity in Greece and in Spain because of the many similarities between the 
                                               
10 Austerity is defined as the reduction in government spending during hard economic times. 
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two countries. In both Greece and Spain, the introduction of the euro caused a large inflow of 
foreign credit, which left both countries vulnerable to external forces when the financial crisis 
created a sudden stop of liquidity. The economic conditions for the crisis, however, were 
mediated by the political context. Importantly, both countries suffered from institutional 
degradation (Royo 2014) in the pre-crisis years and governments and regulators failed to 
prevent the pre-crisis boom. Because clientelism and corruption allowed the Greek and 
Spanish elites to benefit disproportionately from the boom, these same elites had no incentive 
to lean against the wind and prevent economic imbalances. The windfalls from European 
integration tempered the political dysfunctionalities in Greece and Spain, but the drying up of 
foreign resources meant that the state could no longer buy off its citizens with high economic 
growth. Consequently, a collapse of the political order followed the collapse of the economic 
order. Widespread dissatisfaction with the political system and a decline in support for 
traditional parties presented an opportunity for new challengers. Yet, the new challengers that 
emerged in both countries, and the resulting changes in the party system, were different. We 
compare Greece and Spain according to the logic of the most similar system design to shed 
light on these differences. 
 We argue that the political transformations cannot be understood independently of the 
social and political dynamics behind the crisis. In other words, we attempt to link the 
consequences of the crisis to the political context of the countries in question and argue that 
these political contexts before the crisis not only contributed to the economic crisis, but also 
structured the political consequences. Moreover, we show that the imposition of austerity 
from the Troika (the International Monetary Fund [IMF], the European Commission, and the 
European Central Bank [ECB]) was a lot harsher and more closely monitored in Greece than 
in Spain. As a result, the conflict between Greece and its creditors over austerity 
overshadowed all other political conflicts. This allowed traditional political forces to remain 
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at the heart of the political crisis in Greece: while New Democracy (ND) remained the right-
wing pillar of the bipolar party system, Coalition of the Radical Left (SYRIZA), the main 
challenger party, eventually became an ideological purifier on the left that replaced the former 
centre-left Panhellenic Socialist Movement (PASOK). In contrast, in Spain the new 
challenger parties also tapped into the opposition to austerity and dissatisfaction with the 
functioning of national democracy, but less so toward the European Union (EU). Most 
importantly, however, these challenger parties have recurrently emphasized their 
distinctiveness from the previous political order. Although the pro-versus anti-austerity 
conflict came to dominate politics in Greece, we argue that the division between old and new 
politics is key for understanding the evolution of political contestation in Spain. 
 The chapter proceeds in four steps. In the first section we analyse the economic and 
political context out of which the crisis emerged in Greece and Spain. For this purpose, we 
review the dominant economic explanation for the crisis and show how the political and 
economic context contributed to unsustainable economic developments in both countries. 
Next, we compare the crisis dynamics in both countries. For this purpose, we analyse the 
austerity measures that have been implemented in response to the crisis in Greece and Spain 
and assess the economic consequences. We show that Greece had to endure a lot more 
austerity than Spain, which is important in order to understand the diverging political 
consequences. In the third section, we build on this insight to analyse these political 
consequences of the economic crisis. Distinguishing between a behavioural and attitudinal 
dimension of the political crisis, we show that there are important similarities in Greece and 
Spain but that the consequences of economic meltdown have been conditioned by the 
domestic political context and the crisis dynamics in both countries. In the final section we 
outline the implications of our argument. 
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The Origins of the Crisis in Greece and Spain 
The Economic Origins of the Crisis 
The economic origins of the crisis in Southern Europe have been analysed in-depth. The story 
usually starts with the adoption of the euro; the euro was criticized at its inception for forcing 
diverse national economies into a currency union, thus making economic management 
difficult (e.g., Bayoumi and Eichengreen 1997; for reviews see De Grauwe 2012; Jonung et 
al. 2009). These problems became obvious at the turn of the century when the German 
economy was struggling and the Economist (Anon 1999) famously called Germany the “sick 
man of the Euro,” while other countries in the eurozone were booming. In response to this 
asymmetry of European business cycles, the ECB conducted a monetary policy that was 
appropriate neither for the German core nor for the booming periphery (De Grauwe and Ji 
2014). It created pressures for divergence within the eurozone and helped to build up large 
current account imbalances. Large export surpluses in the North were offset by deficits in the 
South, which were financed by credit that the North granted to the South (Hall 2012). The 
result was a large inflow of credit into both Greece and Spain, which increased the liabilities 
of both countries vis-à-vis non-residents (as represented by the financial account in figure 
2.1). 
In Greece the government mostly used this inflow of credit as an opportunity to expand 
government expenditure by borrowing from domestic and foreign banks. This was possible 
because financial markets had repriced Southern European sovereign bonds and, hence, it 
became a lot cheaper for the Greek government to issue debt. For several consecutive years 
the government ran large fiscal deficits, increasing the amount of sovereign debt to 117.5 
percent of GDP in 2009. But contrary to popular perceptions, this did not happen in Spain, 
where government debt remained relatively low. Instead, the ready availability of credit 
allowed the private sector to go on a spending binge: domestic banks leveraged their balance 
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sheets by borrowing money from Northern European banks to finance a mix of real estate 
development and consumption in the early 2000s. This led to a huge boom in the Spanish 
construction sector similar to that in Ireland (Eichengreen 2012), which was also evident in 
employment figures: more than a fifth of all Greek employees worked in the public sector, but 
the Spanish construction sector employed nearly every fourth male employee (Fernández-
Villaverde et al. 2013). In other words, unlike the Greek growth model, which was built on an 
expansion of the public sector, the Spanish growth model was built on an expansion of the 
construction sector. 
Figure 2.1 Financial Account as a pct. of GDP of Germany, Greece, and Spain, 2000–16 
 
Source: IMF 2017. 
 
Nevertheless, the consequences were similar. The large inflow of foreign capital left both 
countries exposed to an external shock. This external shock came in September 2008, when 
the financial conglomerate Lehman Brothers collapsed in the US. The global credit crunch led 
to a flight to safety and a sudden stop of liquidity in Greece and Spain, which resulted in a 
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the construction sector in Spain burst and Greece struggled to finance its deficit on the capital 
markets. As investors lost trust in the ability of the Greek government to service its debt, the 
country had to turn to the EU and the IMF for bailouts in 2010, 2012, and 2015. Similarly, 
eventually the Spanish government could not control the crisis and, on behalf of its banks, it 
also applied for a bailout in 2012. 
The Political Origins of the Economic Crisis in Spain and Greece 
The comparison between Spain and Greece shows that the economic origins of the crisis in 
Greece were, indeed, systemic. Although the details are different, the economic crisis played 
out in a similar manner in both countries. With the benefit of hindsight, it is, therefore, easy to 
argue that there were structural problems with the eurozone (Eichengreen 2012). Yet, this 
begs the question why politicians and regulators allowed the structural problems to persist in 
the run-up to the crisis. Much of the existing literature focuses on the economic and financial 
origins of the crisis and largely ignores the political and social foundation of markets (Polanyi 
2001 [1944]). But in order to understand the consequences of the economic meltdown, we 
need a comprehensive understanding of the crisis, which includes the social and political 
dynamics behind it. 
Matthijs and Blyth (2015) have come a long way in addressing this shortcoming of the 
literature. They focus on the transnational bargains that are at the heart of the euro and argue 
effectively that the euro’s lack of embeddedness in proper European institutions is at the heart 
of the current crisis: not only did the euro lack a proper financial and fiscal union, but it also 
lacked a political union that could create democratic legitimacy. However, on the domestic 
levels these institutions existed. For example, the member-states of the eurozone possessed 
the necessary tools to regulate the banking sector, as Hansen and Gordon (2014) point out. 
Why did they not use them? 
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 In the absence of effective European institutions, the burden to counteract the growing 
imbalances in Europe was on domestic institutions. Yet, this burden was placed largely on the 
shoulders of countries that were least able to do it. First, Greece and Spain both have a weakly 
institutionalized party system. As democratic latecomers, the party systems were formed 
when the level of socioeconomic development had already been relatively high (Hopkin 
2001b); consequently, the party systems are weakly anchored in civil society. As a response, 
parties formed a cartel to obtain resources from the state (Katz and Mair 1995, 2009), which 
they did “either through mass party clientelism and corrupt use of public office to raise 
money, or through the state funding of parties” (Hopkin 2002: 10). This weakened the 
patterns of partisanship even further and contributed to the prevalence of informal politics in 
Southern Europe. 
 In Greece two parties dominated the political system before the electoral crisis: ND 
and PASOK. ND governed Greece’s young democracy in the 1970s, until PASOK came to 
power with a landslide victory in 1981. Initially PASOK supported radical left-wing policies, 
including an exit from the European Economic Community, but quickly the party renounced 
its most extreme positions and shifted toward the centre. In programmatic terms, some 
differences between ND and PASOK continued to exist, but they paled in comparison to the 
way these two parties conducted themselves when they were in power: both parties used the 
state resources to give out favours in return for electoral support (Featherstone 2011). As a 
result, both parties welcomed the cheap access to credit following eurozone membership. Real 
government consumption increased by nearly 30 percent from 1995 to 2003, when PASOK 
was in power, and increased by 17 percent from 2004 to 2009, when ND was in power. 
Consequently, it was not in the interest of Greek politicians to prevent the increasing 
imbalances in the Greek economy in the early 2000s. Rather, they fed off them and used them 
to entrench their position in society. 
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In Spain the government did not play the same role and the situation is less clear-cut. 
In fact, the notion of a clientelistic Southern model should be treated with caution. For 
instance, Hopkin (2001a) finds little evidence of extensive clientelistic mobilization in Spain, 
whereas Lyrintzis (Lyrintzis 1984: 101) argues that “clientelism was the major characteristic 
of Greek political parties”. Still, there is clear evidence of crony capitalism in Spain, much of 
which was revealed after the outburst of the crisis (Royo 2014: 1574). Contrary to the 
situation in Greece, where the clientelistic networks were mostly centralized at the national 
level, the regional and local authorities played a more important role in the case of Spain after 
the administrative and political decentralization in the early 2000s (Hopkin 2012). Eventually, 
the political decentralization “led to the emergence of regional, local elites that took over the 
local and regional institutions. This included the cajas, whose boards were quickly filled with 
political appointees who used their position for their own personal gain and/or as a clientelist 
instrument to finance their projects” (Royo 2014: 1574).11 The rapid expansion of the 
construction sector facilitated by privatization processes increased the opportunities for 
favouritism, mostly at the regional and local levels.12 Most importantly, the distribution of 
public contracts for infrastructure projects allowed politicians to generate financial and public 
resources. 
 Although initially parties tried to blame individual politicians for this behaviour, the 
problem was more endemic. Molinas (2012, 2013) argues that an extractive political class had 
developed in Spain due to institutional arrangements that had been agreed to during the 
                                               
11. Cajas are Spanish savings banks. Many of them were involved in financing the real estate booms and, as a consequence of 
the crisis, had to be rescued by government bailouts. 
12. This process was even supported by the benefits of membership in the European Monetary Union. Funds from the EU’s 
Convergence and Cohesion Funds allowed the public sector to finance new railway stations, highways and airports 
across the country (Hopkin 2012). It is also important to note that while the construction sector also experienced some 
growth in Greece, the value added of the construction sector paled in comparison to that of Ireland and Spain (see 
Giavazzi and Spaventa 2011: 213). 
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transition to democracy. For instance, proportional representation and blocked party lists 
consolidated a weakly institutionalized party system, which the political class used to collude 
with economic elites to extract resources from society. As in Greece, they formed a powerful 
set of interests that could resist reforms that would have prevented the increasing economic 
problems. 
 As Royo (2014) argues, however, the problem was not one of extractive elites only. 
Instead, other vested interests prevented the government from pursuing reforms that would 
have reduced the dependency of Greece and Spain on foreign credit. Importantly, the benefits 
of the welfare state across most of Southern Europe are geared toward providing benefits to 
particular political constituencies (Ferrera 1996, 2005; Rhodes 1997). As Beramendi et al. 
(2015b: 395) show, the Southern European welfare states are characterized by weak social 
investment policies and “particularistic, often residual and regressive social policies of 
consumption.” In particular, the pension systems are expensive due to high replacement rates, 
and high employment protection legislation has contributed to a dualized labour market 
pitting organized insiders against an increasing number of outsiders, who do not benefit from 
this legislation (Rueda 2007). Before the crisis this created an institutional bias against 
reform: vested interests had captured the welfare state and were unwilling to forgo these 
benefits. 
 The protection of insiders came at the expense of the outsiders, but the economic 
windfalls from European integration helped to taper the tensions and insulated elites from 
political pressures for reforms. In other words, there was a vicious cycle: the existing 
institutional power structure created unsustainable economic growth, which in turn 
entrenched the institutional power structure further. This power structure not only contributed 
to the crisis, but also determined how the economic crisis played out in the two countries. 
Despite the similarities in the economic and political origins of the crisis, we argue in the next 
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sections that the diverging political outcomes of these two countries are rooted in the way the 
dynamics of the crisis interplayed with pre-existing structures, thus allowing for a better 
understanding of the diverging fates of both countries. 
Crisis Dynamics in Greece and Spain 
The Economic Response to the Crisis in Spain and Greece 
Although the symptoms of the crisis were different in both countries, international 
policymakers prescribed the same medicine. Building on the idea of expansionary fiscal 
contraction (Alesina and Ardagna 2010; Alesina and Perotti 1997), the creditors insisted on 
structural reforms combined with a sharp reduction of government spending. With respect to 
Spain, this was a fundamental misdiagnosis of the crisis because the Spanish crisis was not 
caused by government profligacy (De Grauwe 2013). However, creditors viewed Spain 
through the prism of Greece and condemned both countries to austerity.13 
A detailed analysis of the memorandums of understanding (MoU) in Greece and Spain 
is beyond the scope of this chapter, but it is useful to briefly compare them on a number of 
dimensions in order to understand their impact. In both countries, the international creditors 
pushed for austerity and structural reforms. Still, the Greek and Spanish governments had 
already implemented reforms before they signed the MoUs. Greece came under pressure after 
the newly elected prime minister, Papandreou, revealed in October 2009 that the budget 
deficit would be a lot higher than previously predicted. Hence, financial markets became 
nervous and the credit rating agency Fitch Ratings first downgraded Greece on 8 December 
2009 from A– to BBB+ (Oakley 2009).14 Bowing to the pressure of the markets, Greece 
                                               
13. For an account of the origins of austerity as an idea, see Blyth (2013).  
14. This was the first time in a decade that Greece did not have an A rating and reflected the worry in the financial markets 
about the sustainability of the Greek debt.  
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announced a first set of austerity measurements in February and March 2010 even before the 
government signed the MoU on 3 May 2010. In the hope of regaining the confidence of 
investors, these measures included, for instance, an increase of the value-added tax (VAT), a 
recruitment freeze in the public sector, and cuts to government expenditure. In the absence of 
a credible commitment from a lender of last resort, however, these measures could not restore 
the confidence of investors. 
 Similarly, Spain reacted to the pressure of financial markets before the official bailout. 
In response to the 2008 financial crisis, the government had initially pursued a stimulus 
program; in 2011 the worst seemed over, when the Spanish economy grew again. However, 
the domestic banks were crippled by many nonperforming loans on their balance sheets, 
which forced the government to bail them out. In combination with the costs of the initial 
stimulus program, this increased the government’s deficit and debt burden. In the context of 
the Greek crisis, international financial markets became increasingly worried about the size of 
the government’s budget deficit and, starting in May 2010, Fitch downgraded Spain six times 
until the country lost its A rating in June 2012. Spain introduced austerity measures in 2010 
and 2011 to regain the trust of financial markets well before the government agreed to the 
MoU on 27 July 2012. In 2011, the Spanish Socialist Workers’ Party (PSOE) and the 
conservative People’s Party (PP) even amended the Spanish constitution requiring 
governments to cap deficits at 0.4 percent of GDP from 2020 onward (Tremlett 2011). 
The contents of the programs introduced to combat the crisis were also similar in both 
countries. In Greece, for example, the terms of the first bailout included cuts in public sector 
pay, additional increases in VAT and other taxes, as well as a limit on public investment and 
expenditure. In 2010 alone, the aim was to generate savings for a total amount of 2.5 percent 
of GDP, and by 2014 the fiscal deficit was supposed to be reduced from 13.6 to below 3 
percent of GDP (IMF 2010). Similarly, in Spain, in June 2012 Prime Minister Rajoy 
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announced spending cuts and tax increases worth 65 billion euro (Tremlett 2012); as in 
Greece, these measures included areas like health care and education. The government also 
committed itself to increasing taxes and reducing government investment and expenditure, for 
example by a freeze on the pay of government employees. Moreover, in both countries, 
austerity measures were combined with structural adjustment programs. The Greek 
government committed itself to liberalizing closed professions and reducing employment 
protection; over the years the creditors demanded that the Greek government intensify this 
program by abandoning the central wage bargaining system, dismissing 15,000 government 
employees, and introducing a large privatization program. The Spanish government also 
implemented a labour reform in February 2012 that made it easier to lay off workers and 
weakened the collective bargaining system. Additionally, the government pursued other 
reforms that resembled those in Greece, including cuts in social benefits, a rise in the 
retirement age, and a privatization program to increase government revenue. 
 Despite these similarities between the austerity programs in Greece and Spain, there 
are also important differences. First, Spain’s austerity program was shorter. Greece has 
remained in the spotlight of the crisis ever since October 2009 and it first implemented 
austerity measures in spring 2010. As the economic recession worsened, Greece was forced to 
pursue several additional reform programs. In 2012 and 2015 it promised reforms in return for 
new bailouts; even in between the MoUs, the Greek government implemented additional 
austerity packages to satisfy the demands of the creditors. Spain also pursued initial reforms 
in 2010 and 2011, but most measures were announced only in 2012, after the economy had 
slid back into recession. Most importantly, Spain became the second country in the eurozone 
to exit the bailout program again in January 2014, while an end to the Greek program is not in 
sight. 
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 Second, international creditors arguably put a lot more pressure on Greece to pursue 
austerity than on Spain. On the insistence of the German government, the IMF was closely 
involved in the negotiations of the Greek bail-out and its implementation. Officials from the 
IMF joined policymakers from the European Commission and the ECB to form the Troika, 
and delegates from the three institutions set up camp in Athens and became regular visitors in 
Greek ministries. Their presence there increasingly constrained consecutive governments, 
while they were a lot less influential and visible in Madrid. Moreover, the ECB was reluctant 
to act as a lender of last resort in response to the Greek crisis in 2010. Only when the crisis 
had fully reached Spain (and Italy) in 2012 did the ECB change its approach. Fearing an 
implosion of the euro, ECB president Mario Draghi famously promised to do ‘whatever it 
takes’ to preserve the euro in July 2012. This change of course was more successful in 
regaining the confidence of investors than any set of austerity measures could have been: 
within days, the borrowing costs of Spain and Greece decreased. Hence, Draghi’s 
announcement came just in time to take some pressure off the Spanish government by 
reducing the borrowing costs of the crisis countries and by supporting their ailing banking 
sectors. 
 Third, the austerity program pursued by the Spanish government was less severe than 
the program pursued by Greece. Although a comparison between the size of different 
austerity packages is difficult, the structural balance can be used as a proxy because it 
excludes the impact of the economic cycle (e.g., through automatic stabilizers) and one-off 
measures (e.g., the sale of mobile phone licenses) on the government’s budget balance. Using 
this measurement as a basis for comparison, Greece’s balance improved by 20.3 percentage 
points from 2009 to 2014, while the structural balance in Spain improved by 8.6 percentage 
points over the same period. This indicates that Greece pursued a great deal more austerity 
than Spain—in fact, Greece had to endure the deepest austerity package of all crisis-ridden 
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countries according to this measurement. Although austerity programs created large economic 
dislocations in both countries, the consequences of the economic crisis were particularly harsh 
in Greece, reaching an unprecedented severity in modern times. 
The Economic Consequences of the Crisis in Spain and Greece 
Greece experienced by far the deepest economic downturn of all countries in Europe. It was 
in recession from 2008 to 2013, when real GDP fell by 26.0 percent. In contrast, Spain had a 
relatively strong recovery after the global financial meltdown had dragged it into an economic 
slump from 2008 to 2010. In 2012, however, Spain slipped back into recession, and overall 
Spanish real GDP fell by 7.3 percent from 2008 to 2013. This fall in economic activity in 
Greece and Spain created similar levels of unemployment in both countries (figure 2.2a) but 
unemployment before the crisis was higher in Spain than in Greece. In Greece unemployment 
increased from 7.2 percent in July 2008 to its peak of 27.9 percent in January 2014. In Spain, 
it increased from 11.2 percent to 25.9 percent over the same period. These levels of 
unemployment not only were dramatically higher than in Northern Europe, but they were also 
a lot higher than in the rest of the crisis-ridden South. Still, the true damage of unemployment 
is evident from the high levels of youth unemployment: in both countries, the share of 
unemployed under the age of twenty-five tripled between 2007 and 2013 (figure 2.2b), 
reaching 60 percent in Greece and 56.9 percent in Spain. Consequently, the crisis hit some of 
the most vulnerable people in society because young labour market participants and low-
skilled workers were the first ones to lose their jobs. 
However, even many people who retained their jobs were a lot worse off because of 
the crisis. On average, the wages of employees fell in both Greece and Spain. In Greece this 
fall was particularly steep: from 2009 to 2014, the average real wage fell by nearly 24 percent 
in Greece, while the average annual real wage fell by 7 percent in Spain. This contributed to a 
low level of domestic consumption, but it also increased poverty and social exclusion. In 
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2014, 36 percent and 29 percent of the entire population was at risk of poverty or social 
exclusion in Greece and Spain, respectively. Compared to 2007 this figure increased by more 
than 25 percent in both countries and, consequently, inequality also increased during the crisis 
according to various measures. While the Gini coefficient rose from 33.4 in 2008 to 34.5 in 
2014 in Greece, it rose from 31.9 in 2008 to 34.7 in 2014 in Spain (table 2.1). Similarly, the 
income of workers at the ninetieth percentile (individuals earning more than the bottom 90% 
of the population) compared to the earning of workers at the tenth percentile (individuals 
earning higher than the bottom 10 percent) increased in Greece and Spain by 20 and 18 
percent, respectively. 
Figure 2.2 Unemployment Rate in Germany, Greece, and Spain, 2000–16 
 
Source: Eurostat 2017a 
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Hence, the social dislocations of the crisis have been large in both countries and the pains of 
the economic adjustment were not shared equally across society. The crisis produced a large 
group of people who were left unemployed, received few social benefits, and suffered from 
the decreasing quality of public services in health and education (Matthijs 2014). At the same 
time, austerity policies have not even had the desired effect on government finances. In both 
countries the government debt in 2015 was significantly larger than at the beginning of the 
crisis, and the deficits remained outside the 3 percent limit specified by the Stability and 
Growth Pact. 
Table 2.1 Gini Coefficient in Germany, Greece, and Spain, 2005–16 
Year Germany Greece Spain 
2005 26.1 33.2 32.2 
2006 26.8 34.3 31.9 
2007 30.4 34.3 31.9 
2008 30.2 33.4 31.9 
2009 29.1 33.1 32.9 
2010 29.3 32.9 33.5 
2011 29.0 33.5 34.0 
2012 28.3 34.3 34.2 
2013 29.7 34.4 33.7 
2014 30.7 34.5 34.7 
2015 30.1 34.2 34.6 
2016  34.3 34.5 
Source: Eurostat 2017b. 
The data for Greece and Spain supports this conclusion. Even though the fall in GDP was a 
lot farther in Greece compared to Spain and any other European country, Greece is no 
exception when it comes to results of the attempted economic reforms. While Spain has fared 
better than Greece during the crisis, it is no poster child for austerity either.15 In fact, a 
comparison with Greece needs to consider not only that the original crisis in Greece was a lot 
                                               
15. In the wake of the Greek referendum, many commentators have claimed that austerity has worked elsewhere. For 
example, the Council of Economic Experts in Germany claimed, “Ireland, Portugal, and Spain all successfully 
completed their program [and that] the economic situation has markedly improved” (Bofinger et al. 2015: 1). 
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deeper than the crisis in Spain, but also that the path of adjustment was a lot more difficult for 
Greece due to a more ambitious reform program, as shown above. Moreover, politicians and 
commentators have consistently and deliberately overstated the positive trajectory of Spain,16 
but the average citizen still feels the hangover after the party, as we show below. 
The Political Consequences of the Economic Crisis 
The Attitudinal Dimension: A Widespread Political Malaise? 
It is no surprise that an economic shock with such social repercussions triggered extraordinary 
political reactions. These reactions were expressed in both attitudinal (lack of confidence in 
political institutions and the political system) and behavioural (protests, electoral volatility 
and collapse of party systems) dimensions (Kriesi 2015). For the first dimension, indicators of 
political trust toward the key representative national and European political institutions, as 
well as those of the levels of satisfaction with democracy, are particularly revealing. Since the 
beginning of the economic crisis in September 2008, as marked by the vertical dotted line in 
our figures, these indicators followed a remarkably similar pattern in both countries. The 
average of satisfaction with the way democracy works in the national country and in the EU 
(figure 2.3) decreased substantially after 2008 in both Greece and Spain, reaching some of the 
lowest levels recorded since the transition to democracy in both countries.17 
                                               
16. Fearing punishment from voters and capital markets, politicians have done this deliberately. For instance, Prime Minister 
Rajoy claimed in a state of the union address, “Spain has passed from being a country on the brink of bankruptcy to a 
model of recovery that provides an example to other countries in the EU” (Buck 2015).  
17. Respondents were asked the following two questions: “On the whole, are you very satisfied, fairly satisfied, not very 
satisfied or not at all satisfied with the way democracy works in (OUR COUNTRY)?” and “How about the way 
democracy works in the EU?” We recoded the answer categories, which now range from four to one: 4 = “Very 
satisfied”; 3 = “Fairly satisfied”; 2 = “Not very satisfied”; 1 = “Not at all satisfied.”  
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Mistrust toward the national government, parliament, and political parties (figure 2.4), 
followed an almost identical trend.18 Although in both countries mistrust toward political 
parties had been considerably lower than toward parliament and government before the crisis, 
we observe that the levels converged to another historical low during the crisis. Compared to 
the levels of trust toward government and parliament prior to 2008, the decrease is nothing 
less than spectacular: while more than 50 percent of respondents trusted the national 
parliament before the crisis, less than 10 percent of respondents trusted the national 
parliament at the height of the crisis.19 
Figure 2.3 Satisfaction with the European Union and National Democracy, 2000–16 
 
Source: European Commission 2016. 
 
                                               
18. Respondents were asked the following question: “I would like to ask you a question about how much trust you have in 
certain institutions. For each of the following institutions, please tell me if you tend to trust it or tend not to trust it.” 
We recoded the answer categories, which now range from zero to one: 1 = “Tend to trust”; 2 = “Tend not to trust.”  
19. The recovery of trust in 2015 in the case of Greece is likely due to the victory of SYRIZA in the January legislative 
elections of 2015. As part of the classic reward-punish mechanisms in democracies, elections tend to momentarily 
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European political institutions also did not go unpunished: figure 2.5 illustrates that European 
institutions suffered the largest average drop in trust in Greece and Spain compared to all 
other institutions. In 2015 there was a slight recovery in these attitudes, but the average levels 
in both countries remain far from the averages prior to the crisis. 
Figure 2.4 Trust in National Institutions, 2000–16 
 
Source: European Commission 2016. 
 
Figure 2.5 Trust in European Institutions, 2000–16 
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Although some studies have shown a strong correlation between the drop of trust in political 
institutions and macroeconomic indicators, particularly with unemployment (Roth et al. 
2013), the widespread political malaise can hardly be attributed solely to economic 
explanations. Applying the classic literature of economic voting whereby voters punish or 
reward incumbent governments depending on the economic performance, we would expect 
that levels of trust toward the incumbent government would have decreased because citizens 
would blame it for its bad management of the economy. If this were the case, however, trust 
should recover after citizens are given the opportunity to reward or punish political parties for 
their performance in government (Key and Cummings 1966a). However, this is not what we 
observe. Instead, “the cumulated effect of the Great Recession, goes far beyond the short-term 
punishment of incumbents” (Hernández and Kriesi 2016: 221) and mistrust is 
indiscriminately projected toward both national and European political institutions, regardless 
of elections and changes of governments. This suggests that both Greece and Spain suffered a 
far deeper political malaise than simply discontent with the incumbent’s performance that led 
to the collapse of their respective party systems. We argue that, beyond the economy, the 
political consequences of the crisis were related to a feeling of widespread discontent linked 
to the perception of a democracy without choices (Bosco and Verney 2012), in which 
mainstream parties were perceived as lacking a differentiated policy program. 
 The diagnosis is the following: mainstream parties, regardless of their ideology, were 
strongly constrained in economic policy, leading to a situation where voters could not 
perceive any significant programmatic differences between them. In other words, the lack of 
political alternatives that accompanied the austerity programs and reforms triggered 
widespread disenchantment with the political systems of Greece and Spain. As a result, large 
sections of society did not feel politically represented and stopped trusting political 
institutions. More specifically, the neoliberal reforms and welfare cuts implemented by the 
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mainstream left parties (both PASOK and PSOE) under the rhetoric of responsibility resulted 
in a significant loss of credibility insofar as these parties could not offer an alternative to the 
right while in government. Although the dynamics of this situation are described in detail 
later in this section, it is worth noting here that this situation is not the first to take place. The 
introduction of similar neoliberal-oriented reforms produced an analogous distortion of party 
systems in Latin America during the era of the Washington Consensus in the 1980 and 1990s 
(Mainwaring 2006; Roberts 2013): in countries where the left was in government at the time 
of implementing cuts, new left populist parties emerged that challenged the true leftist 
character of the mainstream party. In all these cases, the emergence of the populist left parties 
was closely linked to the protest arena, the other crucial—and intrinsically intertwined—
political dimension of the crisis described in the next section. 
The Behavioural Dimension: From the Streets to the Institutions 
The attitudinal expressions of the political crisis in both Greece and Spain eventually 
translated into a behavioural dimension, which manifested itself in both contentious (protests) 
and conventional (electoral punishment and new parties) politics. In the electoral arena, this 
took the form of a two-step process in both countries, as shown in tables 2.2 and 2.3. In the 
first elections during the crisis, the incumbent lost to the mainstream challenger party (ND to 
PASOK in 2009 and PSOE to PP in 2011). In a second step, new challenger parties gained a 
significant share of the votes (2012 and 2015 in Greece and 2015 in Spain). 
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Table 2.2 Spain General Elections Results, 2008–16 
Party 2008 2011 2015 2016 
PP 39.9 (154) 44.6 (186) 28.7 (123) 33.0 (137) 
PSOE 43.9 (169) 28.7 (110) 22 (90) 22.6 (85) 
IU 3.8 (2) 6.9 (11) 3.7 (2) - 
Podemos - - 20.7 (69) 21.2 (71) 
Ciudadanos - - 13.9 (40) 13.1 (32) 
Turnout (%) 73.4 68.9 69.7 66.5 
Note: Number of seats in parentheses. IU = United Left. 
Source: Spanish ministry of interior 2017 
 
Table 2.3 Greece General Elections Results, 2009–15 
Party 2009 
 2012  2015 
 May June  January September 
ND 33.5 (91)  18.8 (108) 29.6 (129)  27.8 (76) 28.1 (75) 
PASOK 43.9 (160)  13.2 (41) 12.3 (33)  4.7 (13) 6.3 (17) 
SYRIZA 4.6 (13)  16.8 (52) 26.9 (71)  36.3 (149) 35.5 (145) 
KKE 7.5 (21)  8.5 (26) 4.5 (12)  5.5 (15) 5.5 (15) 
XA 0.3 (0)  7 (21) 6.9 (18)  6.3 (17) 7 (18) 
ANEL -  10.6 (33) 7.5 (20)  4.7 (13) 3.7 (10) 
Turnout (%) 70.9  65.1 62.5  63.6 56.6 
Note: Number of seats in parentheses. KKE = Communist Party of Greece; XA = Golden Dawn; ANEL = 
Independent Greeks. 
Source: Greek ministry of interior 2017 
However, while this two-step electoral process was similar in the two countries, there are 
significant differences in the protest dimension of the crisis that are worth stressing. In Spain, 
the mass demonstrations that would give the name to the 15-M movement—and that would 
later trigger similar protest in the United States under the “We are the 99 percent” banner 
(Castañeda 2012)—were initially convened by a small online platform called Democracia 
Real Ya! (Real Democracy Now!) in May 2011. With a simple, direct and nonpartisan 
message, Spanish people mobilized both inside and outside Spain. “We want more 
democracy!,” “We are not commodities of bankers and politicians!,” or “They do not 
represent us!” were some of the slogans that were coined by the movement. The so-called 
Indignados movement could connect with large sections of the population despite (or perhaps 
 - 39 - 
because of) the fact that they refused any involvement with traditionally politicized 
organizations such as labour unions or youth organizations of parties. More than just anti-
austerity protests, the movement had to do with providing “time and space for every 
participant to express themselves and take an active part in the camp and movement 
organization, notably through long group discussions and the creation of commissions and 
working groups around specific issues” (Kaldor and Selchow 2015: 206). 
 The causes of contention that sparked the movement were rooted in the perception that 
an extractive and corrupt elite had governed unaccountably and made the citizens pay for a 
crisis that they had not caused. Whereas austerity was an important mobilizing factor for the 
protests, the movement also repeatedly identified the political structure of the country as one 
of the main problems (Calvo et al. 2011). The idea of new politics grew as an alternative to 
old or traditional politics, which, to the movement, was represented by the extractive 
economic and political elites. At the core of this idea were participatory mechanisms and 
claims for more direct democracy, with the use of the internet and social media being its main 
driver (Hughes 2011). The Indignados movement was, therefore, not solely an anti-austerity 
protest movement, but also a much wider expression of the dissatisfaction with the Spanish 
political system. In fact, it was the inception of this new conflict in Spanish politics that 
would later be expressed with the emergence of new parties like Podemos and even 
Ciudadanos, as explained below. 
 Although the so-called Greek Indignados also played a role in the anti-austerity 
protests from 2010 to 2012, they were neither the only actor nor the most important one. In 
fact, anarchists, social justice groups, educational groups, youth organizations, but especially 
political parties and labour unions (from the private and public sector), were equally if not 
more important—depending on the individual protest—in participating and organizing the 
protests. For instance, the two large trade union confederations, the General Confederation of 
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Greek Workers (GSEE) and the Civil Servants’ Confederation (ADEDY), as well as the 
youth organizations of the Communist Party of Greece (KKE), SYRIZA, and ANTARSYA, 
played a key role in the organization of several major protests in the country (Kanellopoulos 
and Kostopoulos 2014). One of the main differences between the way in which anti-austerity 
protests were organized and developed in Spain and Greece—which is particularly important 
to understand the political consequences and the characteristics of new parties—is precisely 
that the Indignados in Spain “mainly involved young and highly educated people not 
connected with ‘old’ political actors like trade unions and political parties” (Karyotis and 
Rüdig 2015: 496). This difference is central for explaining how these movements translated 
into the conventional political arena and the nature of the new challengers. 
The New Challengers: A Populist Left? 
The strong dissatisfaction with traditional parties and the mobilization in the contentious 
arena opened an exceptional opportunity for new political entrepreneurs to capitalize on the 
political crisis. Social democratic parties in both countries faced an irreconcilable dilemma 
that would ease the emergence of new parties on the left. This dilemma, framed by Mair 
(2009) as responsibility versus responsiveness, describes the situation confronted by both 
PSOE and PASOK. Both had to introduce measures contrary to their ideology—whether 
through changes in the constitution or through the implementation of cuts on welfare—in 
order to behave responsibly and satisfy the demands of the international creditors (Bremer 
2018). This came at the cost of responsiveness to the ideological foundations of these parties. 
In Greece this implied the near disappearance of PASOK, going from 43.9 percent of the vote 
in 2009 to 4.7 percent in 2015. By implementing austerity after its election in 2009, the party 
not only had committed an ideological somersault, but by depleting the resources available to 
distribute, it had also undermined the clientelistic linkages that the party depended on (Afonso 
et al. 2014). SYRIZA benefited the most from this decline of PASOK, going from 4.6 percent 
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in 2009 to winning both elections in 2015 with over 35 percent of the votes. Not only did 
most of SYRIZA’s votes came from PASOK, but in addition even some politicians changed 
affiliation to the new party. As PASOK lost the credibility to stand up to the European 
creditors and to implement a leftist program, SYRIZA became PASOK’s ideological purifier, 
a type of challenger party that is successful when established parties are forced to change their 
position with regard to salient lines of conflict (Lucardie 2000). With a radical leftist and anti-
austerity agenda, the party promised to be responsive toward the electorate by standing up to 
the international creditors’ demands and putting an end to austerity, while at the same time 
combating the domestic oligarchy. Thus, SYRIZA confronted both the domestic and the 
European elites, dubbed as the internal and the external Troika. 
 Similarly, in Spain the initial challenger party that emerged from the Indignados 
movement was Podemos, which became the third-largest party in the 2015 election winning 
nearly 21 percent of the vote. Although both SYRIZA and Podemos have been labelled as 
parties of the new populist left in Southern Europe, and despite the visible links between both 
parties,20 there are significant differences that suggest that they are two different animals. 
Most visibly, SYRIZA was presented as a clear alternative from the left and had a long 
political tradition, despite its weak parliamentary representation in the past. In contrast, 
Podemos was a completely new party, which, in line with the ideas of inclusiveness of the 15-
M movement, shed traditional left-right ideological labels. A more analogous situation would 
have been for the United Left (IU) in Spain, a traditional leftist party with a clear anti-
austerity message, to “purify” PSOE, just as SYRIZA did with PASOK. Why did this not 
happen? Why did it take a new party such as Podemos to capitalize on the emerging protest 
vote? 
                                               
20. On 22 January 2015, for instance, Alexis Tsipras symbolically invited Pablo Iglesias, the leader of Podemos, to the end-
of-campaign meeting before the elections. 
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 The electoral arenas of politics in Greece and Spain were closely influenced by 
developments in the arena of contentious politics. Whereas in Greece the anti-austerity 
discourse was one of the key issues in all the demonstrations (i.e., demands that the rich are 
taxed, social welfare provided, ceasing of privatizations, etc.), which was the political 
territory of the left, this was not so clear in the case of Spain. As explained above, the 
Indignados emerged as an all-encompassing movement that persistently claimed to be 
inclusive to all citizens regardless of their ideology, pursuing the idea of new politics. Thus, 
the issue of new politics, including corruption and the opposition to the domestic political 
system, became salient in Spain in both the contentious and conventional arena of politics, 
while the intervention of external European actors in domestic politics did not play a 
determining role as much in Spain as it did in Greece. In fact, Calvo, Gómez-Pastrana, and 
Mena (2011) show that the most important objectives of the 15-M movement were the fight 
against corruption and the reform of the electoral system. As explained in the previous 
section, this was because the intervention of these external actors became much more 
pronounced in the case of Greece. Therefore, Europe and the enforcement of austerity played 
a smaller role in reshaping the Spanish political system than that of Greece (see also Chapter 
3). 
 The greater importance of domestic renewal over European anti-austerity issues also 
explains the strong rise of a new politics right-wing party in Spain, Ciudadanos, which has 
gained rapid electoral support since the last regional elections in 2015.21 Despite being a pro-
austerity party, it entered the conventional political arena as the right-wing equivalent of 
Podemos, which also challenged the domestic elites but had little to say about Europe. 
Although Ciudadanos self-identifies as a liberal party with a very different program from that 
                                               
21. Although there is a similar new party in Greece, To Potami (The River), it obtained only 4 percent of the votes in 
September 2015 and 6 percent in January 2015. 
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of Podemos, their voters share a set of characteristics that place both parties in direct 
competition with each other on this new dimension of conflict despite being on different sides 
of the ideological spectrum. Compared to the voters of PP and PSOE, voters for both parties 
are more concerned with the political situation and are more likely to be young and from 
urban areas (see Chapter 4), indicating a new dimension of political conflict in Spain. 
 This new dimension of conflict in Spain also explains why it would take a new party 
such as Podemos to capitalize on the emerging protest vote. Although the traditional left party 
IU had long campaigned against austerity, it did not correspond with the idea conveyed in the 
contentious political arena about the necessity of new politics and was, thus, not able to 
capitalize on the emerging protest vote. Being perceived as part of the old politics weighted 
heavily among young and urban voters, who were demanding a change in political culture. 
Conversely, the dominance of the new dimension of conflict in Spanish politics can also 
account for failure of Podemos to purify PSOE. While the difference in the depth of austerity 
(and, thus, the degree of ideological betrayal) that the social democratic parties were forced to 
implement is also important for explaining the extent that voters and politicians switched, it is 
only one part of the story. Importantly, many old political forces, including the trade unions, 
remained loyal to PSOE because they also felt threatened by the rise of the new challenger 
parties in Spain. In contrast, one of the important characteristics of the Greek case was 
SYRIZA’s capacity to mobilize the mass demonstrations with the participation of major 
unions. Thus, while in Greece old actors (i.e., major unions) and new actors (i.e., Greek 
Indignados) joined forces under the same banner, the division between old and new actors 
weighted heavily and defined the dividing lines of Spanish politics during the crisis. 
 The political developments of Greece and Spain on the eve of the Great Recession 
resemble each other, but there are important differences that explain the diverging patterns in 
the shaping of the new structure of conflict. The restructuring of the party systems in both 
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countries was different because the main challenger in each country responded to different 
patterns in the contentious arena, which led to a different institutionalization of conflicts.22 
Due to the intensity of the crisis, the conflict about austerity dominated in Greece, while a 
conflict between old and new politics became more prominent in Spain. In other words, the 
domestic dimension prevailed in Spain, whereas in Greece the European dimension became 
more important (see Chapter 3: 63). Naturally, these new conflicts are deeply intertwined with 
other idiosyncratic conflicts in each country. For instance, the rise and success of Ciudadanos 
cannot be understood without the territorial conflict in Spain because the issue of 
independence for Catalonia is key to Ciudadanos’s program (Teruel and Barrio 2015). 
Although a full discussion of these issues is beyond the scope of this chapter, it is important 
to note that the domestic political culture of countries is essential for understanding the new 
political conflicts in Greece and Spain. 
Conclusion 
The response to the economic crisis in Europe has been driven by neoclassical economic 
theory. Policymakers have attempted to turn the South into the North in order to create the 
optimal currency area that Europe has never been. However, in this chapter we have argued 
that the introduction of the euro is not exclusively to blame for the crisis and the resulting 
imbalances in Europe. Instead, prior political dynamics also played an important role. The 
cases of Spain and Greece are tellingly similar in that respect: both countries suffered a period 
of institutional degradation (Royo 2014), where governments and regulators failed to prevent 
the pre-crisis boom. Clientelism and corruption, in its different levels and forms, allowed the 
                                               
22. Although the leaders of Podemos speak of overcoming the left–right spectrum in order to attract voters regardless of their 
ideological position, studies have shown that citizens persistently place the party on the very left of the ideological 
scale (Fernández-Albertos 2015a). 
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Greek and Spanish elites to extract resources and benefit from the pre-crisis boom 
disproportionality. In combination with the support from entrenched interests that benefited 
from the dualized welfare system, this disincentivized regulation that would have controlled 
the excesses in the public sector (in the case of Greece) and the private sector (in the case of 
Spain). In the pre-crisis era the economic windfalls of European were large enough to shield 
the political system from domestic opposition, but the political dysfunctionalities of Greece 
and Spain were exposed in the past few years. In the wake of the crisis, the trust toward 
national and European political institutions dropped dramatically as citizens became 
increasingly dissatisfied with the political system. This dissatisfaction was rooted not only in 
the declining performance of the economy, but also in the political context—that is, the clarity 
of responsibility and the availability of alternatives. The result was an attitudinal crisis that 
was similar in Greece and Spain, but that evolved into two distinct behavioural patterns in the 
two countries. 
 In Greece the austerity programs were so harsh and comprehensive that they 
overshadowed every other political issue. Thus, the international creditors, personified by 
German politicians and bureaucrats of the Troika, were quickly regarded as the main culprit 
for the economic situation in Greece and, as a result, the main conflict in Greek politics 
became one that posed domestic political actors against international actors (and their 
domestic allies). In Spain, in contrast, the political crisis played out differently. The austerity 
program in Spain not only was less deep, but also the European institutions did not have the 
same (perceived) involvement in its design. While the austerity policies were also politically 
divisive, the main political conflict in Spain became an internal one: political forces, who 
stood for old or traditional politics, were attacked by new protest movements and political 
parties, which were supporting a form of new politics cantered around claims for participatory 
mechanisms and more direct democracy. 
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 The new political parties that have emerged out of these conflicts are representative of 
these patterns and, despite their common stance against austerity, SYRIZA and Podemos are 
different political animals. These differences are best explained by the developments in the 
contentious arena of both countries, which created the political opportunities for the new 
challengers. Whereas in Greece it was the traditional left that capitalized on the emerging 
discontent, it took a new party that shunned ideological labels in Spain to do so, at least 
initially. Therefore, the behavioural consequences of the crisis were different because of a 
combination of pre-existing domestic grievances and new conflicts that were brought about 
by an exceptional economic and political situation. 
 Our comparison of Greece and Spain shows what an encompassing effect the 
economic crisis and the austerity policies had on the Greek political system and society. 
Although other European countries like Spain also suffered heavily during crisis, the shackles 
of austerity in Greece were unprecedented. The Greek political system underwent radical 
transformations. Importantly, these transformations are far from over. The transformations of 
the Greek political system have been that of a punctuated equilibrium: it is once again 
dominated by two political parties: the conservative ND on the right and the governing party 
SYRIZA on the left. In 2015 SYRIZA signed a third MoU including further austerity and 
reforms without the guarantee of much-needed debt relief. Because SYRIZA is struggling to 
live up to its political promises to end the austerity regime, the political situation is still 
subject to further changes. Overall, the political consequences of the crisis in Greece have 
already been colossal, but they might have only been the prelude of what is still to come.
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Chapter 3. Old versus new politics: The political 
spaces in Southern Europe in times of crisis 
Introduction 
The economies in the European South have been particularly hard hit by the fallout of the 
Great Recession and the subsequent Euro crisis. Economic indicators show that most 
countries in North-western and Central-Eastern Europe recovered fairly quickly after the first 
storm of the Great Recession which travelled to Europe after the collapse of the US-
American bank Lehman brothers in fall 2008. By contrast, the Southern European economies 
were caught in a spiral of stagnation, rising unemployment rates (most dramatic among the 
young) and public debt for the last 8 years (see Conti et al. 2018). Given the strong economic 
and political interdependence in Europe (especially within the Eurozone), the political 
processes to cope with the economic crisis involved hard bargaining among European states 
and supra- and international institutions. On the European Union (EU) level, these bargaining 
processes have led to conflicts between governments representing their national interest as 
“debtor” (Southern European and Ireland) versus “creditor” (North-western European) 
countries. On the domestic level, especially the so-called “debtor countries” saw major 
changes of their party systems as highlighted by unprecedented electoral volatility and the 
rise of new challengers from the left and right (Hernández and Kriesi 2016; Hobolt and Tilley 
2016).  
In this article, we focus on the way these events have affected the emerging political 
spaces in four Southern European countries—Greece, Italy, Portugal, and Spain— since the 
onset of the Euro crisis. That is, we focus on the supply side of domestic party competition by 
studying the key issue divides that structure the competition and the actors’ configuration 
within the emerging political spaces. Our contention is that with the Great Recession and the 
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subsequent Euro crisis, the configurations of the political spaces in Southern Europe are 
changing. Before the crisis, the Southern European partisan spaces remained essentially 
bipolar with cultural and economic issues amalgamated in one single left–right dimension 
(Polk and Rovny 2015) and parties weakly rooted in the cleavage structure (Gunther 2005). 
This contrasts to the pattern observed in North-western Europe where, driven by consecutive 
mobilization of the new left and populist right, the divides over economic and cultural issues 
are rather orthogonal to each other (e.g., Hooghe and Marks 2017; Kriesi et al. 2008, 2012). 
However, given long-term trends and the way the crisis played out in the domestic 
arenas of the countries under scrutiny, we do not expect the same pattern to emerge as in 
North-western Europe. By contrast, to understand the political changes underway in Southern 
Europe, we argue for the need to consider that these countries simultaneously face an 
economic and a political crisis which both have strong domestic and European components 
(see also della Porta 2015). This should give rise to salient conflicts over both austerity and 
political renewal. Moreover, the key driving forces of change are social movements and 
political parties that forcefully combine opposition to austerity and “old politics”. Thus, we 
expect an alignment of the divides over economic and political issues in the political spaces 
and that this alignment is even stronger when the mainstream left is in opposition. In 
government, the mainstream left is forced to implement austerity that leads to a “neoliberal 
convergence” of the mainstream parties (Roberts 2013), whereas it attempts to capitalize on 
claims for political renewal and anti-austerity when in opposition. To put it differently, once 
the mainstream left in opposition opts for an “accommodative” strategy1 regarding the 
                                               
1 Meguid (2005) differentiates between three major strategies of mainstream parties vis-a`-vis new challengers and their 
claims: dismissive (i.e. neglect the issue), adversarial (i.e. oppose the issue position of the challenger), or 
accommodative (i.e. adopt the issue position of the challenger).  
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challengers’ demands, the resulting political space should be characterized by strongly 
aligned— that is, not orthogonal—divides over economic and political issues.  
This article is structured as follows. To prepare our argument, we first discuss the 
economic and political crises in the four countries. Next, we turn to the challengers in the 
party systems and their differing emphasis on the failures of domestic and/or European elites. 
This leads to more specific expectations on the emerging structure of conflict. Third, we 
introduce design and methods. We focus on the nine national elections that took place in the 
four countries from 2011 to 2015. By doing so, we move beyond an analysis of single 
“extraordinary” elections—like the Greek election in May 2012 or the Italian election in 2013 
(e.g., Conti and Memoli 2015; Katsanidou and Otjes 2015a)—in our quest to assess the 
consequences of the crisis for the emerging conflict structure. Empirically, we follow the 
research strategy of Kriesi et al. (2008, 2012) and rely on a relational content analysis of 
media data. This original new data set allows studying public debates as they unfold during 
election campaigns. In the conclusions, we summarize the key findings, situate them in the 
broader comparative picture of European party politics, and point to limitations of our study 
and directions for future research.  
Overall, the findings support our expectations. Putting the accent on similarities, we 
find that both economic and political issues are key to understanding the structure of political 
conflict in Southern Europe in times of crises. All countries saw significant conflicts over 
austerity and old versus new politics, and there is a strong association between opposition to 
domestic austerity and calls for democratic renewal. This pattern emerges everywhere, 
although its concrete manifestation varies across countries and over time depending on, 
among others, the government participation of the mainstream left.  
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Conflicts in times of economic and political crises  
From our point of view, it is useful to combine structural and strategic approaches to party 
competition as they tend to complement each other (for the two approaches, see De Vries and 
Marks 2012: 187–190). As argued by the structural perspective, processes of social change 
create structurally defined potentials that are, as argued by the strategic approach, mobilized 
by strategic political actors. Of course, an approach that views party competition as 
ultimately rooted in structural conflicts begs the question of which social conflicts have the 
capacity to restructure the partisan space. Given the devastating effect of the crisis on the 
Southern European economies, we expect political conflict to focus on economics. However, 
for understanding the political consequences of the economic crisis, it is crucial to keep in 
mind that Europe has developed into a multilevel governance structure and that, given the 
close economic and political integration of EU member states, the economic crisis in Europe 
has developed into the “Euro crisis” (Copelovitch et al. 2016). This crisis has been mainly 
driven by economic imbalances between the Northwestern and Southern members of the 
Eurozone (e.g., Lane 2012; Scharpf 2011). The governments of the weaker, Southern 
European economies, in particular, were unable to cope with the crisis, and the EMU 
governance structures revealed their structural weakness (e.g., Eichengreen 2012).  
As stated, the ensuing crisis management involved above all the EU’s 
intergovernmental channel, and the European governments represented their national interest 
as “debtor” (Southern European and Ireland) or “creditor” (North-western European) nations 
in this bargaining process—whatever their partisan composition (e.g., Laffan 2016). Under 
the pressure from the EU (represented by the “troika”), the national governments adopted 
austerity policies that were harsh for large parts of society. The model case is Greece, where 
the troika intervened most manifestly and with most dramatic consequences for the country’s 
economy (see Chapter 2). However, under the impact of the crisis, the other three countries 
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under scrutiny became the object of supranational interventions as well. Portugal was bailed 
out by the International Monetary Fund/European Financial Stability Facility in spring 2011. 
Spain accepted a bailout of its banks by the European Stability Mechanism in summer 2012. 
Italy, even if not formally bailed out, became the object of “implicit conditionality” when it 
was hit by the financial storm in summer 2011. 
Table 3.1 (Expected) Conflicts in Southern Europe 
 Economic Political 
Domestic Domestic austerity Welfare, economic liberalism 
Domestic democratic renewal 
Democratic reforms, corruption 
European European austerity Euro, bailout and its conditions 
European integration 
European integration, deepening 
 
As a result, the governments’ manoeuvring space in macro-economic policy making was 
severely restricted, with significant political consequences at the domestic level. In Italy, the 
imposed austerity measures brought down the right-wing Berlusconi government and ushered 
in the technocratic Monti government that was supported by all three major parties (including 
the mainstream left Democratic Party [PD]). In Greece, Portugal, and Spain, the imposed 
austerity policies initially had to be executed by governments from the left. These 
governments were not able to adopt the reforms they had originally promised and were 
forced to take measures that contradicted the policy positions for which they were known in 
the past. In line with the Latin-American experience (e.g., Lupu 2014; Roberts 2013), the 
neoliberal convergence of major parties imposed by forces external to national party 
competition led to party brand dilution, to a decline of partisanship and, eventually, to a 
process of de-alignment—and, in the case of Greece, to the collapse of the incumbent 
Socialist party (PASOK) and even the entire party system (e.g., Verney 2014).  
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However, the challenging of the mainstream parties under the impact of the crisis had 
also domestic origins. Structural problems, policy errors, and misconceptions pre-dated the 
Euro crisis and left the Southern European countries particularly ill-prepared to respond to 
the crisis. All four countries are characterized by weak state capacity (Beramendi et al. 
2015b: 13), and even this capacity has been systematically undercut by clientelistic practices 
and political corruption. Greece certainly has been the worst offender with both major parties 
establishing a system of party patronage (Pappas and O’Malley 2014), while the Portuguese 
parties have been comparatively less clientelistic (Afonso et al. 2014: 6). As Royo (2014) 
argues for Spain, we cannot understand the real estate bubble, the loss of competitiveness or 
the financial crisis without taking into account what he calls the “institutional degeneration” 
in Spanish politics. However, as he also argues, the problem is both the extractive behaviour 
of elites and that civil society tolerated such behaviour. Only when the crisis exposed an 
unsustainable economic model, the public was outraged by the actions of its elites.  
The increased perception of corruption was coupled with growing distrust toward 
both domestic and European political institutions (Muro and Vidal 2016, see also Chapter 2). 
An overall sense of frustration with the political elites captivated a large share of the 
population in Southern Europe and soon translated into activity in the protest arena—signs of 
what Mainwaring (2006) calls the attitudinal and behavioural dimensions of a political crisis. 
While the protests in the four countries differed in timing, size, and organizational sponsors, 
they emphasized similar claims against austerity measures and the malfunctioning of 
(representative) democracy (see Altiparmakis and Lorenzini 2018; della Porta 2015). 
What does this mean for the structuration of the partisan political space? First of all, it 
is important to keep in mind that there are two overlapping conflicts—the conflict with the 
domestic elites and the conflict with the European elites. Second, each one of these conflicts 
has a political and an economic component. To illustrate this, Table 3.1 shows a fourfold 
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table with the four combinations of conflicts and the associated issues. The domestic conflict 
is about austerity policies (an economic issue) and corruption and democratic renewal (a 
political issue). The supranational conflict, where it is present, is obviously about austerity, 
too, but it is also about the defence of the nation state, about national pride and humiliation, 
and the democratic deficit at the European level. To sum up, we contend that the political 
spaces in Southern Europe reflect the economic and the political crises that have unfolded in 
these countries since the outbreak of the Great Recession in 2008. Thus, we formulate the 
following hypothesis:  
Hypothesis 1: Under the impact of a twofold crisis, conflicts over economic (left vs. right) and 
political issues (new vs. old politics) are structuring the political spaces in 
Southern Europe (double-crises hypothesis).  
The rise of (different) challenger parties in Southern Europe  
New challenger parties are the driving forces of the transformation of the political space 
given the programmatic inflexibility of mainstream parties and their tendency to stick to the 
dominant dimensions of conflict (for a recent summary, see Hooghe and Marks 2017). They 
“translate” the latent potentials into manifest conflicts. Therefore, we briefly introduce the 
electorally most successful new challengers in the four countries as this allows refining our 
expectations. 
Once the economic crisis struck, the electorate reacted in a two-stage process in the 
electoral arena. In a first stage, incumbents were punished as predicted by the economic 
voting literature. The punishment was exemplary, but it was rather conventional as voters 
turned to the mainstream opposition party. Only in the second stage, the voters typically 
sanctioned all the mainstream parties and massively turned to challenger parties (e.g., 
Hernández and Kriesi 2016; Hobolt and Tilley 2016). Portugal is the only country among the 
four where there is no marked second stage in sight yet, even if in the 2015 elections an 
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unprecedented 18.5% of the vote went to parties left of the socialist PS— the Left Bloc BE 
gaining the most.  
In Greece, challengers from both the left and the right rose to prominence in the 2012 
elections (e.g., Gemenis and Nezi 2015; Katsanidou and Otjes 2015a; Verney 2014). On the 
right, the period saw the rise of different challengers from the extreme right Golden Dawn, 
the populist right Independent Greeks (ANEL) to the new center-right party The River (To 
Potami). However, by far electorally most successful proved to be the Coalition of the 
Radical Left (Syriza), becoming the largest party in the January 2015 election. Syriza was a 
left-wing opposition party that had been founded in 2004 and that established close links with 
the extraordinary mobilization of Greek society in the streets. Syriza, besides holding a strong 
anti-austerity (and initially anti-bailout) position, opposed both the domestic and the 
European elites. As observed by Stavrakakis and Katsambekis (2014), Syriza’s discourse 
became clearly populist by painting a sharp antagonism between “us” (“the people”) and 
“them” (the “elite”). Tsipras, Syriza’s leader, used the phrase of “external troika–internal 
troika.” In this way, the three-party coalition government of New Democracy (ND), PASOK, 
and the Democratic Left (DIMAR) was effectively equated with the country’s international 
emergency lenders. While the opposition to both austerity and the domestic and European 
elites unites the Greek challengers from the right and left, Stavrakakis and Katsambekis 
(2014: 132) point out that Syriza’s populism tends to be inclusionary. They highlight that 
Syriza has been “one of the most consistent advocates of the immigrants’ equal rights and 
their full inclusion in Greek society” (p. 132). Syriza also supports common claims of the 
new social movements and “new left” parties of the 1970s such as gender equality and LGTB 
rights.  
In Spain, too, challengers rose both on the left (Podemos) and the centre-right 
(Ciudadanos). Although the electoral results do not differ as much as in the Greek case, the 
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new left challenger, Podemos, is so far also more successful than its centre-right rival (e.g., 
Ramiro and Gomez 2017). Podemos grew out of the social movements of the squares. It was 
founded early in 2014 and had its first success in the European elections in March 2014. In 
the 2015 general elections, it obtained 20.7% of the votes. Podemos, as opposed to Syriza, is 
more focused on the national elite and less anti-European. In unmistakably populist manner, 
the party claims to defend the “social majority” (“mayoría social”), the “power of the people” 
(“poder popular”) or simply the “citizenship” (“ciudadania”) against the degenerated “casta” 
of politicians (e.g., Ramiro and Gomez, 2016). The focus on domestic elites is equally if not 
more pronounced with Ciudadanos than with Podemos. Ciudadanos, formed in summer 2006, 
it grew out of civil society in opposition to nationalism in Catalonia (Rodríguez Teruel and 
Barrio 2016). Its ideas concern above all domestic reforms (of the party system, the legal 
system, public administration, and internal decentralization) as well as economic and social 
policy. Both parties are not anti-European. Despite its anti-austerity positions, the program of 
Podemos is conscious of the fact that some of its demands can only be implemented in the 
European context. While at variance with the old Communist left, this is in line with the 
tradition of the Spanish mainstream left for whom Europe provided relief and shelter from 
the fascist past (see Díez-Medrano 2003). Thus, Podemos proposes a new “Carta 
Democrática Europea,” which intends to provide citizens with greater participation in 
European policy-making and ethnic minorities, such as the Catalans, with self-determination. 
Although Podemos and Ciudadanos differ in ideological terms, their voters share a set of 
socio-demographic (younger, more educated, urban, and socio- cultural professionals) and 
attitudinal traits that point to the fact that both parties represent those particularly concerned 
with the political crisis in Spain (Chapter 5).  
In Italy, the new challenger, the five star movement (M5S), is harder to situate, and its 
claim to be neither left nor right is also reflected in its electoral base (e.g., Bobba and 
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McDonnell 2015: 172; Ceccarini and Bordignon 2016: 143).2 It began a startling rise in 
opinion polls from below 6% in April 2012 and obtained no less than 25.6% of the vote in the 
national election in spring 2013. In its program, the party casts the citizens of Italy as the 
victims of a system captured by corrupt and incapable elites at the national and supranational 
level. The blame is firmly laid on the shoulders of Italy’s entire ruling class (comprising all 
existing parties, the media, and business leaders) and European elites, to whom the party 
attributes the malfunctioning of democracy and the economy’s decline (e.g., Bobba and 
McDonnell 2015). To remedy the situation, M5S proposes to overturn the system, removing 
the current elites and restoring power to the Italian citizen by online direct democracy. As 
many of its supporters have defected from the right and given some anti-immigration claims 
in its program, the Italian M5S fits least into the new left category (Ceccarini and Bordignon, 
2016: 154). However, this challenger, too, has some features in common with the new social 
movements and the parties they spawned. As Biorcio (2014: 37, 2015: 121) has observed, 
especially with its calls for a participatory and deliberative democracy, this movement recalls 
the German Greens 30 years ago.  
Based on the programmatic profile of the challengers, we can specify our expectation 
further. Overall, the challengers in Southern Europe—like their counterparts in the North—
raise specific policy demands, but they also pose a challenge to the established system of 
interest intermediation more generally (Hutter 2014). To a certain extent, they combine the 
new left’s call for participatory democracy and its reliance on protest politics with the radical 
right’s populist appeal. While the challengers differ to a certain extent in their program and 
the focus on the European dimension, they all share a strong focus on both the economic and 
political questions at stake (again, see Table 3.1). Moreover, in all countries the paradigmatic 
                                               
2 As a matter of fact, the Spanish Podemos, although clearly to the left, initially adopted a similar strategy as M5S claiming 
to be neither left nor right in order to capture the center of the political spectrum.  
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challengers from the populist radical right prevalent in North-western Europe are not among 
the electorally most successful challengers. The more central role of challengers from the left 
seems due to the discrediting of both the populist radical right and the mainstream left, and it 
mirrors the pre-crisis situation as leftist challengers have traditionally been stronger in the 
South of Europe than in the Northwest (Hooghe and Marks 2017: 15). The populist radical 
right was largely discredited by the authoritarian legacy, the fact that immigration has hardly 
been an issue in these emigration countries until recently, and that European integration was 
essentially seen in positive terms.3 Moreover, the programmatic dealignment of the 
mainstream left resulting from the “forced” implementation of a neoliberal program opened 
up a niche for challengers to capitalize on both conflicts through combining an anti-austerity 
message with a need for regenerating the political system in general. Thus, we expect that the 
relationship between the conflicts shown in Table 3.1 is not orthogonal to each other. Rather, 
due to the integration of opposition to austerity and calls for democratic renewal on the left 
side of the space, we expect an alignment of the divides over economic and political issues.  
This alignment of the economic and political divides in the political space should be 
even stronger when the mainstream left is in opposition. As argued before, the mainstream 
left implemented austerity when in government which led to a certain convergence of 
mainstream left and right on economic issues and opened up a niche for the emergence of 
challengers with an anti-austerity and anti- old politics agenda. By contrast, we expect that 
the mainstream left attempts to capitalize on claims for both political renewal and anti-
austerity when in opposition. Such an accommodative strategy resembles responses of the 
social democrats to the rise of Green parties (Kitschelt 1994) and of the mainstream right to 
the rise of populist radical right parties (Akkerman 2015). If the mainstream left in opposition 
                                               
3 Italy being the most deviant case (see Gattinara 2016) 
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opts for such a strategy, the resulting configuration resembles a reconfigured bipolarity 
between the mainstream right and the rest. Ultimately, this should be reflected in strongly 
aligned—that is, not orthogonal—divides over economic and political issues. To sum up, we 
formalize the discussion in two hypotheses:  
 
Hypothesis 2: The economic and political divides are closely aligned with each other—that 
is, not orthogonal—in the political spaces in Southern Europe given that the 
driving forces of change are challenger parties that combine opposition to 
austerity and “old politics” (alignment hypothesis).  
 
Hypothesis 3: The alignment of the economic and politic divides is more pronounced when 
the mainstream left in opposition adopts the demands of the challenger parties 
as compared to the situation when it is in government (accommodation 
hypothesis).  
Design and methods  
In the following section, we briefly introduce the design and methods (a more detailed 
methodological discussion including a note on our strategy of data analysis can be found in 
the Appendix). We adopt a most different systems design as we are most interested in carving 
out what is similar in the structure of the political spaces in the four countries taking into 
account that they differ in many respects (from the electoral systems to the strength of other 
traditional cleavages, such as the centre-periphery cleavage). Moreover, the previous sections 
have already pointed to crucial differences regarding both the latent potentials and the actors 
who articulate them, that is, the extent to which the two crises affected the countries under 
scrutiny and the types of new party challengers that have been emerging. The campaigns 
covered by the analysis took place when the Euro crisis was in full swing. More precisely, we 
focus on the four Greek elections in May and June 2012 and in January and September 2015; 
the Italian election in 2013; and the Portuguese and Spanish elections in 2011 and 2015.  
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To analyse party competition as it unfolds during electoral campaigns, we follow the 
strategy of Kriesi et al. (2008; 2012) and make use of a relational content analysis of 
newspaper articles. This strategy allows us to study the publicly visible contestation among 
the political parties during the campaigns and map the issues of the day onto broader issue 
dimensions to test our claims about the structure of the political space. The analysis is based 
on the coding of two newspapers per country. To reduce ideological biases, we selected two 
quality newspapers per country, one each from the centre-left and the centre-right. We then 
coded a sample of the selected articles using core sentence analysis (CSA). Following this 
type of relational content analysis, each grammatical sentence of an article is reduced to its 
most basic “core sentence(s)” structure, which contain(s) only the subject, the object, and the 
direction of the relationship between the two. For the following analysis, we rely on all 
relations between party-affiliated actors as subject and any political issue as object. Overall, 
the analysis is based on around 11,000 such actor-issue statements (see Table 1A of the 
Appendix). 
A crucial step in our analysis is aggregating the detailed issues that were coded into a 
set of broader categories. The aggregation was guided by two considerations: (a) to capture 
the general conflicts described in the previous sections and (b) to compare our results to 
previous findings of Kriesi et al. (2008; 2012). More specifically, we regrouped the detailed 
issues into 18 categories (see Table 2A of the Appendix). For the analysis, the first 11 
categories are most important as they allow us to distinguish economic from political issues 
and domestic from European references. Economic issues are covered by the categories 
welfare, economic liberalism, economic reforms (vague), Euro, anti-bailout and anti-bailout 
(conditions). Political issues are covered by the categories democratic renewal, democratic 
reforms (vague), regionalism, media diversity, and Europe. Note that European issues need to 
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refer explicitly to the European dimension of the question at stake. The coded actors are 
aggregated according to their party affiliation.  
The data analysis proceeds in two steps. At first, we present simple measures of issue 
salience and polarization. Salience is measured by the share of core sentences related to an 
issue category in percent of all coded sentences. The indicator for the polarization of party 
positions is based on a modified version of Taylor and Herman’s index of left-right 
polarization in the party system, and it ranges from 0 to 1 (for its calculation, see Appendix). 
We analyse the two measures because conflicts should be both salient and polarized to 
structure the dimensions of the political space. Following Kriesi et al. (2008; 2012), we 
construct the spaces based on the coded issue statements with the help of multi-dimensional 
scaling (MDS). MDS allows graphically representing the location of parties and issues in a 
common low-dimensional space. It helps to identify whether and how conflicts over different 
issues map onto some underlying dimensions (for a more detailed description, see Appendix).  
Empirical findings  
To assess the importance of conflicts over economic and political issues, we first have a look 
at the average salience of the principal categories by country. As expected, the results in 
Table 2 show that the campaigns are highly focused on economic issues in times of a severe 
financial and economic crisis. The partisan debate is most concentrated on economics in 
Portugal (with more than two-thirds of all statements) and the least in Spain (with around 
44%).4 By contrast, Portugal saw the least salient conflicts over political issues. In part, this 
might be because there was no new party emerging out of the movements in the squares in 
                                               
4 Analyzing the single campaigns shows that the low salience of economic issues in Spain is due to the 2015 campaign in 
which political issues trumped over economic ones. In the 2011 cam- paign, by contrast, the focus was as much on 
economic policies as in Portugal or Greece (see Table 3A of the Online Appendix).  
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Portugal. In the other three countries, conflicts over political issues account for around one-
third of all issue statements by parties as reported in the press.  
The focus of the agenda on economic matters seems not as surprising during an 
economic crisis (see also Borghetto and Russo 2018). However, the relatively high salience 
of political issues supports our first hypothesis: under the impact of contemporaneous crises, 
the political actors are involved in struggles over both austerity and ways to improve the 
quality of the democratic process. By contrast, other kinds of substantive policy issues 
(ranging from cultural liberalism to immigration and environmental protection) do not get 
much attention in the mass-mediated partisan debate, which contrasts with previous findings 
of Kriesi et al. (2008; 2012) for North-western Europe.  
Table 3.2 Issue salience by major issue categories 
 
Spain Italy Greece Portugal 
Economic 44.1 51.2 60.4 67.5 
Domestic (1) 42.7 50.0 30.4 58.9 
European (2) 1.4 1.2 30.0 8.6 
     
Political 35.8 34.0 28.1 14.9 
Domestic (3) 35.1 30.6 20.8 13.9 
European (4) 0.7 3.4 7.3 1.0 
     








N 2142 1521 4002 2947 
 
On the role of Europe in the debates, the findings in Table 3.2 are striking. Apart from 
Greece, the campaigns do not constitute critical moments in the politicization of Europe. This 
result contradicts the expectations of some observers (e.g., Schimmelfennig 2014; Statham 
and Trenz 2015). Explicit references to European issues amount to less than 10% in 
Portugal—with much higher values in 2011 when the country had just accepted its bailout 
agreement—and even less than 5% in Italy and Spain. In the latter two countries, we rather 
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find constellations of “strategic de-emphasizing” of the European issue in the national 
electoral arena (Hutter et al. 2016). This mirrors the predominant focus of the challenger 
parties on the failures of the domestic political class outlined above. For Spain and Portugal, 
it might also reflect the fact that Europe was traditionally seen as a modernizing and 
democratizing force (Diez Medrano 2003).  
By contrast, and in line with Katsanidou and Otjes’ (2016) case study, references to 
European economic (i.e. Eurozone membership, the bailout and its conditions) and political 
issues were very salient in the partisan debate in Greece. The emphasis on European issues in 
Greece mirrors the fact that the country was at the centre of the Euro crisis in many respects. 
In fact, Greece was involved in negotiations with its European and international lenders 
throughout the period covered. The high salience of Europe also concurs with the idea that 
Syriza had a clearer dual strategy of criticizing both the failures of the domestic and 
European elites. This result does not mean that the struggles over economic and political 
reforms in the other three countries did not take place in the “shadow” of European 
constraints. However, the extent to which the European component was explicitly articulated 
in the electoral arena clearly sets Greece apart from the other three countries.  
To examine the structuring capacity of an issue (i.e. the combination of salience and 
polarization), we now turn to the 18 specific issue categories outlined above. Figure 3.1 
shows the two measures by issue and country in a simple scatter plot. The horizontal 
dimension refers to salience, the vertical dimension to polarization. To ease interpretation, we 
added lines that indicate the respective means across all issues and countries. The critical 
issues are the ones in the upper right-hand corner of the figure, that is, the issues that combine 
an above average salience with an above average polarization. Overall, Figure 3.1 lends 
additional support to our first hypothesis as conflicts over both economic and political issues 
are structuring political conflict in Southern Europe. In this respect, it is most significant that 
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the issue of “democratic renewal” (mainly focused on institutional change and on fighting 
corruption and clientelism) gave rise to highly salient and polarized debates in all countries. 
Also, “economic liberalism” is situated in the upper-right corner in Figure 3.1 in all countries 
except Italy.  
Figure 3.1 Issue salience and polarization by specific issue categories 
 
Apart from these similarities, there are marked differences in the type of economic and 
political issues that were structuring conflicts in the electoral arenas. For Greece, the results 
again underline the highly contested status of all European issue categories—both economic 
and political. For Portugal, we observe conflicts over the general need for economic reforms, 
the bailout (mainly in 2011) and welfare state reforms (primarily in 2015). In Italy, cultural 
liberalism—in particular, gender equality and gay rights— led to fairly polarized and salient 
conflicts, too. Finally, Spain stands out for contestation related to regionalism (dominating 
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the 2015 campaign) and the welfare state. We cannot present detailed accounts of the various 
conflicts in this article. Rather, we want to emphasize here that cultural liberalism in Italy is 
the only case in which an issue not covered by one of our two broad issue categories— 
economic or political—was the object of salient and polarized debates.  
So far, we have described the most salient and polarized issues in the campaigns, but 
what we are most interested in is the way the various conflicts relate to each other, that is, 
how they structure the political space. As explained in the methods’ section, we rely on MDS 
to represent the distances between parties and issues graphically. Figure 3.2 presents the 
respective configurations for each country and election separately.  
In general, the MDS procedure resulted in two-dimensional solutions for all 
campaigns covered by the analysis (Figure 3.2). The major dimensions of the partisan spaces 
in Southern Europe tend to be characterized by amalgamated conflicts over economic and 
non-economic issues (see also Polk and Rovny 2015; Tsatsanis et al. 2014). More precisely, 
we find support for our second hypothesis: in all countries except Italy, conflicts over 
austerity and democratic renewal do not represent independent orthogonal dimensions, but 
are aligned in the political space. The new challenger parties are closely associated with 
opposition to both austerity and “old politics” (for an additional systematic analysis, see 
Table 4A of the Appendix). This result is illustrated in Figure 3.2 by the fact that the circle 
that covers the left-wing challengers and the issue democratic renewal is located at the left-
wing pole of the economic divide in all countries except for Italy. A key difference is that, in 
the case of Greece, the main economic conflicts revolve around European measures, but 
around domestic measures in the other three countries. To substantiate these general remarks, 
let us take a look at each country in detail.  
In Greece, the spaces in all four campaigns are structured around conflicts over 
domestic and European austerity, as well as over democratic renewal (Figure 2(a)). While the 
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resulting configuration is two dimensional, it is the EU bailout/anti-bailout conflict that 
dominates the 2012 campaigns and the one in January 2015 as indicated by the spread of all 
parties along this dimension (see also Katsanidou and Otjes 2016). We have highlighted this 
main line of conflict by connecting the issues of “anti-bailout” and “(pro-)euro.”5 However, 
as we want to emphasize here, this conflict overlaps with the divide between the parties that 
stand for new politics and those that stand for the “old corrupted political class.” As can be 
seen in Figure 3.2(a), the two established mainstream parties, PASOK and ND, are closely 
associated with the pro-bailout/anti-democratic renewal pole, while there is a diverse camp of 
left-wing (The Communist Party KKE and Syriza) and right-wing (ANEL and Golden Dawn) 
challengers located at the anti-bailout/pro-democratic renewal pole in the May 2012 
campaign.  
The spatial configuration changed in autumn 2015 when Syriza (now in government) 
supports the third bailout agreement. For this campaign, Figure 3.2(a) indicates that the main 
line of conflict is a kind of transformed left-right dimension with Syriza as the main party on 
the left (close to welfare and democratic renewal) and ND as its main opponent situated close 
to economic liberalism. Of course, the bailout/anti-bailout division has not disappeared. 
However, with the schism within Syriza that led to the formation of the new splinter party 
“Popular Unity” in the run-up to the fall 2015 election, the bailout divide no longer overlaps 
as much with the “new versus old politics” divide.  
In Spain, we observe a different configuration which reflects the fact that European 
issues were hardly debated neither in 2011 nor in 2015 (Figure 3.2(b)). The 2011 campaign is 
                                               
5 In Greek crisis elections, the classic version of the left–right divide between pro-welfare and economic liberalism is of 
secondary importance. The secondary status of this divide is due to the rather low salience of welfare-related 
questions and, most importantly, because the Greek parties tend to agree on a minimum level of welfare protection (in 
the sense of fighting poverty and supporting social aid) and they all don’t fully embrace the idea of economic 
liberalism and budgetary rigor at the national level.  
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characterized by a two-dimensional structure, although one dimension dominates the 
configuration. This divide separates the Socialist Party (PSOE) from the mainstream right 
People’s Party (PP). It combines conflicts over welfare and economic liberalism with 
conflicts over cultural liberalism and defense. The secondary dimension is characterized by 
questions of regionalism and European integration. As shown in Figure 3.2(b), the radical left 
(IU) and the newly created social-liberal Union, Progress and Democracy (UPyD) are closest 
to democratic renewal in the 2011 election, while the two mainstream parties are equally 
distant from it. In 2015, we observe even more polarization on the economic left–right divide 
(with PP moving closer to economic liberalism and PSOE closer to welfare). This time, the 
second dimension in Spain is mainly based on regional conflicts in general and Catalonian 
independence in particular.6  
                                               
6 While Podemos was in favor of a referendum and more regional autonomy, the other parties—especially Partido Popular—
were more opposed to such ideas, as indicated by the fairly large distance of their position to the regional issue. 
Another minor issue on this secondary dimension was defense, as Ciudadanos and Podemos had different opinions 
about military interventions debated in reference to the anti-jihadist pact after the Paris attacks a month before the 
2015 elections.  
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Notes: The size of the circles around issues and parties indicates the relative salience of the corresponding actor 
or object. Selected issue labels: ecolib: economic liberalism; eco-ref: economic reform (vague); demnew: 
democratic renewal; dem-reform: democratic reform (vague); anti-bail: anti-bailout; anti-bail_c: anti-bailout 
(conditions) (descriptions of all issue categories can be found in Table 2A of the Online Appendix). 
 
Note that in all graphs only parties with at least 30 observations and issues with at least 3% of all observations 
were included. 
 
Stress values: (a) Greece. Stress-1: 0.37 (2012 May), 0.29 (2012 June), 0.22 (2015 January), 0.28 (2015 
December). (b) Spain. Stress-1: 0.18 (2011), 0.26 (2015). (c) Italy Stress-1: 0.24. (d) Portugal Stress-1: 0.27 
(2011), 0.13 (2015).  
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However, most importantly for our argument, there is an even stronger integration of the 
issue democratic renewal on the left of the economic divide. This becomes obvious when 
looking at the positioning of the new left-wing challenger Podemos. It is located very close to 
welfare and democratic renewal as is the old radical left (IU). Also, Figure 3.2(b) indicates 
that, in line with our third hypothesis, the socialist PSOE in opposition moved to the left and 
became closely associated with democratic renewal, criticizing corruption and clientelism 
(notwithstanding related problems in its own ranks). 
The case of Italy in 2013 presents yet another rather exceptional manifestation of how 
support for democratic renewal is embedded in the political space. More specifically, the 
Italian configuration in Figure 3.2(c) does not support our second hypothesis as it comes 
closest to a two-dimensional space with two orthogonal lines of conflict (see also Conti and 
Memoli 2015). As shown before, the main competitors in the party system—ranging from the 
Social Democrats (PD) via Berlusconi’s People of Freedom (PDL) to Monti’s Civic Choice 
(SC)—are all placed rather closely together in the middle of the economic divide. This 
reflects the fact that they had all backed at least part of the reform agenda implemented by 
Monti’s (incumbent) technocratic government. The results also highlight the fact that M5S is 
not as closely related to the left as the other new challengers. Rather, as Figure 3.2(c) shows, 
it is positioned in the centre of the economic divide, far away from economic liberalism and 
further away from welfare than the two mainstream parties from the left and the right. In the 
2013 campaign, its economic program did not attract much attention, and it backed 
incoherent proposals anyway (Ceccarini and Bordignon 2016: 147 ff.). By contrast, the 
movement is mainly associated with its opposition to the “casta” and calls for democratic 
renewal—highlighted by the small size of the circle connecting it with this issue category. 
While PD and SC share some of the claims for democratic renewal, the main culprit on this 
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dimension is Berlusconi’s party, PDL, which is located most distant from the issue of 
democratic renewal.  
Finally, for Portugal, Figure 3.2(d) shows different configurations in 2011 and 2015 
which has a lot to do with the timing of the bailout in the country and government-opposition 
dynamics. The Socialists (PS) lost the 2011 election and were succeeded by a mainstream 
right-wing coalition formed by the Social Democrats (PSD) and the Conservatives (CDS). As 
indicated in Figure 3.2(d), the structure of the political space is two dimensional for the 2011 
campaign. As in Spain and Italy, we observe an economic left–right dimension (indicated by 
the straight horizontal line). The right, PSD and CD, are situated close to economic liberalism 
and the radical left, BE and PCP, close to welfare. The governing Socialists are also located 
at some distance from economic liberalism. Their support for the bailout agreement and 
attacks from their opponents (blaming them for the political crisis in the country) opened up 
the second dimension. This second dimension mainly results from a split within the left 
between the radical left in opposition and the incumbent Socialists. The situation is very 
different in 2015 when economic issues divide a unified left from a unified right, with 
positions in favour of institutional change being embedded on the left-hand side of this one 
dimension. The fact that the PS was by then in the opposition apparently facilitated the 
unified position of the left regarding both economic and political conflicts (supporting our 
third hypothesis).7 
                                               
7  The dominance of such an integrated dimension is in line with findings of Tsatsanis et al. (2014) based on an elite survey 
during the respective legislative term. The second dimension in the 2015 election campaign is of secondary 
importance, since the parties do not much address the two issues constituting this dimension (European integration 
and immigration) and since they are all equally opposed to tougher immigration policies.  
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Conclusions: Restructuring party politics and the rise of a new left?  
Based on original media data about national election campaigns, we have assessed the 
partisan political spaces in four Southern European countries (i.e. Greece, Italy, Portugal, and 
Spain) in the Euro crisis. We have developed the argument that, to understand the politics of 
the crisis, one needs to consider that the countries simultaneously face an economic and a 
political crisis—a crisis of representation that opposed the old political elite to new 
challengers. We also argued that both crises have domestic and European components and 
that given the fact that the challengers forcefully combine opposition to austerity and old 
politics, the structure of the political spaces is characterized by closely aligned divides. To 
sum up, we can draw at least four major conclusions from our analysis.  
First, putting the accent on similarities, we do find support for the claim that both 
economic and political issues are key to understanding the structure of political conflict in 
Southern Europe in the early 2010s. All countries saw significant combinations of conflicts 
over austerity and old versus new politics.  
Second, apart from Italy, we found a strong alignment of opposition to domestic 
austerity and calls for democratic renewal in the political spaces. This alignment tends to be 
stronger if the mainstream left is in opposition. In government, the mainstream left is forced 
to implement austerity policies, whereas it attempts to adopt economically more left-wing 
positions and capitalize on the issues of political renewal when in opposition. The Portuguese 
and Spanish elections in 2015 are telling examples of this mechanism.  
Third, the structure of political conflict that is shaping up in all four cases differs from 
the structure we found in the Northwest of Europe. In North-western Europe, the driving 
forces of the most recent transformations of party competition has been the new populist right 
and the conflict structure is characterized by the double impact of the challenges of European 
integration (perceived as a threat to the sovereign nation state) and immigration (perceived as 
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a threat to the national identity). In the Southern European countries, we have only observed 
sustained references to the European component of the conflicts in the Greek case. Moreover, 
the focus on the bailout and its conditions did not politicize Europe in a cultural-identitarian 
way, but rather replaced the economic left–right divide by a new divide related to European 
austerity (at least until autumn 2015). 
Fourth, there are other major differences in the way the latent potentials induced by 
the crises have so far been politically articulated in the various countries and in the way they 
are embedded in pre-existing political divides. Thus, far from claiming that there is a uniform 
political space in Southern Europe, we have just pointed to the commonalities in this article. 
Based on our results, future research should describe and explain in more detail the different 
manifestations of the general argument. Among others, an interesting avenue for future 
research is the extremely high salience of EU-related issues in the Greek case. As we 
speculate in this article, this might be related to the differing strategies of the challengers, the 
almost constant bargaining process with the European lenders, and ultimately the potential 
negative diffusion effects that the “Greek case” might have had on electoral campaigns in 
other countries, such as in Spain in late 2015. However, more research is needed on this 
front—especially comparative research including countries from North-western and Central-
Eastern Europe as well.  
Apart from a more systematic treatment of cross-national differences, another 
limitation of our study is the focus on “crisis” elections only. Here, follow-up research should 
extend the time period of the study both back in time and include the elections to come. 
Regarding the latter, it may be too early to foretell the outcome of the transformation of the 
conflict structure in the Southern European party systems. Nonetheless, we would like to end 
with some speculations. As we interpret the configurations that have been shaping up in the 
last elections, it is crucial that the main thrust of the new challengers has come from the left. 
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In a way, the crisis has opened up an opportunity for a new left to emerge in Southern 
Europe. As our analysis indicates, this new left does not differ much in programmatic terms 
form the old radical left (the most telling example being the Spanish case). By contrast, it 
seems that the strong focus on renewing the political system and unfulfilled expectations 
helped them to gain voters from the old radical left and beyond (e.g. Ramiro and Gomez 
2016; Vidal 2018). To the extent that the new challengers from the left dominate the scene, 
they are the drivers of the integration of the call for democratic renewal into the traditional 
left–right division. We can see this happening in Greece, where democratic renewal is clearly 
associated with the left but also in Spain and Portugal, where the fact that the socialists were 
in opposition in the 2015 has helped to unify the positions of the new leftist challengers with 
those of the old left. In Italy, finally, the waters have been muddied by the fact that there has 
been only one crisis election so far. Also, this election has been following up on a 
technocratic government with which all the major parties were associated. As a result, the 
political conflict has been the prime mover of the structuration of the party system in the 
2013 elections and the conflicts over economic and political issues do not (yet) align. Thus, 
more evidence from coming electoral campaigns is needed to firmly establish whether and 
why Italy is indeed a “deviant” case (most likely reasons being the atypical character of the 
new challenger and the way the economic crisis played out in Italy). However, the other three 
cases suggest that, ultimately, even this atypical challenger might act as a functional 
equivalent of the new left and its call for democratic renewal might well align it with the 
forces on the (centre-)left in the long. 
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Chapter 4. Out with the Old: Restructuring Spanish 
Politics 
Introduction 
The Great Recession in 2008 became a critical turning point for Spanish politics. What used 
to be an imperfect bi-partisan system with a stable bipolar conflict structure become a fluid 
landscape with new actors and issues that have rocked the ‘old’ political system. The 
combination of a political and an economic crisis at the national and European levels 
profoundly transformed a political system that had been broadly stable. In this article, we 
focus on the dynamics of transformation of Spanish politics before and after the crises struck. 
To do so, we analyse two elections before the beginning of the crisis (2004, 2008) and two 
elections afterwards (2011, 2015) in depth. 
We find that the Spanish story, unlike the Portuguese one (Ferreira and Mendes 
2017), but similarly to that of Greece (Altiparmakis 2018), is one of transformation. The 
elections before the crisis were characterised by two poles identifiable on the left-right scale 
represented by the two main parties, the Popular Party (PP) and the Socialist Party (PSOE). 
Cultural and territorial issues dominated in this period as a satisfactory performance of the 
economy kept economic issues inconspicuous. After the fall of Lehman Brothers in 2008 and 
the subsequent European debt crisis in 2009, the public debate shifted dramatically. Initially, 
the economy was the main concern in the public arena and economic issues dominated the 
debate in the 2011 election. However, in the 2015 election we observe corruption and 
political regeneration gaining prominence. The economic crisis coexisted with a political 
crisis, which was also expressed in a reinvigoration of territorial issues in a new context (i.e. 
Catalan independence). In this new multipolar configuration of political conflict, the new 
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radical left (Podemos) drove these transformations by combining advocacy against austerity 
and for political renewal. 
This new scenario revealed different government-opposition dynamics. While in opposition, 
the mainstream left (PSOE) followed an accommodating strategy and joined the advocacy for 
political renewal. Moreover, the PP was challenged for the first time by a new centre-right 
party –Ciudadanos– which combined issues of political renewal, re-centralisation of the 
territorial organisation and opposition to Catalan separatism. Overall, we find evidence that 
the political space evolved from a bipolar configuration before the crisis to a multipolar one. 
The chapter is structured as follows. First, we contextualise the Spanish cleavage 
structure and review the main lines of conflict by relying on existing literature. We then 
proceed to describe the main actors and characteristics of the Spanish party system. Next, the 
unfolding of the economic and political crisis dynamics is discussed, allowing us to form 
expectations about the empirical results. These are presented next. A general discussion of 
the Spanish case concludes the chapter. 
Traditional and new divides 
After a long period of dictatorship, the societal divisions and the political agency that 
emerged during the transition to democracy responded to patterns similar to those of the 
democratic period in the 1930s (Gunther et al. 1986: 14). After some turbulent years marked 
by a consolidation of the party system and high levels of political violence (Bermeo 1997), 
the election of 1993 set the lines of conflict for the following decades (Castro 2008; Ruiz 
Jimenez 2007). We argue that the Great Recession shook this configuration of the political 
space, which had been marked by a strong alignment of the dimensions of conflict and a 
stable party system. 
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Spanish political conflicts have traditionally been articulated along the left-right 
dimension, which Spanish citizens use for heuristic cues (Torcal and Medina 2007: 277). 
This unidimensional meta-structure comprises both economic and cultural dimensions, which 
are strongly aligned in the case of Spain (Moreno 1999: 29–30; Rovny and Polk 2014: 8; 
Vidal 2018) and also encompass traditional cleavages such as religiosity and social class 
(Cainzos and Voces 2015; Calvo et al. 2010). On the economic dimension, the poles of the 
axis are represented by economic liberalism on the right and welfare on the left. At the right-
wing pole, the PP stood for the promotion of private initiative and market liberalisation 
(Balfour 2005; Michavila Nuñez 2015). At the opposite pole, the socialist party PSOE and 
the radical left coalition (IU) supported the development of the welfare state and the fight 
against economic inequality (Mendez 2007; Urquizu 2015). However, the conflictual 
character of this dimension has at times been reduced due to broad agreements on different 
social and economic policies such as pensions (Fernández-Albertos and Manzano 2012a).  
In contrast to the pacts and agreements reached over welfare policies, cultural policies 
generally remained controversial, particularly in the pre-crisis period. While the left aligned 
itself with cultural liberalism, the right embraced patriotism and the defence of traditional 
values (Ruiz Jimenez 2010, 2007). This was particularly salient during Jose Luis Rodriguez 
Zapatero’s first legislature (2004-2008), and led to a peak in polarisation (Balaguer and Sanz 
2010). The socialist party pushed for a social rights agenda regarding issues such as equal 
marriage and abortion rights (Field 2009). Supported by the upper echelons of the Catholic 
Church and conservative media outlets, the conservative PP launched a campaign against the 
government, accusing it of shattering traditional family principles (Sampedro and Seoane 
Perez 2009). At the same time, the fight against terrorism became politicised and salient, an 
issue that linked security concerns with another structuring dimension of Spanish political 
conflict: the territorial cleavage (Bonet et al. 2010). 
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The territorial cleavage can be considered the third relevant dimension of political 
conflict necessary to understand Spanish politics (Gunther and Montero 1994; Torcal 2010). 
This conflict materialises tensions regarding the territorial organisation of the state, and 
results in the presence of actors (i.e. regionalist parties) that have small concentrated 
constituencies and strong veto power in the national institutions. The 1978 constitution 
introduced a complex four-level territorial organisation1 that attempted to dilute the potential 
territorial conflict in the national arena and channel it into regional institutions (Colomer 
1998; Romero 2012). However, ethno-regionalist parties managed to consolidate their 
presence in regional institutions and enter the national arena, becoming key actors in 
government formation. 
The territorial dimension has been articulated through a number of issues, which 
include amongst others: political decentralisation or the distribution of competences between 
the state and sub-state entities; and interregional solidarity or the distribution of public 
investment amongst the regions or infrastructure policy.2 Catalonia and the Basque Country 
stood out in this conflict, claiming self-determination rights using different forms of political 
action. For instance, one of the salient actors in the Basque self-determination movement was 
a terrorist organisation (ETA), which led to a close alignment of the territorial conflict with 
cultural (security) conflicts. The PP campaign transformed the fight against terrorism from a 
                                               
1 Although the Constitution does not fully set out the nature of the territorial administration, it does mention that besides the 
national government there will be autonomous communities, provinces and local governments. The inclusion of these 
figures in the Constitutions is relevant because it crystallises them, given the complexity of the procedure to change 
the constitution. 
2 The territorial dimension of conflict has frequently comprised national infrastructure investment policies, using them as 
bargaining chips to obtain the support of ethno-regionalist parties to pass other norms. However, this bargaining has 
also influenced the internal organisation of parties, even the highly hierarchical PP (Castro 2008: 282), as the conflict 
over hydro-electric resources has frequently shown. 
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valence issue into a positional issue by connecting it to concerns about national identity 
(Astudillo 2009; Bonet et al. 2010).  
To recapitulate, the structure of political conflict in Spain has three dimensions: 
economic, cultural and territorial. We have argued that the first two were traditionally aligned 
along the left-right axis. However, we expect this configuration to have changed with the 
economic and political crises that unfolded after 2008. However, the political change that 
Kriesi et al. (2008, 2012) observed in most of western Europe does not capture the recent 
political transformations in Spain. ‘New’ cultural issues such as migration, which were at the 
core of the transformations in NWE, are largely absent from the political agenda in Spain 
(Encarnación 2004; Fernández-Albertos and Manzano 2016; Zapata-Barrero 2009). Instead, 
and in line with the overall argument put forward for southern Europe (Hutter et al. 2018), 
the combination of deep economic and political crises seems to have triggered changes in the 
configuration of the party system. Issues concerning political renewal have become more 
salient, resulting in a reinterpretation of the cultural dimension of conflict. However, before 
discussing these transformations and the crisis dynamics, in the following section we first 
review the characteristics of the institutional setting and the party system. 
Institutional setting and party system 
The 1978 Constitution defined Spain as a parliamentary monarchy with high levels of 
political decentralisation and a fuzzy delimitation of competences between administrations. 
This institutional design also permeated party organisations, translating into different 
territorial equilibria within the individual parties (Fabre 2010; Hopkin 2009). During the 
transition to democracy, the territorial organisation was designed to accommodate the 
expected territorial conflict but also to avoid the tensions that marked the Second Republic 
and led to the civil war in the 1930s (Gunther et al. 1986). As Linz and Stepan (1996: 99) 
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point out, the problem of stateness posed by Catalan and Basque nationalism was one of the 
defining challenges of Spain’s transition to democracy, and in their view it was handled 
comparatively well relative to other countries facing similar situations. Nevertheless, as this 
chapter will show, the institutional framework set up during the transition to mitigate 
territorial conflict did not make these tensions disappear, as they later re-surfaced to the 
forefront of political conflict. 
In a gamble similar to the territorial reorganisation, in the 1970s the electoral system 
was also designed behind a veil of ignorance about the true distribution of prospective 
voters,3 and it has remained unchanged since (Hopkin 2005: 376–377). Although formally 
proportional, it includes corrective elements to favour government formation, turning the 
formally proportional system into an almost majoritarian one (Lago and Montero 2005). 
Traditionally, those who benefited most from this electoral system were mainstream office-
seekers and ethno-regionalist parties with territorially concentrated support. In contrast, 
parties such as Izquierda Unida (IU) with dispersed support have found the effective 
threshold to be much higher, turning the electoral system into a strong obstacle against 
electoral success (Montero 1998; Urdánoz 2008). 
                                               
3 The Spanish electoral law devises two parallel electoral systems, one for the Congress and one for the Senate. That of the 
Congress is the main one. In this election the stakes are higher given that it leads to the appointment of the Prime 
Minister. Furthermore, its electoral rules are the ones applied by default in regional and local elections whenever the 
region concerned has not passed its own electoral law, making this combination one of the most frequent in Spain 
(Montero et al. 1992). Candidates present themselves in closed and blocked lists. The electoral rules provide for 52 
constituencies, which fill the 350 seats according to their population size, with a minimum of two seats for the least 
populated constituencies. Most of the constituencies are allocated between 3 and 5 seats. That is, their size is very 
small, contributing to the disproportionality. Within constituencies, the seats are allocated using the D’Hondt formula. 
The Senate is chosen following different rules. Most of the Senate is elected by direct suffrage in provincial 
constituencies. Voters can tick the individuals for whom they cast their vote, even from different parties (panachage), 
although this option is not frequently used by voters. The rest of the members of the Senate are elected by the regional 
parliaments (Villodres and Pereira 2002). 
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The combination of this institutional setting and the political conflict resulted in two 
main features of the Spanish party system: an imperfect bipartisanship and political parties 
strongly reliant on sub-national structures. Two main parties dominated the political arena but 
regional parties also became key players in the case of minority governments (Hopkin 2005). 
In terms of organisation, political parties struggled to balance two opposing forces: intra-
party discipline and territorial diversity. National leaders were able to exert much control 
inside parliament, given that Spain is one of the countries with the highest levels of intra-
party discipline (Sánchez de Dios 1999: 159). At the same time, subnational entities exerted 
considerable influence due to their control of resources and regional state institutions and to 
their contribution to the parties’ electoral resources (Fabre 2010; Pallarés and Keating 2003; 
Sánchez de Dios 1999). 
Table 4.1 summarises the election results and party system features for the years 
2004-2016.4 As the table indicates, the 2011 election shows the first signs of transformation 
of an otherwise stable party system. With the emergence of the two new challenger parties in 
2015 – and the subsequent election in 2016 – we observe an explosion of volatility, a 
corresponding increase in the effective number of parties and the lowest proportion of votes 
for the mainstream parties recorded. Although voter turnout declined in the 2011 election, the 
new parties seemed to drive participation back to pre-crisis levels. All in all, the changes 
initiated in 2011 seem to have been reinforced in 2015 and consolidated in 2016. The Spanish 
party system went from being dominated by two main parties to a scenario with four parties, 
two on each side of the ideological spectrum. 
                                               
4 The recall election held in 2016 is not included in the analyses of political conflict given that the issues are close to the 
ones dealt with in the preceding campaign. However, we do include the election in the introduction to describe its 
outcome and to fully cover the crisis period. 
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Table 4.1 Election results and party system features: percentages and index results. 
Election 2004 2008 2011 2015 2016 
Election results (vote share)1  
Mainstream right 37.71 40.38 45.23 28.89 33.01 
PP2 37.71 40.38 45.23 28.89 33.01 
Mainstream left 42.59 44.36 29.16 22.14 22.63 
PSOE3 42.59 44.36 29.16 22.14 22.63 
Mainstream others 4.96 5.01 11.78 3.7 - 
IU/Unidad Popular (radical left) 4.96 3.81 7.02 3.7 - 
UPyD (centre-right) - 1.2 4.76 - - 
Ethnorregionalist4 10.99 7.15 10.42 9.74 9.7 
CiU/DyL 3.23 3.06 4.22 2.26 2.01 
ERC 2.52 1.14 1.01 2.4 2.66 
ICV-EUIA 0.92 - - - - 
PNV-EAJ 1.65 1.2 1.35 1.2 1.19 
EA/Amaiur/Bildu 0.32 - 1.39 0.87 0.77 
CC 0.92 0.68 0.59 0.32 0.33 
BNG 0.82 0.83 0.76 - - 
CHA 0.37 - - - - 
Na-Bai/Gbai 0.24 0.24 0.17 - - 
Compromís - - 0.52 2.69 2.74 
FAC - - 0.41 - - 
Challenger left 0 0 0 18.12 18.41 
Podemos - - - 18.12 18.41 
Challenger right 0 0 0 14.04 13.06 
Ciudadanos - - - 14.04 13.06 
Party system features  
Turnout (percent) 75.7 73.8 68.9 73.2 66.5 
Volatility A 1.3 1.3 2.4 24.8  
Volatility B 8.4 2.7 12.2 11.5  
Volatility A+B 9.7 4.0 14.6 36.3  
Effective number of parties (seats) 2.5 2.3 2.6 4.5 4.2 
Mainstream party vote 85.26 89.75 86.17 54.73 55.64 
Asymmetry5 9.84 6.59 -13.81 -3.05 -10.38 
Polarization (0 to1; own media data) 0.17 0.26 0.19 0.35 - 
1 The table only reports the vote share of parties that made it to Parliament. 
2 Vote share includes that obtained by parties that have ran in coalition with PP such as UPN, PAR or FAC in 
2015. 
3 Vote share includes the percentage obtained by PSOE-PSC. Sometimes it is reported separately due to the 
peculiar relationship between the Catalan party and the national federation. 
4 Some of these parties have changed brands across elections. They have been reported together to ease 
interpretation of the table. 
5 This indicator is calculated by subtracting the vote for mainstream right to the mainstream left.  
Asymmetry = (PSOE+IU/UP) – (PP+UPyD)  
Sources: Electoral results were obtained from the Parliament's website 
(http://www.congreso.es/consti/elecciones/generales/index.jsp). Indexes are the result of author's own 
calculations and those contained in the ParlGov dataset (http://www.parlgov.org/explore/esp/election/). 
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PP and PSOE are the two mainstream parties. The period under study starts when PSOE 
unexpectedly5 regained office after eight years of PP government. The successes and failures 
of the PSOE in the 1980s and early 1990s left it a party in deep trouble, from which it only 
managed to recover in the initial phase of Rodriguez Zapatero’s leadership (Rico 2007; 
Urquizu 2015). Zapatero’s first legislature was articulated around the extension of civic rights 
and a revitalisation of the territorial conflict, while the second legislature focused on the 
outbreak of the economic crisis.6 PSOE’s perceived incapacity to manage the crisis and be 
loyal to its constituencies generated tensions that led to severe disputes within the party.  
On the right of the spectrum, PP had long been the only contestant. From 2003, 
Mariano Rajoy acted as party leader after a personal decision by former president Aznar 
(Michavila Nuñez 2015). Rajoy proved to be a political survivor, losing three elections before 
he won his first in 2011, due to a debacle in the socialist party. During his time in office, he 
cultivated the image of a trustworthy man (Botti 2013; Martínez and Rodríguez 2015), 
allowing him to remain in office despite a succession of corruption scandals and the 
implementation of drastic austerity policies. During his first legislature, some of the regional 
allies voiced discontent, one of the most notorious being former minister Francisco Alvarez-
Cascos, who founded his own party, FAC. In the 2015 and 2016 elections, however, all of 
these voices were appeased, and they re-edited existing coalitions such as the one in Navarre 
with UPN. 
Although our results do not show a large presence of regionalist actors in the electoral 
campaigns,7 their content and development cannot be understood without keeping in mind the 
                                               
5 This victory was unexpected because the polls predicted that the PP would again win the election, but the 11 March 
terrorist attacks right before the 2004 election appears to have influenced the electoral result (see Montalvo 2012). 
6 See Table 2A in the Appendix for a summary of the governments in the period covered. 
7 Regionalist parties are excluded from the empirical analysis due to the low number of observations that are reported in the 
selected newspapers. Given that the newspapers analysed have a national readership, they tend to over-represent 
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key role of these actors in agenda-setting and government formation (Bonet et al. 2010). 
Their territorially concentrated political support made some of them government parties in 
their regions (mainly PNV and CiU) but vote-seekers in the national arena, able to place their 
demands on the agenda. The overlap of cleavages reflects the difficulties that national parties 
face in these regions as they compete on every dimension. In other words, there are leftist 
ethno-regionalist parties like ERC, Compromís and Bildu, and rightist regionalist parties such 
as PNV and CiU. 
Finally, during the pre-crisis period, two parties became proto-challengers: Izquierda 
Unida (radical left) and UPyD (moderate right). Both parties tried to challenge the status quo, 
advocating for a better quality of democracy, amongst other issues. Izquierda Unida is a 
coalition of very small radical left parties, including the Communists. The short-lived UPyD 
was founded by Rosa Díez, a former socialist leader, in 2007 after discontent with the way 
the party managed issues related to decentralisation. It dissolved after the 2015 election.8 
Crises and crisis dynamics 
The electoral dynamics of the crisis followed a two-stage process. First, as the economic 
voting literature would predict, the incumbent was punished and voters turned to the 
mainstream opposition. PSOE lost the 2011 election to PP, which won an absolute majority 
(186 seats and 44.6 percent of the vote). Second, the poor performance of the incumbent and 
the incapacity of the opposition to offer different policy solutions opened a window of 
opportunity for new actors to enter the political competition. In the 2015 election, although 
                                               
national actors at the expense of regional parties. This explains the limited number of cases compared to their 
prominence in the political arena. 
8 UPyD and IU have been labelled ‘proto-challengers, because they intended to play this role in the political system but they 
were never able to succeed in the way Podemos and Ciudadanos did. UPyD disappeared because Ciudadanos 
occupied its space, and IU is struggling to find a place, whether as a competitor of Podemos or as an ally. 
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PP remained the most voted party, its vote share decreased substantially (123 seats and 28.7 
percent of the vote), while PSOE was unable to capitalise on the shifting vote (90 seats and 
22 percent of the vote). Two new forces emerged on either side of the political spectrum – 
Podemos (new radical left) and Ciudadanos (centre-right) – which benefitted from these 
floating voters, putting an end to the political dynamics that had been dominant for decades.  
After apparently solid economic growth since the mid-90s, Zapatero’s cabinet faced 
the financial crisis following the fall of Lehman Brothers in 2008 with optimism, assuring 
citizens that “the Spanish economy is well prepared to face a situation like the one that we 
have gone through with the turbulence of the financial sector.”9 However, such optimism 
proved to be ill-founded (for a review of the causes see Royo 2014). By 2010, the same 
socialist government had completely shifted its discourse and talked about “special, singular 
and extraordinary efforts” regarding the austerity policies introduced to face the economic 
downturn, including raising taxes, cutting salaries, reducing pensions and reigning in social 
spending. 
The implementation of the neoliberal recipes foisted on Spain by the Troika continued 
with the approval of a labour market reform and a change to the constitution agreed with PP 
to cap public debt (article 135 of the Constitution). In a fashion very similar to the dynamics 
behind the collapse of many Latin-American party systems during the 80s as described by 
Roberts (2013), the Spanish party system witnessed a neoliberal convergence of the two main 
parties. PSOE favoured ‘responsibility’ instead of ‘responsiveness’ (Mair 2009), at the cost 
of being perceived to be an undifferentiated alternative to the mainstream right. In Lupu’s 
(2016) words, this produced a brand dilution that reduced the differences between the two 
mainstream parties. 
                                               
9 See http://www.elmundo.es/elmundo/2008/09/16/espana/1221587906.html. 
 - 86 - 
It was precisely this lack of perceived differences between the two mainstream parties 
that was voiced with the slogan “PP and PSOE are the same” in the protests that took place in 
May 2011, triggered by several organisations, amongst which ‘Democracia Real Ya’ (Real 
Democracy Now!) stood out. As in other countries (della Porta 2015), a wave of anti-
austerity protests gave way to a new movement: The Indignados or ‘15-M’ movement. Their 
claims were not limited to anti-austerity but also arose concerns about the Spanish political 
system and widespread corruption (Anduiza et al. 2014; Calvo 2013). Amidst the turmoil in 
the protest arena and after a rocky legislature, prime minister Zapatero called an early 
election for November 2011. 
This election was mainly dominated by economic concerns and the government’s lack 
of ability to restrain unemployment rates. Although the Indignados movement had already 
raised concerns relating to the political crisis, a soaring destruction of jobs and worsening 
economic indicators monopolised the political discussion. In fact, unemployment remained 
the most important problem in the eyes of the citizens.10 At the time of the election, the 
political crisis did not materialise institutionally, amongst other things because no 
institutional actor credibly represented preferences for democratic renewal. 
PP’s landslide victory, however, neither deterred the introduction of further austerity 
measures nor appeased a growing sense of political dissatisfaction reflected in the growing 
levels of mistrust towards key political institutions (García-Albacete et al. 2016a; Muro and 
Vidal 2016). In fact, a series of corruption scandals further contributed to the widespread 
disenchantment. As Orriols and Cordero (2016: 6) point out, the three largest scandals were 
the Gürtel case, the Bárcenas papers and the ‘black credit cards’ of Caja Madrid/Bankia. 
Unsurprisingly, corruption and the political elite soon became the issues of most concern to 
                                               
10 Corruption only started becoming a main issue in 2011 (see Orriols & Cordero, 2016). Until then, unemployment was the 
main issue. 
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the Spanish citizenry. Given the new government’s incapacity to ameliorate the economic 
situation in addition to the corruption scandals, it did not take long for its support to decline. 
In 2014, a new party called Podemos ran in the European election and surpassed all 
expectations in the polls, obtaining close to 8 percent of the vote. With an explicit anti-
austerity agenda and an unequivocal populist rhetoric, the new formation presented itself as a 
party of the people inspired by the Indignados movement. Founded by a group of political 
science lecturers and leftist activists, Podemos at first tried to appeal to a heterogeneous 
platform by focusing on political discontent and anti-elitism. However, leftist activists and 
their own electorate soon pushed them within the radical left, to the despair of those in the 
party who advocated against left-right politics (Fernández-Albertos 2015b; Galindo et al. 
2015). This inconsistency seems to have hindered Podemos’ capacity to fully benefit from 
the turbulent situation amongst the socialist ranks. 
In a very short period the newcomer managed to connect with the wider sense of 
dissatisfaction deriving from the economic and political crisis, particularly appealing to the 
young, urban and educated strata of society that showed clear signs of distrust towards the 
main political institutions (Vidal 2018). In 2015, with the support of smaller factions of the 
party at the municipal level in large Spanish cities such as Barcelona, Madrid, Valencia and 
A Coruña, Podemos obtained 20.7 percent of the vote. 
Changes were not limited to the configuration of the left camp in the party system. 
The right also saw the rise of a challenger: Ciudadanos, which obtained 14 percent in the 
2015 election. Rodríguez Teruel and Barrio (2016) identify two main reasons for this 
breakthrough. On the one hand, the continued uncovering of corruption scandals within PP 
facilitated Ciudadanos’ capitalisation on demands for “political renewal, transparency and 
democratic regeneration” (Rodríguez Teruel and Barrio 2016: 2), a fertile ground also 
exploited by Podemos. On the other hand, the strengthening of the territorial dimension in 
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Catalonia weakened the Catalan branch of PSOE (PSC), opening a space for an outspoken 
anti-Catalan-nationalist party. 
The Catalan secessionist challenge was, in fact, a fundamental aspect of the political 
crisis. While the pre-crisis period was dominated by security concerns and disagreement over 
the way to defeat terrorists in the Basque country, the within-crisis period revolved around 
Catalan claims for independence. A reform of the Statute of Autonomy and a ruling by the 
Constitutional Court led to a surge in confrontation between the Catalan and national elites. 
The arrival of PP in government and the implementation of austerity only added fuel to this 
conflict (Barrio and Rodríguez-Teruel 2016: 10). A demonstration on 11 September 2013 
showed that the conflict had taken on a different meaning amongst citizens, producing a 
whole new level of support.11 Instead of further autonomy, independence became the main 
demand. The revival of the Catalan issue has been attributed to a process of ethnic 
polarisation based on elite-driven motivations (Barrio and Rodríguez-Teruel 2016) in which 
identity, as well as partisanship, were the main drivers of support for secession (Muñoz and 
Tormos 2015). While PP and Ciudadanos had a clear position regarding the territorial 
organisation, both PSOE and Podemos struggled to place themselves on this issue. Podemos 
supported holding a referendum but PSOE rejected it, supporting a constitutional reform 
instead. 
The combination of PSOE’s neoliberal turn, the reinvigoration of the Catalan conflict 
and the emergence of two new parties on different sides of the political spectrum left the 
socialists in a difficult situation. Despite its initial reluctance to position itself in the political 
spectrum, Podemos became a solid competitor on the left, while Ciudadanos positioned itself 
                                               
11 The movement in favour of Catalan independence holds demonstrations every 11 September, the Catalan national day, 
commemorating the fall of Catalonia to Bourbon troops in 1714. Since 2012, mass demonstrations have been held but 
none as successful or as numerous as the one held in 2013. That year, the Catalan National Assembly coordinated 
citizens to make a human chain that stretched over 400 km. 
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on the moderate right. In this new scenario, the socialist party had little choice but to adapt its 
discourse and distance itself from its recent past, although the new leadership did not 
necessarily reflect this change.12 If the party was to retain its image of a transformative force 
in Spanish politics, it had to incorporate the demands for political renewal raised by the new 
challengers. Being in opposition facilitated PSOE’s adoption of the demands for political 
renewal. 
In sum, the crisis dynamics in Spain were the product of an interplay among a 
deteriorating economy, a substantial loss of credibility on the part of the traditional parties 
and a strengthening of the Catalan territorial conflict that followed. Following a period 
marked by stability, the economic shock introduced these new issues onto the political 
agenda and brought about volatility and political incertitude. We expect our evidence to show 
the potential for a new multipolar structure of conflict revolving around austerity, political 
renewal and the reinvigoration of the territorial conflict. After the socialists’ debacle in 2011, 
a space opened up for a leftist alternative to tap into feelings of anti-elitism and anti-austerity 
(see Hutter et al. 2018). We expect Podemos, the new left challenger, to induce an alignment 
of left economic issues and democratic renewal. Likewise, a space on the centre-right opened 
up for a challenger able to combine the transversal claims for democratic renewal (i.e. anti-
corruption) with a new strain of the territorial conflict expressed in the Catalan secessionist 
challenge. Ciudadanos, the new liberal party, seized this new space. Finally, we also expect 
government-opposition dynamics to be reflected in these transformations. 
The content and structure of party competition 
In this section, we describe the dynamics of party competition during the electoral campaigns 
                                               
12 In fact, the new candidate was Alfredo Perez Rubalcaba, who had previously acted as vice-president, minister of the 
interior and spokesperson for the government, thus not signifying a strong break with past policies. 
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as reported by the media. To observe the impact of the crisis we cover two elections before 
the outbreak of the Great Recession (2004, 2008) and two elections afterwards (2011, 
2015).13 We begin by discussing the salience and politicisation of the main issues that 
structured the campaigns over time together with the parties’ positioning on these issues. We 
then explore the transforming configuration of the political spaces.14 
A comparison of the salience and politicisation (salience x polarisation) of the main 
issues covered in the pre-and post-crisis campaigns largely confirms our expectations about 
the main issues that structured party competition in Spain. Figure 4.1 illustrates the salience 
and politicisation of a set of aggregate issues during each of the campaigns covered. Figure 
4.2 illustrates the party positions with regard to the different issue levels. 
Figure 4.1 Salience of issues by election 
 
                                               
13 Although some of the results of the 2016 election are also discussed, this election became mostly about parties blaming 
each other for the need to repeat the election. Moreover, the story told in this chapter is about the transformative 
nature of the elections in which new challengers emerged, and which the 2016 one did not change. 
14 For an overview of the main events during the four campaigns covered, see Table 1A in the Appendix. 
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In the 2004 campaign, the most salient category is that of ‘old’ cultural issues, which 
encompasses issues relating to security and defence. One of the key components of this issue 
is related to terrorism. At the time, the Basque terrorist organisation ETA was being 
relentlessly pursued by the police with notable detentions. Fighting terrorism thus became the 
most discussed issue during the campaign. PP tried to build issue ownership on security and 
the fight against terrorism, particularly after Carod Rovira (the ex-leader of the left-wing 
Catalan nationalist party ERC) was found to have met with members of the organisation and 
received offers of a ceasefire only in Catalonia. Until then, fighting terrorism had been a 
valence issue but disagreements over the strategy to disband ETA led PP to put the issue on 
the agenda,15 which explains the low levels of politicisation of the issue reported in Figure 
4.1. The participation of Spain in the Iraq war also contributed to the salience of the category, 
with PSOE promising to withdraw troops and PP planning to keep them in the field. The Iraq 
                                               
15 PNV/Abertzale left were strongly criticised for their ambivalence regarding terrorism. At this point, the Ajuria Enea 
Agreement was broken and PP and PSOE stopped being a united front supporting each other’s policies. 
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war issue, however, was secondary to terrorism.16 These issues would linger on into the next 
legislature, when the socialist government pursued negotiations that led to a permanent 
ceasefire (Leonisio et al. 2016) and pulled out the troops from Iraq. At the same time, this 
period was also characterised by growing demands of the Catalan and Basque autonomies for 
further recognition, which led to a negotiation of new autonomy laws in an attempt to 
mitigate territorial tensions. 
One of the substantial differences between the 2004 and 2008 campaigns is the 
emphasis on cultural liberalism. During the legislature, the winning party of the 2004 
elections, PSOE, focused heavily on civil rights issues such as abortion, allocations for 
dependents, gender quotas and equal marriage, despite the social resistance rallied by the 
Catholic Church. This is reflected in the most salient issues of the 2008 campaign in the 
‘new’ cultural category, which encompass all these cultural issues relating to civil rights but 
also immigration-related issues. The socialist government eased the process of naturalisation 
and this was not well received by the conservatives. The PP responded by trying to build a 
position problematising migration, particularly that from Muslim countries. This is clearly 
reflected in the high degree of polarisation and the correspondingly high level of 
politicisation of ‘new’ cultural issues in Figure 4.1. Although early signs of the economic 
crisis already started to show during the 2008 campaign, issues relating to welfare had not yet 
become polarised. However, the debate around cultural issues also spurred the debate around 
democratic reform. UPyD ran for the first time in this election to capitalise on this issue,17 
although with very modest results, as can be seen from Table 4.1. Overall, these results 
suggest that the pre-crisis elections were dominated by the territorial and cultural dimensions 
                                               
16 Note that three days before the election Spain witnessed its worst Al-Qaeda terrorist attack. The proximity to the election 
day made it largely absent from the sample. 
17 Although UPyD ran for the first time in the 2008 election, our results do not include it because of the low number of 
observations. 
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of conflict, reflecting a bipolar configuration of the political space. Furthermore, the results 
confirm the highly polarising nature of cultural issues, except for terrorism, which remained 
salient but not polarised. 
In terms of issues, the picture changed radically with the first crisis election in 2011. 
Economic liberalism and welfare became the most salient issues by far, completely 
structuring the conflict in the campaign. The economic crisis was unleashing its full effects 
and the political debate mostly focused on issues relating to austerity measures and reforms, 
such as privatising health care, reducing unemployment, estate tax, budgetary rigor, 
retirement provisions and social justice. The increase in salience of economic issues trumped 
that of cultural issues. Political renewal, mostly pushed by UPyD, obtained some traction 
after the 15-M mobilisations, but the political issues were overshadowed by economic 
concerns. 
As anticipated, the 2015 campaign shows a different stage of the crises. Economic liberalism 
and welfare-related issues were still highly salient. However, the results also show some 
differences with respect to 2011. For instance, regionalism was no longer related to Basque 
terrorism but to the Catalan claim for independence. The Catalan secessionist challenge was 
by far the most recurrent issue during the campaign. Traditionally, territorial organisation had 
related to democratic and power-sharing views: leftist parties in Spain supported a more 
decentralising approach while the right preferred more centralisation. Faced with the 
challenge of a secession referendum, circumstances forced both old and new parties to take 
positions, as Figure 4.2 shows. Ciudadanos has run on a platform against Catalanism since its 
foundation and stands strongly against independence. Likewise, PP defended national unity 
as a strategy to improve its electoral gains outside Catalonia. In the left camp, the limits of 
power-sharing caused more tensions within the parties. While Podemos advocated holding a 
referendum but campaigned in favour of remaining, the socialists were divided between 
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different forms of federal solutions. 
Figure 4.2 Position of parties by election on main issues 
 
Besides the economy and the Catalan referendum, the political crisis re-emerged, agitated 
mainly by the new parties. Issues such as political renewal, reforms of the political system, 
direct democracy and the fight against corruption became an integral part of the political 
conflict. If in the regionalist conflict Podemos stood alone against all the other national 
parties, with respect to political renewal it was the PP which was opposed to all the others. 
The dominant dynamic was that of government-opposition. The new parties had strong 
incentives to build platforms on these issues, insisting on their novelty as opposed to existing 
institutionalised bad practices. 
Overall, the crisis campaigns show a picture that is very different from that of the pre-
crisis campaigns, with a new radical left party leading these transformations. Cultural issues 
are replaced by issues relating to political reforms, while regionalist issues change in content 
and are largely intensified. The 2015 election was dominated by issues concerning political 
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renewal and the Catalan secessionist challenge, confirming the incapacity of the political 
system to circumscribe the territorial conflict to the subnational arenas. To better observe the 
conflict alignments, structuring dimensions and government-opposition dynamics, we turn to 
the more sophisticated methods of multidimensional scaling to observe the relational 
distances between the different issues and actors across the elections. 
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Political Spaces 
Using graphical representations of multidimensional scaling for the issues and party positions 
(see Appendix of Chapter 3), we can shed light on the structures of party competition over 
time and observe how conflicts relate to one another. Figure 4.3 shows the structure of 
political spaces in the 2004, 2008, 2011 and 2015 campaigns. 
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At first glance, we observe a similar structure for the first two elections. This begins shifting 
in 2011 and fundamentally transforms in 2015. The evidence shows that in the pre-crisis 
elections there is a strong integration of the economic and cultural dimensions, the opposite 
poles being represented by PP –closer to issues such as economic liberalism, defence, 
security and immigration– and PSOE –closer to welfare, cultural liberalism, education, 
regionalism and the environment. This largely confirms the expectation of an aligned 
structure of conflict on the left-right dimension producing a bipolar configuration, which has 
been reported to be of particular importance in the case of Spain (Rovny and Polk 2014). 
A closer look at the configuration in 2011 shows the first signs that a transformation 
was underway. Both IU and UPyD stand close to political reform and new politics, 
foreshadowing the structure that ultimately defined the 2015 election. However, as discussed 
in the previous paragraphs, the 2011 election largely focused on economic issues. It 
nonetheless represents a transition stage to a period where the mainstream options were not 
able to truly differentiate from one another and new alternatives emerged. 
Lastly, the 2015 campaign data shows the aftermath of a political earthquake. Two 
new parties enter the scene, raising democratic renewal issues. Three points call for attention. 
First, Podemos and Ciudadanos were aligned with issues regarding democratic reform. Even 
if Ciudadanos successfully capitalised discontent on the right, Podemos, the new left, should 
be credited with having put the issue on the agenda, institutionalising demands that had 
frequently been heard at demonstrations since the outbreak of the crisis. Second, the fact that 
two direct competitors gave salience to issues of democratic renewal forced PSOE, the 
mainstream left, to reposition itself. It could do this because it was in opposition. Third, the 
territorial dimension remained a cross-cutting conflict throughout the entire period, even if 
the content substantively changed. While the new parties shared views on the need for 
renewal, they were strongly split over how to address the Catalan situation, with Podemos 
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defending the negotiations to hold a referendum and Ciudadanos opposing them on the 
grounds that consultations are illegal and against national unity. These dynamics created a 
new configuration of conflict with multiple poles, as can be observed from the enlargement 
of the grey areas in Figure 4.3. Whereas in the pre-crisis period the main actors aligned along 
a single dimension, the 2011 and most notably the 2015 elections show how the public 
debated enlarged around the issues of political renewal and austerity. 
Conclusions: Towards a multipolar space? 
In line with the ideal-typical scenarios for southern Europe described in Hutter et al. (2018), 
the story of Spain is that of a process of transformation. The Great Recession triggered a 
political crisis of major proportions that introduced pronounced changes in the party system 
configuration and the political agenda. We find that the pre-crisis elections displayed a stable 
bipolar competition between PP and PSOE, supported by ethno-regionalist parties. Cultural 
issues, security concerns and the territorial conflict dominated the public debate. In contrast, 
the crisis elections exhibited volatility and change. This change was driven by demands for 
political renewal and anti-austerity positions together with the Catalan secessionist crisis 
facilitating Spain’s transformation to a multipolar party system with the emergence of two 
new parties: Podemos and Ciudadanos. Overall, the Spanish experience deviates from the 
general southern European expectations in two main respects. First, a new liberal party 
emerged linked to the activation of the territorial conflict. Second, no populist radical right 
party emerged during the crisis period. However, this might be changing with a new party, 
Vox, which gained 12 seats in the 2018 regional elections in Andalucía and could make it to 
the national parliament in the next general elections (see Chapter 7). 
As in the other southern European countries, the economy played a prominent role in 
the first Spanish crisis election (2011). Although some signs of political dissatisfaction and 
 - 99 - 
demands for political renewal were already present in the protest arena, the debate centred 
around austerity measures and reforms. The implementation of austerity policies by the 
socialist government during the legislature showed a certain degree of convergence between 
the main office-seeking parties. This lack of a clear political alternative opened the space for 
new actors to enter the political competition. The second crisis election (2015) reflected this 
new structural space with the emergence of a new populist left party: Podemos. Comparable 
to the Greek experience (Altiparmakis 2018), a new party on the left could capitalise on the 
erosion of the social-democrats due to the implementation of austerity policies enforced by 
supranational institutions. 
While the emergence of Podemos fits the general story of SE quite accurately, the 
Spanish case deviates from the expected general pattern as a new centre-liberal party, 
Ciudadanos, also emerged. Building on its experience in Catalan politics, it ran as both a 
response to the Catalan secessionist challenge, which became an integral part of the political 
crisis, and as another option to renew the political landscape and substitute the existing 
corrupt elite. A second particularity of the Spanish case is that none of the new challenger 
parties belonged to the populist radical right. Several interpretations have been advanced for 
this phenomenon, such as the fact that the territorial dimension in Spain implies that the 
nativist discourse is already ‘occupied’ (Alonso and Rovira Kaltwasser 2015), that migrants 
were already amongst the unprotected in a strongly dualised labour market (Fernández-
Albertos and Manzano 2016; Zapata-Barrero 2009) and that there simply was no political 
agent capable of succeeding (Mendes forthcoming). In this respect, our findings show that 
despite the PP’s feeble attempt to politicise the immigration issue in the 2008 campaign 
neither the structural space nor the content of political conflict facilitated any possibility for 
such a type of party to capitalise on the discontent. Yet, the Catalan secessionist issue (see 
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Chapter 6) might have altered this pattern by opening space for a far-right party to capitalise 
on Spanish nationalism and against Spanish separatism. 
Although the story told in this chapter stops with the emergence of the new 
challengers in the 2015 election, it is important to add some lines on the events that followed. 
The 2015 election resulted in a virtual tie between the four front-runners, to the point that 
none of them could form a government coalition, and so a new election was held in 2016. 
Conflict in this campaign was largely about how the preceding negotiations had developed. 
Few substantive policies were discussed. After tense negotiations, PP finally managed to 
form a government again with the abstention of PSOE and the support of Ciudadanos. 
Paradoxically, while the multi-party scenario seems to reflect demands for change in the 
political system, the ‘out with the old’ discourse driving these transformations did not 
materialise in the conservatives being kicked out of office, and Mariano Rajoy became 
president for the third time. 
Whether the new actors and lines of conflict will stabilise in the long term remains to 
be seen. Despite some signs of crystallisation, the demand-side structure of political 
competition in Spain remains largely unidimensional in terms of economic and cultural issues 
(see Chapter 5). Moreover, the issues concerning political renewal, upon which the new 
parties campaigned, have an expiry date. That is, once parties are established or have 
assumed government responsibility they can hardly sustain a discourse of political renewal. 
While political issues have contributed to a reinterpretation of the cultural dimension, they 
may in the long-term be replaced once again by ‘new’ cultural issues. Indeed, one possibility 
is that the current configuration evolves into one like that of the north-western European 
countries, with a new cultural divide cross-cutting the economic dimension of political 
competition, encompassing issues such as European integration, nationalism and 
immigration. This would open up political spaces through a combination of new ‘issue 
 - 101 - 
packages’ onto which challengers could consolidate their positions. For the time being, in this 
rather exceptional transition period we find little evidence, however, of such a convergence to 
a north-western European type of conflict structure.
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Chapter 5. Challenging Business as Usual? 
The Rise of New Parties in Spain in Times of Crisis 
Introduction 
The 2015 Spanish general elections put an end to the two-party system that had existed since 
the country’s transition to democracy. The two traditional parties that had dominated the 
Spanish political arena for over 30 years, the conservative Partido Popular (PP) and the 
social-democrat Partido Socialista Obrero Español (PSOE), obtained its worst electoral results 
ever. Together, they amounted to 50.7 percent of the vote, a significant drop since the 2011 
elections (73.4 percent), and even more significant since the elections in 2008 (83.8 percent). 
The poor results of the two traditional parties were capitalised by two emerging formations: a 
populist left wing party, Podemos (20.7 percent); and a centre right liberal party, Ciudadanos 
(13.9 percent). The drastic political changes that the polls had been foretelling finally 
consolidated. Why did close to 35% of the electorate chose to vote for new parties in the 
general elections of 2015? Most importantly, what do the answers to these questions tell us 
about the magnitude and type of political change that is underway in Spain? 
While theories on economic voting predict the punishment of incumbent governments 
during times of economic crisis, they shed little light as to the political consequences of a 
wider sense of political dissatisfaction with the overall political system. The mass 
mobilisations in the protest arena that took place in May 2011 with the ‘Indignados’ 
movement, and the widespread mistrust towards both national and European political 
institutions appreciable in public opinion polls, indicate the need to consider alternative 
explanations beyond reward and punishment models based on economic performance. Using 
the 2015 and 2016 post-electoral survey data from the CIS to conduct an empirical analysis of 
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voting behaviour, I argue that the theoretical prism of crisis of representation allows to best 
understand the emergence of the two new parties in Spain. 
The empirical analysis reveals that the economic voting approach to understand the 
emergence of new parties does not uncover the full story. Although voters of Podemos are 
more critical of in their perceptions of the economy, neither pocketbook nor sociotropic 
evaluations seem to clearly distinguish the voters of new parties from voters of the 
mainstream parties. Instead, it is the attitudes of dissatisfaction towards the political system 
and the will for political regeneration which make a difference. Moreover, examining the 
voters of new parties shows that they do not substantially differ in traditional economic and 
cultural issue positions when compared to the mainstream parties, and that the demand-side 
structure of political conflict remains largely unidimensional. In this unidimensional structure, 
Podemos capitalises the critical voters on the left while Ciudadanos does so on the right. 
Lastly, there is an important general divide: it is those concerned with the political situation 
but especially amongst the young who are more likely to vote for new parties. 
While it may be too early to talk about lasting or durable patterns, focusing on Spain 
as a case study contributes to the understanding of the political consequences of economic 
shocks, which might allow us to grasp broader political transformations in the shadow of the 
Great Recession. The article is structured as follows. The next section contextualises the 
Spanish case and reviews theories on the emergence of new parties, economic voting, and 
crisis of representation; giving way to a set of expectations on the ideological structure and 
vote characteristics of new parties. The methodology and operationalisation are then briefly 
discussed before introducing the results. Finally, some concluding remarks are presented. 
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Party system breakdown and the emergence and success of new parties 
The evolution of the Spanish electoral arena during the crisis, as illustrated in Figure 5.1, 
underwent a two-step process: 1) the punishment of the incumbent in favour of the 
mainstream opposition; and 2) the emergence of two challenger parties. In the first crisis 
election (2011) we observe that the mainstream opposition (PP) benefited from the 
punishment of the incumbent (PSOE), eventually obtaining a clear majority of the votes. In 
the second crisis elections (2015), however, it was not the mainstream opposition (PSOE) 
who capitalized on the punishment of the incumbent for the deteriorating economic situation, 
nor was ultimately the extreme left (IU). Instead, two new parties on the left (Podemos) and 
the centre (Ciudadanos) suddenly emerged putting a tentative end to the stable Spanish two-
party system that was consolidated in the 2016 elections1. The Spanish case perfectly fits the 
predicament of Hernández and Kriesi (2015), who claim that ‘the cumulated effect of the 
Great Recession goes far beyond the short-term punishment of incumbents’, where ‘other 
mainstream parties which habitually govern hardly benefited from the predicament of the 
incumbents’ (Hernández and Kriesi 2015: 19). 
                                               
1 For an analysis on the differences between the 2015 and 2016 elections see Simón (2017). 
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Figure 5.1 The Emergence of Podemos and Ciudadanos in the Polls 
 
Notes: Dotted vertical lines indicate elections: General Elections 2008; 2011; European Elections 2014 (light 
gray); General Elections 2015 and 2016. From May 2016, United Left forms a coalition together with 
Podemos called Unidos Podemos, thus they are represented together. Podemos also includes regional 
parties such as Marea (Galicia), En Comú Podem (Catalonia) and Compromís (Valencia). 
Source: CIS Barometer Databank. 
How can we explain these unexpected changes in voting behaviour? Most research focusing 
on the emergence and success of new political parties has relied on either institutional —
including the type of electoral system, electoral rules or the structure of the state, amongst 
others (Harmel and Robertson 1985; Müller-Rommel 1998; Hino 2012; Jackman and Volpert 
1996; Abedi 2002; Ladrech 1989)—; sociological explanations —in line with socioeconomic 
conditions (Dalton et al. 1984; Franklin et al. 1992; Knigge 1998; Lubbers et al. 2002), value 
orientations of a society (Inglehart 1997; Golder 2003), or cleavage structures (Kriesi et al. 
2006, 2008, 2012)—; and spatial strategic models of party competition (Rohrschneider 1993; 
Harmel and Svasand 1997; Meguid 2005) following a Downsian perspective whereby the 
strategic actions of the parties enhance or hamper opportunities for new parties to emerge. For 
instance, the emergence and success of New Left parties, as well as of the Populist Radical 
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Right (PRR), has been explained on the basis of socioeconomic explanations such as the 
‘enlargement of the tertiary sector, the substantial expansion of educational opportunities 
during the past two decades, the increasing usage of mass media, and the significant increase 
in geographical and social mobility of voters’ (Rohrschneider 1993: 683). Other studies have 
found that economic variables such as unemployment increase the probability of PRR’s 
success (Knigge 1998; Lubbers et al. 2002). 
Most notably, Kriesi et al. (2012, 2008, 2006) have gone a long way in explaining the 
emergence of a new cultural cleavage (integration-demarcation) that reshapes party systems 
in North-Western Europe. According to the authors, two waves of transformations rendered a 
new structure of conflict by which to understand the emergence of the New Left and the PRR: 
1) endogenous socio-economic transformations that weakened traditional class and religions 
cleavages and 2) exogenous processes such as globalisation and EU integration. The story of 
the new cultural cleavage proposed by Kriesi and his colleagues, however, does not travel 
well to Southern Europe, where equivalent transformations did not occur. Arguably, the 
fascist legacies and other supply-side factors in these countries weakened the opportunity 
structures for the emergence of a new populist right (Alonso and Rovira Kaltwasser 2015), 
while class struggles sustained the competition between the social-democrats and the 
communist, thus diminishing the structural opportunities for the New Left. In short, the 
attenuation of classic cleavages that is appreciable in North-Western Europe (NWE) contrasts 
with a story of the prevalence of traditional cleavages in the South. In this regard, the 
structure of conflict would be more similar to Central and Eastern Europe than to NWE 
(Rohrschneider and Whitefield 2012). 
In the case of Spain, the traditional left-right cleavage has been shown to be 
particularly strong amongst voters. Rovin and Polik’s (2014) show that there is a high 
correlation between both socio-cultural and economic issues that can be understood under a 
single dimension, speaking against the emergence a new cultural divide. Fernández-Albertos 
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(2017) suggest that this remains the case despite the emergence of new parties. If the structure 
of conflict remains indeed unidimensional and issue preferences are correlated under a single 
dimension, we can conclude that the emergence of new parties is not due to new parties 
offering different configurations of issue ‘packages’ as is the case for the emergence of the 
New Left and PRR in North-Western Europe. A first hypothesis can thus be formulated: 
Hypothesis 1: The demand-side structure of political conflict in Spain remains unidimensional 
despite the emergence of new parties (structure of conflict). 
Instead, the success of Podemos and Ciudadanos might be better understood by looking at the 
political consequences of the economic crisis in the short-term. I thus focus on the evolution 
of the political landscape and the strategic reactions of voters and parties to the economic 
crisis as an external shock. To that purpose, the following sections review theories of 
economic voting and crisis of representation that might provide a more suited explanation for 
the emergence of new parties in Spain. 
Economic voting: evaluations of economic performance 
Following the classic reward and punishment logic whereby citizens hold their representatives 
accountable for their actions (Key and Cummings 1966b), literature on economic voting 
provides some explanations as to the electoral consequences of economic shocks. Incumbent 
governments, the story goes, will be electorally punished when macroeconomic conditions 
worsen and rewarded when the economy performs well (Lewis-Beck 1990). To explain 
variation in the degree of punishment of the incumbent, several conditions have been 
identified that mediate the strength of the relationship, such as the clarity of responsibility 
(Powell and Whitten 1993; Anderson 2000) or the constraints placed on governments insofar 
they are capable of blame-shifting strategies (Hellwig and Samuels 2007). In Southern 
Europe, for instance, Lewis-Beck and Nadeau (2012) show that the effect of economic voting 
is stronger than in other North-western European countries, arguably due to less complex 
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government coalitions and overall worse performing economies. Although their analysis only 
covers the period until 2008, more recent research confirms that this trend has continued over 
the economic crisis. For instance, Hernández and Kriesi (2015) show that economic 
punishment can be systematically observed throughout Western Europe in the shadow of the 
Great Recession. 
While macroeconomic studies of economic voting predict strong correlations with the 
punishment of the incumbent, it is important to look at individual-level economic voting to 
disentangle the effects on voting behaviour. At the individual level, two types of economic 
voting can be distinguished. First, voters might evaluate the performance of the economy in 
general, that is, sociotropic evaluations. These evaluations are, however, often shaped by 
partisanship. It is expected that supporters of the incumbent government will have better 
evaluations than those in supporting any other party in opposition (Evans and Pickup 2010; 
see also Balcells et al. 2015). Second, negative evaluations of the personal economic situation 
might influence voting behaviour, that is, pocketbook evaluations. A deterioration of the 
personal economic situation has been shown to have a significant effect for explaining the 
vote to new challenger parties form both the left and the right (Hobolt and Tilley 2015).  
However, as rightly pointed out by Hobolt and Tilley (2015), negative evaluations of 
the personal economic situation do not shed light in explaining why voters might turn to a 
challenger party instead of the mainstream opposition. One of the arguments developed in the 
next section is that both mainstream parties in Spain introduced austerity measures, leading to 
a situation of brand delusion (Lupu 2016) or neoliberal convergence (Roberts 2017). 
Following this argument, evaluations of the personal economic situation should reflect a 
dissatisfaction with the consensus of mainstream parties in the economic management of the 
crisis. As such, we would expect that individual-level pocketbook voting reflects a divide 
between mainstream and new parties, while sociotropic evaluations merely reflect the 
incumbent-opposition nature of competition. Thus; 
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Hypothesis 2a: Negative evaluations of the economy in general render a lower probability to 
vote for the incumbent, but they do not render a higher probability to vote for 
new parties as opposed to mainstream parties (sociotropic economic voting). 
 
Hypothesis 2b: Negative evaluations of the personal economic finances (pocketbook evaluations) 
render a higher probability to vote for new parties as opposed to mainstream 
parties (pocketbook evaluations). 
Existing literature on the determinants of vote for Podemos and Ciudadanos in relation to 
economic voting is somewhat contradictory. On the one hand, Fernández-Albertos (2015a) 
speculates that Podemos is becoming the party of the economically excluded. This would 
suggest that pocketbook economic evaluations would be strongly significant in explaining the 
vote for Podemos. On the other hand, Orriols and Cordero (2016) present evidence showing 
that pocketbook evaluations do not explain the vote for either Ciudadanos or Podemos, while 
positive sociotropic evaluations render a higher probability to vote for PP and a negative 
probability to vote for PSOE. Moreover, Bosch and Durán (2017) show that those more 
critical with the overall economic situation tend to vote for either Podemos or Ciudadanos, 
while they only find evidence that those with worse personal economic finances are more 
likely to vote for Podemos (Bosch and Durán 2017: 7). In any case, economic voting might 
only be part of the story. In the next section I argue that a crisis of representation unfolded 
alongside the economic crisis, suggesting that the reasons for the two new parties to emerge 
might be also found beyond economic-related factors. 
The crisis of representation: critical and dissatisfied 
Democratic representation consists of a principle-agent relationship between the voters (the 
principles) and politicians (the agents) which establishes channels for interests to be 
institutionally represented. Elections are thus the mechanism whereby voters deposit trust in 
politicians hoping they will defend these interests, which might take different forms, such as 
delivering material advantages (clientelism) or the pursuit of policy programs (programmatic) 
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(Kitschelt and Wilkinson 2007; Kitschelt 2000). It is precisely through the failure of these 
linkages between the electors and parties where the crisis of representation occurs and when a 
window of opportunity opens for new parties (Morgan 2011). From a theoretical standpoint, 
the failure of linkages between voters and politicians will destabilize party competition. But 
how are we to recognize a crisis of representation? 
Mainwaring (2006) distinguishes two dimensions that constitute a political crisis or 
crisis of representation: an attitudinal dimension, involving citizens’ perceptions, and a 
behavioural dimension, which considers ‘actions by citizens rejecting existing mechanisms of 
democratic representation’ (Mainwaring 2006: 15). The first dimension, attitudinal, also 
referred to as the latent political potentials (Kriesi 2015: 3), constitutes the degree to which 
citizens are dissatisfied with the political system and (do not) feel represented by democratic 
institutions. It is therefore an indicator of the more or less fertility for a political crisis, which 
only breaks lose when it is manifested in the behavioural dimension, that is, when there is an 
overt manifestation (Kriesi 2015). The second dimension, behavioural, is concerned with the 
manifestations in both the formal (electoral volatility, changes in the party system, emergence 
of new parties) and informal (protests) political arenas. Both dimensions, as explained below, 
are observable in the case of Spain. 
Indicators of political trust towards the key representative national and European 
political institutions, as well as those of the levels of satisfaction with democracy, are 
particularly revealing to understand the attitudinal dimension that preceded the emergence of 
two new parties in Spain. Figure 5.2 illustrates the changes in political and economic 
indicators in Spain from 2000 to 2015.  
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Figure 5.2 Political and Economic Crisis Indicators in Spain, 2000-2016 
 
Notes:Vertical lines indicate the beginning of the financial crisis (September, 2008). 
Sources: All indicators are standarised in percetanges (0-1). Political indicators are obtained from biyearly Eurobarometers 
(April and October). Situation of the National Economy is a monthly indicator obtaned from CIS (for details on the 
methodology see http://www.cis.es/cis/opencms/ES/11_barometros/metodologia.html#ISE). Unemployment and youth 
unemployment is a quarterly measure obtained from Eurostat. 
Since the beginning of the economic crisis in September 2008, these indicators followed a 
remarkable similar pattern (see also Muro and Vidal 2016). The average of satisfaction with 
the way democracy works in the country decreased substantially after 2008, reaching some of 
the lowest levels recorded since the transition to democracy. According to Eurobarometer 
data, while 77% of Spaniards claimed to be very or fairly satisfied with the way democracy 
works in 2007, only 22% did in 2014. Distrust towards the national parliament and political 
parties followed an almost identical trend. Although distrust towards political parties had been 
considerably lower than towards parliament, the levels converged to another historical low in 
the period after the outbreak of the crisis: less than 10% of the population claimed to trust 
these institutions. Compared to the levels of trust towards parliament prior to 2008, the 
decrease is nothing short of spectacular: while close to 50 percent of respondents trusted the 
 
 - 113 - 
national parliament before the crisis, less than 10 percent of respondents trusted the national 
parliament at its height2. 
While the changes in the political indicators appear to be strongly correlated with 
changes in the perceptions of the economy (i.e. situation of the national economy) and with 
objective economic indicators (i.e. unemployment, especially youth unemployment), the 
economic malaise seemed to trigger a far deeper discontent than with the incumbent’s 
performance3. Moreover, in the cases of Spain and Portugal, the effect of economic indicators 
on political mistrust has been found to be rather limited when compared to the effect of the 
perception of political responsiveness and corruption scandals (Torcal 2014). A simple 
reward-punishment mechanism based on the performance of the economy alone cannot thus 
seem to explain the indiscriminate dissatisfaction with the political system that outspread in 
Spain during the crisis. Instead, as first pointed out by Krastev (2002) for the Balkans, and 
later applied to Southern Europe by Bosco and Verney (2012), it is the situation of a 
‘democracy without choices’ which produces frustration with the democratic process and 
aggravates the crisis of political representation. This situation is the outcome of what is best 
described by the growing tension that governments face between acting ‘responsible’ versus 
‘responsive’4 (Mair 2009), or in other words, in dealing with the gap between democracy and 
efficiency (Scharpf 1999). Under the external constraints of the EMU, the governments of the 
crisis-ridden South were pressured into adopting a set of fiscal consolidation policies and 
                                               
2 European political institutions did also not go unpunished and suffered an almost identical drop in trust compared to 
national institutions, suggesting that the increase in mistrust was not limited by national borders (Muro and Vidal 
2016). It is important to note here that domestic issues over reforms of the domestic political system were has much 
more visibility than issues related to Europe during the post-crisis electoral campaigns (see Hutter et al. 2015). 
3 It is important to note, however, that these attitudes do not necessary mean an increase in the illegitimacy towards 
democracy as a regime, as pointed out by Magalhães (2005) in the case of Portugal. 
4 This divide is also brought up in Rohrschneider and Whitefield’s (2012) notion of the strain of representation, which 
explores the ideological congruence between partisans and independents. The authors conclude that especially in 
NWE, parties still offer policy alternatives and that they are rooted in their social characteristics. 
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structural reforms with the objective of reducing debt and regaining access to international 
credit markets. Incumbents of both sides of the ideological spectrum introduced these 
unpopular measures to different degrees claiming to act ‘responsibly’ at the cost of being, 
especially for the left, ‘responsive’ to both their constituencies and ideological principles. The 
lack of clarity of responsibility for these policies and reforms that stems from the multilevel 
governing structure of the EU further contributed to a the widespread attribution of blame to 
all political institutions indistinctively (Hobolt and Tilley 2014). 
In the case of Spain, the PSOE announced significant welfare cuts5 and structural 
reforms as prescribed by the ECB during Zapatero’s government6, such as the labour reform 
(Field and Botti 2013), but it also agreed to change the constitution together with PP to cap 
the budget deficit (Tremlett 2011). Although the retrenchment policies would be much 
harsher with the government of PP in the following years, the decline in effective political 
competition between mainstream parties arguably led to a situation of neoliberal convergence 
similar to that discussed by Roberts (2013) in the case of Latin-America to understand the 
collapse of the party system (see also Roberts 2017). In short, when major political 
contenders participated in the process of market liberalization, that is, when centre-left 
governments either supported or directly introduced reforms in line with the neoliberal 
orthodoxy, then programmatic dealignment occurred, leading to a situation of neoliberal 
convergence. The crisis of representation that unfolded in Spain, however, was not limited to 
the programmatic convergence of the mainstream parties. It was also closely linked to 
political corruption. 
                                               
5 For a list of the welfare cuts and reforms in May 2010, see (in Spanish): 
http://elpais.com/diario/2010/05/13/espana/1273701601_850215.html  
6 See letter that the ECB sent to Zapatero in 2011 asking for reforms: https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/other/2011-08-05-
letter-from-trichet-and-fernandez-ordonez-to-zapateroen.pdf?e5c1a67f9627c5f087d5c7f02168e0da 
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The surfacing of corruption scandals became a key issue in the Spanish political 
agenda in the years following the financial crisis. Concern over corruption and fraud became 
the second most worrying problem for Spaniards in November 2014 (slightly below 
unemployment). By then, 63.8 percent of Spanish citizens claimed that corruption and fraud 
was one of the three most important problems facing the country. Back in March 2008, only 
an insignificant .2 percent claimed so. Similarly, Spain scored one point lower in the 
Corruption Perception Index (CPI) between 2007 and 2016 (from 6.7 to 5.8). Three large 
corruption scandals linked to the PP (i.e. Gürtel case, the Bárcenas papers and the ‘black 
credit cards’ of the savings banks Caja Madrid/Bankia) shifted public attention to the issue of 
corruption (Orriols and Cordero 2016: 6), though there were many others affecting parties of 
all colours, especially at the regional and local levels (see also Riera et al. 2013: 520). 
Political corruption is crucially linked to dissatisfaction with representative 
institutions. Several studies have found positive correlations between corruptions scandals 
and political discontent (Ares and Hernández 2017: 2), especially when there are no side 
benefits to them (Fernández-Vázquez et al. 2016). Moreover, perceptions of corruption are 
conditional on the economic context (Zechmeister and Zizumbo-Colunga 2013), heightening 
during times of economic hardship. Other case studies on crisis of representation have shown 
that, in times of economic crisis, corruption scandals erode voters’ confidence in 
representative institutions and magnify discontent by highlighting perceived state deficiencies 
(Mainwaring 2006). Moreover, recent studies of the Spanish show that being preoccupied 
with corruption renders a higher probability to vote for Podemos (Bosch and Durán 2017). 
This suggests that corruption played an important role in the Spanish crisis of representation 
and the resulting transformations in the electoral arena, which were first reflected in the 
protest arena. 
Massive mobilisations in the protest arena followed the politics of austerity and corruption 
scandals. Two small network organizations, Real Democracy Now! (Democracia Real Ya!) 
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and Youth Without Future (Juventud Sin Futuro), successfully triggered mass demonstrations 
on May 2011 giving birth to the Indignados protest movement. Neoliberal reforms, welfare 
cuts and the corrupt political class became the movement’s most visible struggles (della Porta 
2015). The participants, which were younger, more educated and less politically involved 
than in other demonstrations, were also sceptical of traditional political actors such as labour 
unions and political parties (Anduiza et al. 2014). Despite rejecting the existing political 
available choices, however, the movement also shared a criticism over political apathy, 
affecting positively attitudes towards voting (Galais 2014). The so-called ‘Spanish 
Revolution’ thus opened a window of opportunity for new formations capable of connecting 
with the discourse of change that was being voiced in the squares. The message was largely 
transversal. A survey by Metroscopia7 conducted on July 2011 showed that 81% agreed that 
the movement had good reasons to protest, while 84% claimed that it raised problems 
affecting the whole of society. The claims of the protestors, as it seems, trespassed ideological 
frontiers and largely connected with Spanish society. All of this suggests that the emergence 
of new parties might be contingent upon the feeling of discontent towards the Spanish 
political system. Following on from previous literature suggesting that politically dissatisfied 
citizens tend to have a higher probability to vote for challenger and protest parties (Hobolt 
and de Vries 2016; Hooghe and Dassonneville 2016), and the discussion on corruption and 
neoliberal convergence in the Spanish case, we can therefore specify a new hypothesis based 
on the political crisis: 
Hypothesis 3: The higher the voter’s perception of a political crisis, the higher the probability to 
vote for new parties (political crisis voting). 
 
                                               
7 These numbers also include voters of PP. See the survey results here: http://metroscopia.org/wp-
content/uploads/2011/06/INFORME-Clima-Social-24ª-Oleada-junio-2011.pdf 
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Yet, while the drive behind the emergence of these two new parties might be closely related 
to critical attitudes towards the political system, the question remains as to why two new 
formations emerged instead of just one. In fact, if we consider the programmatic dealignment 
for the centre-left as the reasons for the collapse of the party system, we would only expect a 
party on the left to emerge. Rodríguez Teruel and Barrio (2016) argue that the reasons for 
Ciudadanos’ emergence are two-folded. On the one hand, it took a position against 
predominant nationalism in Catalonia facilitated by the weakening Catalan branch of PSOE 
(PSC). On the other hand, it capitalized on ‘unsatisfied demands for political renewal, 
transparency and democratic regeneration.’ (Rodríguez Teruel and Barrio 2016: 2). Recent 
research has also pointed to the possibility that stealth democracy attitudes, that is, different 
preferences on democratic political decision-making procedures, is an important divide 
between these two parties; Podemos calling for participatory procedures whereas Ciudadanos 
calling for moderate democratic reforms (Lavezzolo and Ramiro 2017). While the territorial 
dimension and stealth democracy attitudes might partly answer the question as to the 
emergence of Ciudadanos, it does not tell us why not just one party was able to capitalise the 
political dissatisfaction, especially keeping in mind Podemos’ early attempts to shun 
ideological labels. 
One possible answer might be found in the ideological structure of conflict. If the 
nature of this structure has remained unidimensional as suggested by hypothesis 1, a deeply 
rooted ideological cleave might have limited the transversality of parties in capitalising 
political discontent. If so, we might expect that it is those concerned with the political crisis 
and on the left of the ideological spectrum that vote for Podemos, while it is those most 
concerned with the political crisis on the right which vote for Ciudadanos. Thus, we can 
formulate an interaction hypothesis between ideology and critical attitudes towards the 
political system: 
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Hypothesis 3a: Those on the left of the ideological spectrum and concerned with the political 
crisis have a higher probability to vote for Podemos, whereas those on the right and 
concerned with the political crisis have a higher probability to vote for Ciudadanos 
(political crisis + ideology).  
Beyond the ideological structures, it comes hardly as a surprise that a youth organisation 
triggered the mobilisations and that the crowd in the 15-M protests was younger than usual. 
The management of the economic crisis was particularly harsh amongst the youth, which 
suffered from particularly high levels of unemployment (up to 55.48% in 2013, see table 2). 
The youths’ weak labour position is partly explained by the market segmentation derived 
from deregulating temporary jobs in presence of strict job security provisions (Noelke 2016: 
476). This exceptionally harsh situation for the youth during the crisis, combined with the 
exposure of corruption scandals affecting the political class, led young Spaniards to ‘echo the 
crisis to a greater extent than the rest of society’ (García-Albacete et al. 2016b). Thus, a 
generational divide is expected to be reflected institutionally with the emergence of new 
parties. This expectation is also substantiated by most research on the determinants of vote for 
Podemos and Ciudadanos that have pointed to the existence of a generational divide 
(Fernández-Albertos 2015a; Orriols and Cordero 2016; Rodríguez-Teruel et al. 2016). 
Bearing this in mind, we can hypothesise that there is an interaction effect between the 
perceptions of political crisis and age:  
Hypothesis 3b: Amongst those concerned with the political crisis, the probability to vote for new 
parties declines with the increasing age of the voter. (political crisis + age).  
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Data and methodology 
The empirical analysis relies on a pooled dataset of the 2015 and 2016 post-electoral survey 
study conducted by the Centro de Investigaciones Sociologicas (CIS)8. To test the hypotheses 
outlined above, multinomial logistic regressions are employed, where the dependent variable 
is the party voted for in the last elections9: 1) PP, 2) PSOE, 3) Podemos, 4) Ciudadanos, 5) 
Other, and 6) Abstention. Table 5.1 summarises the main categories in the dependent 
variable.  
Table 5.1. Parties and Number of Observations in the CIS survey, 2016 
Party N party voters in sample 
Proportion of 
voters in sample 
Party’s vote share in 
last election (June 
2016) 
PP 2438 19.63 33.03 
PSOE 2212 17.81 22.66 
Podemos* 2083 16.78 21.10 
Ciudadanos 1167 9.40 13.05 
Total 6984 63.62 89.84 
Note: From May 2016, United Left forms a coalition together with Podemos 
called Unidos Podemos, thus they are represented together. Podemos also 
includes regional parties such as Marea (Galicia), En Comú Podem (Catalonia) 
and Compromís (Valencia). 
To test the first hypothesis (H1) on the structure of political conflict, I employ a battery of 
questions included in the surveys on different issues that capture the economic, cultural, and 
territorial dimensions. These include 1) Public Services vs Tax; 2) Multiculturalism; 3) 
Security & Freedom; and 4) Territorial Organisation10. To test for the ideological structure, I 
first analyse the correlation between the different questions with the left-right scale. Then the 
average positions of the voters are plotted with fitted lines to observe the correlations between 
                                               
8  The 2015 post-electoral study 3126 was conducted from January 7th to March 19th 2016 and includes 6.242 interviews. The 
2016 post-electoral study 3145 was conducted from July 2nd-21st 2016 and includes 6.175 interviews. Both surveys are 
representative at the national level stratified and using quotas of gender and age. The interviews were all conducted 
face-to-face. 
9 Last elections refer to the general elections in December 2015 for barometer 3126, and June 2016 for barometer 3145. 
10 Details on the operationalisation can be found in Table 2. 
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parties in the ideological structure. 
To test the second hypothesis (H2) on economic voting, two variables are included in 
the models. First, to capture pocketbook economic voting, a Likert-scale question on the 
evaluation of the personal economic situation that ranges from ‘Very Good/Good’ to ‘Very 
Bad’ is used. Second, to evaluate the effects of sociotropic voting, an index that combines 
position and salience is crated. The argument is that combining both provides a more accurate 
reflection of the degree of concern with the economy. Position is determined based on a 
Likert-scale question on the general state of the economy that again ranges from ‘Very 
Good/Good’ to ‘Very Bad’. The salience variable is constructed hierarchically based on 
whether the individual claims that the economy or unemployment are the first, second, or 
third most important problems facing the country. These two variables are combined to 
produce a normalised ‘Sociotropic’ index. 
To test the third hypothesis (H3) on the political crisis, a similar index is constructed 
combining position and salience. The positional variable is based on a factor that combines 
the level of satisfaction with democracy with the level of trust towards parliament and 
political parties11. This is a proxy for being critical with the overall political situation of the 
country. Once normalised, this variable is then weighted by salience. Similarly, salience is 
measured hierarchically based on whether the individual claims that corruption is the first, 
second, or third most important problems facing the country. This renders an index where, 
one the one extreme, we find those who are most dissatisfied with the political situation and 
claim that corruption is the most important problem, and on the other extreme, those who 
fully trust the political system and see corruption as no threat. This same index is also used to 
                                               
11 A factor analysis of these three indicators shows that all three variables load on a single factor, suggesting that they largely 
capture the same attitudinal dimension. See Table A.1 in the Appendix for the results of the factor analysis. For 
robustness purposes, I have also conducted the regressions for each indicator separately weighted by corruption 
salience (see Table A.2 in the Appendix). Although coefficients vary in the size of the effect, they all report the same 
direction and level of statistical significance than the overall measure. 
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test the interaction with ideology (H3a) for which a variable on ideological self-placement 
ranging from 0 (left) to 10 (right) is used. Similarly, the political crisis index is interacted 
with age to test for the generational effects (H3b). The models also control for a range of 
socio-structural and attitudinal variables, including the level of education, gender, region, size 
of town/city, social class12, region, employment situation, political interest and personal 
income. A dummy variable is also included to control for the fixed effects of the time when 
the survey was conducted. Table A.0 in the appendix presents detailed summary statistics of 
all variables and constructed indices. 
Results 
To recapitulate, the first hypothesis concerned the structure of political conflict in Spain. The 
theoretical section discussed the possibility that the emergence of new parties in Spain were 
possible thanks to the opening of new dimensions of conflict similarly to the emergence of the 
New Left and the PRR in NWE (Kriesi et al. 2008, 2012). Against this hypothesis, Rovny and 
Polk’s (2014) suggest that there is a unidimensional conflict structure in which the socio-
cultural and economic dimensions are strongly correlated in the case of Spain. It could be, 
however, that this changed with the irruption of Podemos and Ciudadanos. This does not 
seem to be the case. Figure 5.3 shows how the average positions of the voters for different 
combinations of policy issues fall under a single dimension. 
The demand-side ideological structure appears to be composed of two extremes and 
two intermediate positions. The extremes are covered by Podemos on the left, combining 
strong multicultural attitudes with preferences for territorial decentralisation, civil liberties 
and economic redistribution13; and on the other extreme, combining the exact opposite issue 
                                               
12 Social class is constructed based on Oesch’s (2006a) class scheme. See Figure A.1 in the Appendix for more details. 
13 Note that support for enlarging the welfare state and redistribution are not exactly the same, as pointed out by Fernández-
Albertos and Manzano (2012b) in the case of Spain. 
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preferences, the PP. PSOE and Ciudadanos adopt intermediate positions on the centre-left and 
centre-right respectively. Conducting a pairwise correlation further suggests that all the issue 
positions are significantly correlated with the left-right scale (see Table A.3). The results 
confirm that both economic and socio-cultural issues, particularly the latter, remain strongly 
correlated with the ideological left-right scale. These results are also in line with the findings 
of Fernández-Albertos (2017). 
Figure 5.3 Average position of voters of main parties in Spain according to various 
ideological dimensions 
 
Notes: Dotted lines represent the linear fit. All variables have been normalised for simplification purposes. 
 
The second hypothesis (H2) is concerned with economic voting. Two variants were specified. 
First, we expected sociotropic economic voting to be driven by partisanship and thus not shed 
much light on the emergence of new parties (H2a).  Second, the evaluation of personal 
 
 - 123 - 
economic finances was speculated to drive the vote for new parties as a proxy for the rejection 
of the economic consensus that took place during the management of the economic crisis 
(H2b). Table 5.2 shows the marginal effects of three different models based on multinomial 
logistic regressions for the different parties. Let us for now consider the coefficients on the 
sociotropic and pocketbook evaluations. 
For the sociotropic evaluations, the results are mostly as expected. The probability to 
declare that the economic situation of the country is doing well significantly increases the 
probability to vote for the incumbent government, that is, the PP (models 1.A and 3.A). On 
the contrary, the probability to vote for both PSOE14 (model 1.B) and Podemos (models 1.C 
and 3.C) increases to a similar degree if the individual claims that the economy is not 
performing well. All models show that the results are statistically insignificant for 
Ciudadanos. With these results we can conclude that, as expected, sociotropic evaluations of 
the economy are driven by incumbent-opposition dynamics and do not shed much light on the 
divisions between in the electorate of mainstream and new parties.  
For the pocketbook evaluations, the results are mixed. As expected, declaring to have 
worse personal economic evaluations renders a significantly lower probability to vote for the 
mainstream parties (models 1.A, 3.A, 1.B and 3.B). Substantively speaking, this is more 
pronounced in PSOE than in PP (see also model 3 in Tables A.5 and A.6 in the Appendix). As 
also expected, we find the opposite effect for the Podemos: worse pocketbook evaluations 
render a higher probability to vote for Podemos (model 3.C, see also Model 3 in Table A.3 in 
the Appendix)15. However, the results for Ciudadanos defy the expectations as worse 
                                               
14 Note that the coefficient for sociotropic evaluations becomes insignificant for PSOE once the political crisis index is 
included. This suggests that once controlling for the effects of the political crisis, sociotropic evaluations become an 
insignificant predictor. 
15 Note that the coefficient for pocketbook evaluations in Table 3, Model 1.C is insignificant. However, in two other models: 
either controlling for the political crisis (Table 3, Model 3.C), or running a regression with pocketbook evaluations 
alone (Table A.3, Model 2), the results show statistical significance. 
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pocketbook evaluations render a negative coefficient (models 1.D and 3.D, see also model 3 
in Table A.4 in the Appendix). These results suggest that, while the vote for Podemos is 
consistent with the expectations for hypothesis H2b, it does not follow for the other new party 
Ciudadanos. Therefore, the results only tell part of the story: negative pocketbook evaluations 
only render a higher probability to vote for Podemos, but not Ciudadanos.  
The third hypothesis (H3) concerned the crisis of representation. According to the 
theory, we could expect that the emergence of new parties answered to a perception of general 
dissatisfaction with the political system. Let us know focus on the coefficients for the political 
crisis variable in Table 5.2. In all cases, the results are statistically significant and as expected. 
In all models, critical attitudes towards the political system render a higher probability to vote 
for new parties, whereas they render a lower probability to vote for mainstream parties. 
Substantively speaking, Podemos seems to better capture the vote of those dissatisfied with 
the political situation. This is also confirmed if the different components of the political crisis 
indicator are run separately in the regressions (see Table A.2 in the Appendix). 
If the concern over the political situation is the prime driver of the punishment for old 
parties, however, why then might we expect the emergence of two new challenger parties and 
not just one? Given that the ideological structure of political conflict remains unidimensional 
as tested by the first hypothesis, a variant of the third hypothesis (H3a) suggested that, in this 
unidimensional structure, voters on the left of the ideological spectrum and dissatisfied with 
the political system would have a higher probability to vote for Podemos, whereas those on 
the right for Ciudadanos. The argument here is that the ideological cleavage cuts across the 
critical attitudes towards the political system.  
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Figure 5.4 shows the marginal effects of the interaction between the political crisis 
index and ideology. The results confirm the expectations16: the perception of the political 
crisis is mediated by ideology to explain the vote for new parties. It is worth noting that 
Podemos seems to better attract those most dissatisfied around the centre, though they are 
unable to reach those disaffected on the right as their strategy of shunning ideological labels 
was expected to achieve. Given the dissimilar impact that management of the economic crisis 
had for the different generations in Spain, the final expectation was that there is a significant 
generational divide that also cuts across perceptions of the political crisis (H3b). Specifically, 
it was hypothesised that the vote for new parties is driven by those most concerned with the 
political situation but especially amongst the young. 
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Figure 5.5 shows the marginal effects of the interaction between the political crisis index and 
age. As expected, the probability to vote for new parties amongst those who are most 
dissatisfied with the political situation increases as age declines. Again, this effect is 
substantially stronger in the case of Podemos than in Ciudadanos. Being critical of political 
system and being younger, on the contrary, renders a drastically lower probability to vote for 
mainstream parties1. Thus, while age is in itself a significant predictor for the vote towards 
new parties2, those who are young and critical with the political system are more likely to 
vote for new parties. 
Figure 5.4 Average Marginal Effects of Interaction between Political Crisis Indicator and 
Ideology on Probability to Vote for PP, PSOE, Podemos, and Ciudadanos 
 
                                               
1 See Model 7 in Tables A.3, A.4, A.5 and A,6 in the Appendix for the marginal effects of the interaction at the mean of 
ideology. 
2 Note that all coefficients of age render a statistically significant lower probability to vote for new parties and a higher 





 - 128 - 
Notes: Based on results from Model 6 in Tables A.3, A.4, A,5 and A,6. 
Figure 5.5 Average Marginal Effects of Interaction between Political Crisis Indicator and 
Age on Probability to Vote for PP, PSOE, Podemos, and Ciudadanos 
 
Notes: Based on results from Model 7 in Tables A.3, A.4, A,5 and A,6 in the Appendix. 
 
Conclusions 
The collapse of the party system in Spain observed during the general elections of 2015 and 
the emergence of two new parties raises important questions that speak directly to the 
literature on the crisis of representation and cleavage politics. How can we make sense of 
these transformations and what do they tell us about the ongoing changes in the structure of 
political conflict in Southern Europe in the shadow of the Great Recession? This article has 
argued that the key to understand the emergence of both new parties in Spain is through the 
crisis of representation that unfolded alongside the economic crisis. To get to that conclusion, 
different hypothesis on the structure of political conflict and economic voting theories were 
tested using individual-level survey data from the 2015 and 2016 post-electoral survey studies 
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of CIS. 
The finding can be summarised in five points. First, 1) the structure of political conflict in 
Spain—for state-wide parties—remains unidimensional despite the emergence of new parties. 
This suggest that, unlike the New Left and PRR in North-Western European countries, the 
emergence of new parties in Spanish is not a consequence of new dimensionalities of conflict. 
Second, 2) economic voting approaches only tell part of the story. Sociotropic voting, as 
expected, only reflected incumbent-opposition dynamics. Pocketbook evaluations, on the 
other hand, distinguished mainstream parties from Podemos, but not from the other new party 
Ciudadanos. It does not seem that evaluations of the personal economic situation are the key 
feature driving the vote for new parties. Third, 3) dissatisfaction with the overall political 
system drives the vote for new parties and reduces the probability to vote for mainstream 
parties. This is consistent with the unfolding of a crisis of representation and its institutional 
translation. Fourth 4), the unidimensional ideological structure cuts across these critical 
attitudes insofar those critical and on the left vote for Podemos, whereas those critical on the 
right vote for Ciudadanos. Fifth and last, 5) there is a strong generational divide that also 
accounts for the emergence of new parties. It is those critical with the political system, but 
especially amongst the young who have a higher probability to vote for new parties. 
Despite the inherent limitations to case studies, these results constitute a first step to 
better grasping the political and structural transformations in other countries in the shadow of 
the Great Recession. The general implication that transcends the Spanish case is that the 
dimensionality of party competition and socio-demographic divides moderate the behaviour 
of parties and the response of voters to the economic malaise. Although much remains to be 
done in comparative perspective, the underlying mechanism presented here is that the impact 
of the economic crisis—understood as an exogenous shock—will result in political 
configurations that are mediated by pre-existing demand-side political structures. These 
political outcomes are, of course, not exempt of other supply-side and contextual factors. 
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For instance, to stick to two other Southern European examples, the reconfiguration of 
the Greek party system appears to have been strongly mediated by the issue of the European 
bailouts and a much more severe economic crisis that tear apart the existing clientelistic 
linkages (Katsanidou and Otjes 2015b; Hutter et al. 2015). In Portugal, different pathways to 
democracy (Fernandes 2015), the lack of structural space on the left covered by the 
communist party PCP, changes in the leadership of the social-democratic party PS, and the 
economic struggles the country already faced before the economic crisis, are all factors that 
might have contributed to the seeming stability of the party system in the aftermath of the 
Great Recession (Ferreira and Mendes 2017). Future research should further explore the 
extent to which both supply, demand, and contextual factors explain the different cross-
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Chapter 6. Conflict Activation in Times of Crisis: 
The Case of Catalonia 
Introduction 
When the first news of an economic crisis landed in Spain by the end of 2008, only 15 
percent of Catalans supported the idea of Catalonia becoming an independent state. Six years 
later, that number escalated to represent half of the Catalan population. Given the entire 
population of Catalonia (7.5m), this would mean that close to 2.5 million Catalans changed 
their views with regards to the pillar of a community’s political organization in just over half 
a decade. With these staggering numbers, it is no surprise that Catalan secessionism became a 
central concern of Spanish politics, let alone Catalan politics. How could something as 
fundamental as the preferences for the organization of the State change so rapidly? What led 
to the activation of this conflict during the aftermath of the Great Recession? What are its 
political consequences? 
To answer these questions, I trace the Catalan process during the period of change and 
argue that two complementary mechanisms are responsible for the activation of the conflict. 
The first has to do with the political strategy of the incumbent government (CiU) led by Artur 
Mas that took office in the 2010 regional elections. In order to overcome adverse political 
circumstances, the incumbent party sought a conflict-displacement strategy by instigating the 
secessionist conflict. The party was successful in this strategy, brining most of its previous 
electorate on board and reshaping political conflict as a result. The second mechanism 
concerns protest voting and political grievances. The profound economic crisis and 
subsequent crisis of representation at the national level drove many to support independence 
as means of protest against a discredited political system. With the activation of the conflict, 
it is shown that Catalan politics underwent a process of ethnic polarisation which is reflected 
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in the ethnic alignment of the vote starting the in the 2012 regional elections, lingering on to 
the 2015 and 2017 elections. During this process, it is shown that polarisation in ethnic terms 
had a strong mobilising effect. This effect was particularly strong for independence 
supporters at first, but the opposite camp caught up as the conflict consolidated and other 
parties took an adversarial strategy (i.e. Ciutadans). 
The article proceeds as follows. The first section reviews the literature on conflict 
activation and discusses the strategies that political parties can pursue to influence political 
conflict. This is followed by an in-depth analysis on the dynamics of conflict activation of 
Catalan secessionism focusing on the interaction between the role of the elites, the 
developments in the public opinion, and the reaction to specific events. The last section 
consists of an empirical inquiry into the social divides of Catalan society and the activation of 
the conflict by analysing the evolution of the Catalan electorate. Finally, some concluding 
remarks are presented. 
The Activation of Conflict 
What political conflicts structure societies? How and why do these conflicts transform? 
These two questions have been one of the primary concerns of comparative politics since, at 
least, the seminal work of Lipset and Rokkan (1967a). These inquiries respond to the 
ambition of understanding the formation of cleavage structures, its political translation, and 
its evolution. Several works have been devoted to this topic in the field of political sociology, 
a field that Sartori (1969) distinguished from the sociology of politics. The main difference is 
that, while the former studies the socio-structural architecture of political conflict, the latter 
deals with the political factors that shape those structures and produce change. Political 
sociology deals, in essence, with the activation or translation of cleavages into party system 
structures by focusing on the political factors that produce such transformations. 
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A notable work in the field of political sociology is that of The Semi-sovereign People, by 
Schattschneider (1960), in which he disentangled the political process and proposed two 
ways in which political conflicts can transform: 1) the development and expansion of conflict 
and 2) the displacement of subordinate conflicts by dominant conflicts. These two 
mechanisms point to the idea that societies are confronted not with one, but multiple 
dimensions of conflict that scuffle with each other to dominate the public agenda (Mair 
1997b). This conflict of conflicts, or the “unequal intensity of conflicts”, ultimately 
determines which issues are politically relevant and, as a consequence, how political systems 
are structured (Schattschneider 1960: 66). 
Yet, not all issues become equally important in defining political systems, nor do all 
issues become cleavages. As pointed out by Bartolini and Mair (1990), cleavages are 
composed of three constitutive elements: social structure, values and beliefs, and institutional 
and organisational agreements. In understanding cleavage formation, structuralist approaches 
have often thought of this process from a bottom-up perspective, in which the conflict found 
in the demand-side of politics (i.e. the electoral “mass”) eventually translates into stable 
cleavages. However, this approach has often neglected the role of political actors (i.e. the 
supply-side of politics) in influencing the activation of conflict, introducing new issues in the 
public debate, or even helping to establish new cleavages. 
Political actors may seek to influence the political agenda for a number of reasons. 
Most understandably, parties and politicians will aim to frame the public debate in a way that 
is beneficial to their interest. One way to do so is the substitution of conflict, which 
Schattschneider argues to be the “most devastating kind of political strategy” (1960: 71). This 
is because, ultimately, the actor that is capable of introducing a conflict into the political 
agenda will have an advantage in shaping the political game. The substitution of conflict, or 
the conflict-displacement strategy, consist of replacing existing issues that dominate the 
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public debate by other issues in which the party might have issue ownership or a particular 
advantage. Such a strategy, when successful, can reshape political competition to the 
advantage of the actor pursuing the strategy and translate into electoral success. 
Conflict displacement strategies can take the form of avoidance and instigation. 
Avoidance strategies include the undermining of specific issues in an attempt to de-
emphasise the line of conflict that is of no advantage to the political actor. Meguid (2005) 
calls this the dismissive strategy, which refers to a deliberate tactic of “non-action” by a 
mainstream party in response to an issue introduced by a niche party (2005: 349). This may 
be combined with strategies that aim to instigate an alternative conflict or change its focus, 
which may take the form of personalisation strategies —placing the focus on individual 
political actors as to “distract attention from political issues” (Kriesi et al. 2009: 355); or the 
adoption of alternative issues. 
If, on the one hand, the issue was absent from political competition, then the party may 
follow an issue-entrepreneurship strategy, defined by Hobolt and De Vries (2015) as “a 
strategy by which parties mobilize issues that have been largely ignored in party competition 
and adopt a policy position on the issue that is substantially different from the mainstream 
status quo” (Hobolt and de Vries 2015: 1161). According to the authors, this strategy is 
pursued by niche parties and not mainstream ones, since due to the latter’s “overall 
advantageous position, they have an incentive to reinforce existing patterns of political 
competition and the policy issues underlying them. Consequently, they are unlikely issue 
entrepreneurs.” (Hobolt and de Vries 2015: 1161). Moreover, Hobolt and de Vries (2015: 
1163) suggest that, since this strategy is a risky one, those parties seeking and issue-
entrepreneurial strategy will be political losers, defined by “[lack of] office-holding 
experience, distance to average party position on the dominant dimension of party 
competition, and electoral defeat.”. 
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If, on the other hand, the issue was already present in party competition, we may speak 
of trespassing. Sides (2006) suggests that parties may trespass by adopting an issue —
already owned by another party— when the salience of that issue is high enough in public 
opinion so that it may prove advantageous. This has been referred to in the literature as riding 
the wave strategy. The adoption of the issue may be in vague terms or focusing on an 
attribute of the issue (Kriesi et al. 2009: 355), but the party may also fully engage in that 
issue and try to steal ownership. Riding the wave differs from issue-entrepreneurship in that 
the former implies that an issue is already salient in the public opinion, while the latter 
implies the issue is absent from it. As such, riding the wave is understood as response to a 
growing demand, while the purpose of issue-entrepreneurship is precisely to create a demand 
for the new issue in the first place. Table 6.1 summarises the relationship between issues in 
party competition and the type of displacement strategy. 
Table 6.1 Types of displacement strategies by issues in party competition 
  Displacement Strategy 
  Avoidance  Instigation 
 
New Issue Dismissive  Issue entrepreneurship 
Existing Issue Dismissive  Riding the wave 
While riding the wave has been often conceived as a strategy that responds to the changes in 
the public opinion —i.e. growing salience of a specific issue—, it can also be thought of as a 
strategy for conflict displacement. Mainstream parties are capable of foreseeing a 
disadvantageous political context and can opt for trespassing on a specific issue with the 
hopes to reshape political conflict. This is because the trespassing might create large enough 
majorities on a specific issue so that the issue itself becomes victorious in the “conflict of 
conflicts”. If this strategy is successful, then the party may ultimate activate a new line of 
conflict and secure a dominant place in it. 
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However, similarly to issue-entrepreneurship, the risks of riding the wave are high. 
This is because “the mobilisation [of an alternate issue] may destabilize parties internally, put 
off certain voters, and jeopardise future coalition negotiations” (Hobolt and de Vries 2015: 
1161). Additionally, there is the risk that the party already owning the issue will capitalise on 
the increasing salience derived from the mainstream’s party trespassing, and the trespasser 
will not be able to capitalise on the gains. This will depend on the credibility and the reasons 
given for the trespassing as well as the frame developed by the party to do so. I argue that 
when the party is at risk of political loss —understood as electoral defeat or the loss of 
power— then it will be more likely to take on such risks. 
There are several contingent factors that might increase the risk of political loss, 
therefore providing an incentive for a mainstream party to ride the wave. Events such as 
corruptions scandals or economic crisis —thus being constrained to implement unpopular 
economic policies— are some examples. These may be combined with contextual factors that 
provide similar incentives and that might come from outside the party, such as bottom-up 
pressure from civil society organisations, or within the party, such as internal party factions 
that might have an ideological incentive to pursue a specific issue. Party militants and civil 
society organisations close or linked to the party can act as pressuring forces on the party to 
shift positions on a specific issue, even if the issue in itself is not a key issue for the electorate 
of the party. 
Once a party has changed positions on an issue, there may be important consequences 
for the electorate. The effect of the partisan elite influencing changes in preferences has been 
a widely discussed in the literature of the origins of mass opinion and mass-elite linkages 
with regards to the question “who is cueing whom?” (see Steenbergen et al. 2007; Zaller 
1992, 2012). Literature on political psychology explores the mechanisms through which 
parties might exert such influence (for an extensive review of the literature, see Leeper and 
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Slothuus 2014). More recent research aims at exploring the causal impact of a party’s change 
of position of a specific issue on the electorate, confirming that a large share of the electorate 
does indeed follow the party when it changes its position (Bisgaard and Slothuus 2018). 
The case of Catalonia described in the next section provides a real-world example of this 
complex interaction of factors to explain how the secessionist conflict was activated by 
analysing the developments in party competition and the actors’ motivations for changing 
positions and engaging in the issue. This is followed by a section on the consequences of 
such changes and an empirical analysis of the electorate that, without pretending to engage in 
the debate over the causality of elite’s influence (given data limitations), shows the evolution 
of patterns consistent with the above-described capacity of political parties to actively engage 
in strategies that reshape the political debate and change partisan’s preferences. 
The Catalan Revolt: Elites, Context and Events 
To understand how the conflict transformed in Catalonia it is imperative to assess the 
developments of both the demand and the supply side of politics during the time period 
where change can be observed. In doing so, it is also important to examine the events that 
unfolded, and the reaction and framings of these events by the different actors. Figure 6.1 
illustrates the evolution of Catalans opinion with regards to the relation between Catalonia 
and Spain. A number of events are also highlighted in the figure, including Spanish general 
and Catalan parliamentary elections, demonstrations, and other political events (referendums, 
court’s decisions, etc.) that shaped the public debate in relation to the Spanish-Catalan 
relations. 
The variation in the degree of support for an Independent state observed in Figure 6.1 
is substantial. While in the years previous to the economic crisis the number of Catalans that 
declared to want an independent state amounted to roughly 15 percent, between 2013 and 
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2015 the corresponding share escalated to almost half of the population (about 45 percent). 
As this preference gained weight amongst Catalans, the alternatives of a Federal State or 
maintaining the status quo (autonomous community) decreased proportionally.  
Figure 6.1 Evolution of Catalans opinion with regards to the relation between Spain and 
Catalonia 
 
Notes: Respondents are asked what they think the relationship between Catalonia and Spain should be. Y-axis 
indicate the percentage of respondents in each category. Catalan elections are displayed in the bottom 
of the graph with horizontal labels, whereas general Spanish elections with vertical labels. Events 
mentioned at the top are explained in the text. 
Source: Own elaboration from the data of CEO (Centre Estudis d’Opinió). Inspired by a graph published by La 
Vanguardia (2016). 
 
In particular, a large jump is observed in the year 2012, right between two of the events 
marked in the figure. These events are the XVI Congress of the right-wing nationalist party 
CiU1 (Convergència i Unió) and the 11 of September (national day of Catalonia) which had 
                                               
1 A federation of two parties: Convergencia Democràtica de Catalunya (CDC), and Unió. After 37 years together, the 
coalition would finally split three months before the 2015 elections. The party has changed its name several times in 
the past years. 
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as a slogan “Catalonia: A New State of Europe”. In order to understand the importance of 
these two events it is important to take a step back to retrace the evolution of the Catalan 
political landscape in the years before the crisis. 
Several articles have pointed to the sentence of the Statue of Autonomy (SoA) as a 
defining event for the transformations in the Catalan political sphere (Rico and Liñeira 2014; 
Orriols and Rodon 2016; Basta 2017; Muro 2009). Each autonomous community in Spain 
has its own Statue of Autonomy which consists of a legislative corpus that established the 
organization of the regional government. In 2003, the tripartite —a coalition of PSC (Partit 
Socialista de Catalunya) ERC (Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya) and ICV (Iniciativa-
Verds)2— orchestrated a reform of the SoA that granted more autonomy to the region, which 
generated a strong opposition from the right. After having been approved in Parliament, the 
SOA was ratified in a referendum in 2006, months before the regional elections in November 
which were characterised by high amount of abstention and dissatisfaction (Lago et al. 2007). 
Subsequently, the right-wing Partido Popular (PP) legally contested the reform and presented 
an appeal to the constitutional court. The final sentence over the SoA would come in June 
2010 and declared 14 articles unconstitutional, indicated in Figure 1 as “Resolution CC”. The 
amendment implied a “decrease [in] powers granted by the approved version.” (Rico and 
Liñeira 2014: 261).  
The sentencing of the court became a key factor in the change of discourse of the 
nationalist forces in Catalonia. As argued by Basta (2017: 10), this event was key in 
redefining the frame of nationalist parties, going from autonomy to independence: 
Before the adoption of the 2006 Statute of Autonomy, the dominant Catalan nationalist 
frame was that of gradual, if contested, advancement of Catalonia’s self-government 
within the Spanish constitutional framework. Between 2006 and 2010, Catalan 
                                               
2 Coalition agreement between the nationalist left (ERC), the social democrats (PSC) and the greens/new left (ICV). 
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secessionists attempted to transform this frame by inducing status-quo nationalist 
politicians to acknowledge that the gradualist approach to meaningful self-government 
was at an end. The new diagnostic frame they were proposing was that the Constitutional 
Court decision on the 2006 Statute, which they predicted would reduce the scope of 
Catalonia’s autonomy, would decisively demonstrate that Spanish political elites were no 
longer capable of accommodating Catalan political demands.  
The court’s decision provoked a strong reaction in the protest arena. On July 10th, 2010, 
Barcelona saw one of its largest demonstration of its democratic history. Under the banner 
“we are a nation, we decide”, the constitutional ruling was framed as a violation of the 
sovereignty of the Catalan people. During this period, we can observe a slight increase in the 
preferences for an independent state, reaching about 25 percent of the population. After the 
demonstration, and in a context of “rampant economic recession and growing political 
discontent” (Rico 2012: 217), president Montilla (PSC) called for snap elections that were 
held on November 28th, 2010. They resulted in a victory of CiU led by Artur Mas, who 
would form a minority government. In a sense, these elections constituted the return to 
normality in Catalan politics, given that, besides the previous two exceptional legislatures 
governed by the tripartite (2003-2006, led by Pasqual Maragall and 2006-2010, led by José 
Montilla) the right-wing party CiU had governed for the previous 23 years. The punishment 
of the incumbents, as shown by Rico (2012), had much to do with the performance of these 
parties at the national level, as opposed to the 2006 elections. Table 6.2 shows the results of 
all Catalan parliamentary elections since 1980s. 
The years following the victory of Artur Mas in 2010 until the next snap elections in 
November 2012 were politically tumultuous, both in Catalonia and in the rest of Spain, and 
they are a crucial period for understanding the activation of the secessionist conflict. I put 
forward two arguments to explain the sudden change of preferences in the territorial 
organisation during this period. The first is concerned with the change of the centre-right 
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party CiU. The second is concerned with a growing sense of dissatisfaction with the 
incumbent government at the national level and the crisis of political representation that 
unfolded during this period. 
Table 6.2 Catalan Parliament Elections Results (percentage over valid votes) 1984–2017 
Party 1984 1988 1992 1995 1999 2003 2006 2010 2012 2015 2017 
JxCat                     21.7 
JxSí          39.7  
Unió          2.5  
CiU 46.8 45.7 46.2 40.9 37.7 30.9 31.5 38.4 30.7   
PSC 30.1 29.8 27.5 24.9 37.9 31.2 26.8 18.4 14.4 12.8 13.9 
ERC 4.4 4.1 8.0 9.5 8.7 16.4 14.0 7.0 13.7  21.4 
PP 7.7 5.3 6.0 13.1 9.5 11.9 10.7 12.4 13.0 8.5 4.2 
ICV-EUiA 5.6 7.8 6.5 9.7 2.5 7.3 9.5 7.4 9.9 9.0 7.5 
C's       3.0 3.4 7.6 18.0 25.4 
CUP         3.5 8.2 4.5 
SI        3.3 1.3   
CDS  3.8          
EUiA     1.4       
Others 4.9 2.8 4.7 0.9 1.4 1.4 2.4 6.9 4.5 1.1 1.2 
Blank 0.5 0.6 1.2 1.0 0.9 0.9 2.0 2.9 1.5 0.5 0.4 
Turnout (%) 64.4 59.4 54.9 63.6 59.2 62.5 56.0 58.8 67.8 75.0 79.1 
Note: ICV-EUiA in 2015 runs as Catalunya Sí que Es Pot (CSQEP) and in 2017 as Catalunya en Comú-Podem 
(CECP). In 2015 CDC (split of CiU) and ERC run together under Junts pel Si (JxSí). 
Source: idescat. Government of Catalonia 
 
Activation: The Road Towards Independence 
Just six months after the regional elections of 2010 in which Artur Mas would become 
president of the Generalitat, massive protests against austerity policies and in favour of 
democratic regeneration against the ruling elites flooded Spanish cities, giving birth to the 
indignados movement. Barcelona was no exception. Indeed, it became one of the main 
headquarters of the new born movement, which would be the expression of a crisis of 
political representation linked to the irruption of two new parties at the national arena, 
Podemos and Ciudadanos (see Chapter 5), and also to new municipalist movements such as 
Barcelona en Comú or En Marea. In Barcelona, the demonstrations included an explicit 
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rejection of the austerity policies being implemented by the incumbent party CiU. The 
sudden emergence of the Indignados movement appeared to have temporarily displaced the 
‘self-determination’ debate that had been growing since the court ruling over the SOA, 
introducing a new frame of the ‘the people’ versus ‘the elite’. 
The alignment between the anti-elitist discourse and the opposition to austerity made it a 
particularly dangerous combination for CiU, especially because it represented the political 
elite that had governed for most of Catalonia’s democratic life and had introduced severe 
austerity measures during the crisis period. The cuts CiU implemented were substantial and 
highly unpopular. By May 2012, hardly a year and a half after assuming office, the 
government of Artur Mas was already announcing the third adjustment plan, this time of 
1.500 million, which included the reduction of salary supplements for civil servants, the 
selling of public assets, increasing university fees, and severe cuts in the health budget3. The 
commitment to austerity was agreed between both central and regional right-wing 
governments, an agreement that secured the Catalan government’s access to the regional 
liquidity fund (FLA). 
This adverse political context for CiU worsened due to several corruption scandals 
affecting the party. The most significant ones were the case Palau, uncovered in 2009, which 
involved the deviation of 26 million euros of public funds and affected several senior 
politicians of the party and revealed illegal party financing; the ITV case, uncovered in 2012, 
regarding the rigging of concessions related to the technical inspection of vehicles for which 
the secretary general of CDC was condemned for influence peddling; and the public health 
                                               
3 The cuts in health budget would drop about 1500 million from 2010 to 2014. It is important to note that health was one of 
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scandals, also uncovered in 2012, which included a series of scandals in the public health 
system concerning years of irregular payments, rigged competitions and political favours that 
directly involved a MP of the Catalan Parliament of CDC.4 
Amidst this adverse political context that aggravated the weight of governing during times of 
austerity, including several corruption scandals, and the emergence of a new political frame 
that challenged the elites, CDC held its XIV congress in the small town of Reus on March 23, 
2012, as marked in Figure 1. In this congress, titled ‘the national transition’, the party voted 
by unanimity (99.9 percent) of the votes to start working towards the creation of an 
independent State. For the first time CDC, which had always embraced moderate Catalanism, 
would openly support the creation of a new Catalan state. In the words of Oriol Pujol, the 
secretary general, the process was “irreversible”. The procés (process) towards independence 
had officially begun with the shift of the mainstream right in favour of secessionism. 
This change of position would mark the beginning of a campaign for the regional 
elections that would take place on the 25th of November 2012, in which CiU adopted a 
populist rhetoric focusing on “the will of the people” and pursued a strategy of 
personalisation based on its leader Artur Mas (Barrio et al. 2018). The date of the elections 
was not decided by chance but strategically placed after September 11, the national day of 
Catalonia, where massive demonstrations in favour of independence took place. This time, 
with CiU openly behind it. Both the timing of the shift in position and the time of the 
elections suggest that CiU strategically selected the dates to magnify the impact and 
electorally capitalise its change of position. 
                                               
4 CDC refers to Convergència Democràtica de Catalunya, which constitutes the majoritarian party in the CiU coalition. 
Unió, the other partner in the coalition, run separately in the 2015 elections after disputes over support for 
independence and obtained 2.5% of the vote. Fore a comprehensive list of the corruption scandals affecting CDC see: 
https://www.casos-aislados.com/Caso-por-partido.php?Partido=CDC 
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The shift in position of CiU to openly support independence was justified based on the 
impossibility of further advancing in the ambitions of autonomy of the Catalan people and 
the negative response from the central government. It is important to note that, contrary to 
ERC who had openly supported independence since 1989 (Serrano 2017: 143), CiU had 
never endorsed it in the past, even if it did not rule out the possibility either. It simply did not 
consider it “currently relevant” (Newman 1997: 43). In terms of the narrative, Serrano (2017: 
148) provides an accurate description of this shift in framing which he calls a “remedial shift 
towards independence”: 
According to the nationalist narrative, the Spanish government’s refusal to negotiate a 
bilateral process showed the impossibility of finding satisfactory accommodation within 
Spain, especially after an agenda of recentralization policies on key areas such as 
education or the failure to make the public investment included in the Statute of 2006. 
Even though the proposal suggested reaching an agreement with the central government 
for the referendum to be held under the existing constitutional framework, the situation 
could eventually legitimate unilateral decisions by the Catalan parliament if the state’s 
negative position persisted. The official statement of the Parliament underlines the failure 
of the historical goal of Catalanism, that is, the accommodation of Catalonia within a 
plurinational Spain, leaving statehood within Europe as the only remaining alternative. 
The shift towards openly supporting independence was, therefore, not completely at odds 
with the party’s past, which had always maintained that possibility. Unlike other cases where 
a change in position over a certain issue that might be detrimental to a party, this is a case 
where the narrative was not at odds with the change of position, therefore lowering the risk of 
being seen as a “copy” to the original party owning the issue. 
It is important to mention the weight of civil society organisations in potentially 
influencing the shift in party position. The pro-independence camp included some highly 
mobilised civil society organisations such as Omnium cultural (and later ANC — Assamblea 
Nacional de Catalunya) that supported several actions such as the not-binding referendums 
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on independence that 166 cities and towns organised on 13th December 2009 with the 
participation of 15,000 volunteers (Guibernau 2014: 17; Della Porta et al. 2017). The 
mobilisation capacity of these organisations made it attractive and safe for a political party to 
be on their side, and costly to be against them. 
Did this change towards supporting an independent state actually respond to a change 
in the electorate’s preferences? Barrio and Rodríguez-Teruel (2017) tackle this very question 
by analysing “to what extent the outbidding competition between the main Catalan parties 
during the 2000s was driven by changes in voters’ attitudes or, instead, by prior elite partisan 
polarization” (2017: 1777). Using data on party elites and activists from surveys conducted in 
party conferences, they show that the latter case is true, that is, there was a process of 
“outbidding competition without previous significant changes in the opinions and attitudes of 
the electorate” (2017: 1790). The changes over the territorial preferences illustrated in Figure 
1 support this finding, given that the significant change occurs after the XVI conference of 
CDC, thus suggesting that the party elites shifted before the electorate. Noteworthily, in the 
case of national identity in Catalonia, previous research has found elites to be much more 
radicalised on the issue than the electorate (Baras et al. 2015: 218). In line with this evidence, 
we therefore expect that the electorate of CiU would have followed the party’s initiative, 
accounting for much of the change that is observed in Figure 1 after the XVI congress.  
Hypothesis 1:  Following cues. The electorate of CiU turned more pro-independence 
following the party’s change in position 
So far, I have argued that the adverse political context for CDC —such as the indignados 
mobilisations, the weight of governing during the crisis, or corruptions scandals—, together 
with bottom-up pressure from civil society organisations and a more nationalistic elite, 
provided incentives for CDC to change its position on the issue of secessionism. This change 
can be considered as trespassing, since the mainstream centre-left nationalist competitor ERC 
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had advocated secessionism for a long time. However, the change of position of this party 
might not reveal the full story. In fact, there is a second mechanism at play that might also 
explain the growing vote in favour of independence: protest voting. 
The rising support for independence in Catalonia cannot be fully understood without 
the developments of Spanish politics in the aftermath of the crisis. The economic crisis gave 
way to a political crisis throughout the Spanish territory, resulting in high levels of distrust 
towards political institutions. The perception that the left-wing Zapatero government (2008-
2011) did not introduce any different economic policies than its main right-wing competitor 
would have introduced, generated a crisis of representation that would be voiced by the 15-M 
as “PP and PSOE are the same”. Yet, even after the widespread 2011 protest, the right-wing 
PP won the Spanish elections in November. The victory of PP constituted a new opportunity 
for the pro-secessionist discourse, especially since nationalism in Catalonia is not orthogonal 
to the left-right dimension but aligned with the left (Dinas 2012) due the historical 
association between Spanish nationalism and the Francoist regime (Muro 2018). 
The promise of a different political system proposed by Catalan secessionism that 
contested, to the eyes of many, an irreformable Spanish state, constituted an attractive 
political project for those most dissatisfied with the functioning of democracy. I thus expect 
political grievances arising from the crisis of representation (see Chapter 5) to be correlated 
with support for independence. I expect this correlation, however, to be more pronounced 
amongst those with instrumental reasons for independence as opposed to identitarian reasons. 
Since it has been repeatedly shown that support for independence is strongly correlated with 
national identity (as explained below), it is expected that the protest mechanism will be more 
pronounced amongst those with dual identities, which is taken here as a proxy for having 
instrumental reasons for wanting independence. Thus; 
 
 - 147 - 
Hypothesis 2:  Protest Voting. Support for independence is mediated by political 
grievances, especially amongst those with dual identities. 
In sum, it was argued that two mechanisms produced the large shift in the electorate and 
activated the secessionist conflict. The first is the change of position of CiU, which is 
explained by the adverse circumstances of the party at the time and the need to reshape 
political conflict to sustain power, and which would account for the large shift in preferences 
towards secession from its electorate. Second, the political grievances stemming from the 
crisis of representation also drove many to support the creation of a new Catalan state. What 
were the consequences of such activation? 
Consequences: Ethnic alignment and polarisation 
The activation of the secessionist conflict in Catalonia produced profound changes in the 
structure of conflict, which are expected to have translated into the electorate. In this new 
scenario of conflict, the dominant political divide would no longer be the left-right divide but 
the divide about secessionism. Because support for secessionism has been shown to be 
strongly correlated with national identity (Muñoz and Tormos 2015; Orriols and Rodon 
2016), the activation of the secessionist conflict is expected to have activated a process of 
ethnic polarisation amongst the electorate. Comparing the 2010 and 2012 at the aggregate 
level, Serrano and Bonillo (2017) show  the “existence of an ethnic alignment of vote and 
that this relation grows as reflected in the variation between the elections of 2010 and 2012” 
(2017: 385). Considering that the conflict has by no means decayed in intensity in later 
elections (2015 and 2017), we would also expect this ethnic polarisation to have become 
stronger in the electorate at the individual level. In other words, we would expect that 
national identity would become a stronger predictor of voting behaviour. 
Hypothesis 3: Ethnic polarisation. National identity becomes a more relevant factor 
in predicting the vote from the 2012 elections onwards. 
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With the polarisation of the conflict, we could also expect a larger turnout in the elections 
from both ‘identity’ camps. This is because, just as decline in polarisation of conflict has a 
negative effect on turnout (Steiner and Martin 2012), increasing polarisation may, on the 
contrary, lead to higher turnout, especially when something as fundamental as the creation of 
a new state is at stake (Andersen et al. 2014). I expect that the pro-secessionist camp 
mobilised first, and that the anti-secessionist camp caught up only after some time. This is the 
case for two reasons. First, because the Spanish identity in Catalonia may be correlated with 
lower education levels, which known to correlate with lower political participation and 
turnout (Persson 2015). Second, because the activation of the secessionist conflict is likely to 
have triggered an adversarial strategy from the opposition, namely Ciudadanos, who would 
have campaigned strongly against secessionism, thus attracting the vote of those strongly 
opposed to it as the issue became more salient. 
Hypothesis 4:  Ethnic mobilisation. Polarisation leads to higher turnout in a sequential 
manner, first by the pro-secessionist electorate, then followed by those 
against secession. 
Data and Methods 
This study relies on three different sources of survey data that include different elements that 
are of interest to the analysis, namely the CEO (Centre d’Estudis d’opinió) from 2006-2018, 
which consists of a periodical survey on electoral behaviour conducted by the Catalan 
regional Government; the post-electoral CIS (Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas) 
surveys from 2006-2017, which is the Spanish state-wide equivalent; and the ICPS (Institut 
de Ciències Socials i Polítiques) surveys available from 1991-2016, an institute affiliated 
with the Autonomous University of Barcelona. Each of the surveys provides advantages to 
tackle different aspects. The CEO survey is conducted up to three times a year and it allows 
for a more nuanced view of the changes in support for key questions regarding secessionism. 
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However, the methodology of the survey changed from phone interviews to face-to-face 
interviews in 2013 and as such there is a break in the series that limits temporal analysis. The 
ICPS survey is only conducted once a year but it has an extensive questionnaire and more 
specific questions than the other two surveys with regards to Catalan’s opinion and 
preferences over independence. It also has the advantage of going back until the early 90s. 
Finally, the CIS provides post-electoral surveys close to the election dates with a large 
sample but with a limited number of questions. 
Ideally this study would have benefited from individual-level panel data to shed light 
on the causal mechanisms behind the activation of the conflict, but to my knowledge such 
data does not exist. Each of the hypotheses are tested using the survey data that best allowed 
to isolate the effect. Replication amongst datasets was conducted when possible (results 
available upon request). Regression analysis is based on logistic regressions and includes the 
most used socio-economic control variables, namely gender, age, education, province and 
size of municipality, as well as ideological variables when pertinent such as the left-right 
scale or identity variables such as national identity. 
National identity: The Linz-Moreno Question 
The question on national identity is based on the Linz-Moreno question, which was first 
conceptualised by Linz et al., (1973) for the case of Spain. This question includes five 
categories, asking respondents to choose amongst a range of categories between “I feel only 
[national]” and “I feel only [regional]”, including a dual identity category in which 
respondents report being equally national and regional. This question has been used in 
several studies of nationalism and has been recently scrutinized in depth by Guinjoan and 
Rodon (2016). The categories of “I feel only Spanish” and “I feel more Spanish than 
Catalan” have been lumped together following other studies (Muñoz and Tormos 2015; Rico 
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and Jennings 2012; Muro and Vlaskamp 2016). This is because there are often very few 
observations in those categories and because there are no theoretically different expectations 
from those respondents. 
One of the problems of using the Linz-Moreno question to observe changes in the 
support for independence is that identity might not be exogenous to the preference for 
territorial organisation. In other words, supporting independence might also lead an 
individual to declare itself ‘Only Catalan’. For this reason, I have replicated whenever 
possible the results with two other variables that serve as proxies for identity, namely the 
language used at home and the place of origin of parents. These proxies for identity should be 
more stable over time and reduce the endogeneity of the relationship. 
Empirical Analysis: Activation and Consequences of Secessionism in Catalonia 
Following cues 
The first hypothesis suggested that CiU’s electorate turned more pro-independence with the 
party’s change of position. I first analyse the share of pro-independence supporters over time. 
Comparing support for independence across waves amongst those who claim to have voted 
for a party in the previous elections allows us to approximate the degree to which the 
electorate of each party changed preferences over the issue of secessionism. Figure 6.2 shows 
the percentage of those favouring independence by the party voted in the last Catalan 
parliamentary elections. 
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Figure 6.2 Share of pro-independence citizens by party voted in last Catalan elections, 2006-
2014 
 
Notes: Own elaboration from CEO Barometer (2018). Each dot for line “CiU” represents an individual survey 
study. Vertical lines represent Catalan Parliamentary elections. 
Source: CEO, 2006-2013. 
 
There are at least three aspects worth highlighting. The first is the constant increase of ERC’s 
electorate in preferring an independent state. Although ERC always advocated for an 
independent state, only 40 percent of its electorate supported independence before the Great 
Recession. This number escalated close to 90 percent in 2013. Second, the constituency of 
ICV, a left-federalist party, underwent an important shift prior to the 2012 elections. The 
percentage of individuals that reported having voted for ICV in 2010 and that supported 
independence increased to 45 percent in October 2012 from barely 25 percent in June of the 
same year. However, this number is reduced down to 30 percent after the 2012 elections. 
Third, the percentage of pro-independence supporters amongst those who claim to have voted 
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for CiU in the 2010 elections, increased from 28 percent in January 2011 up to 60 percent in 
October 2012, right before the November 2012 elections. The largest change occurs between 
June 2012 and October 2012, where the percentage increases by nearly 20 points. If we 
consider the period between the 2010 and 2012, the largest shift comes from the electorate of 
CiU. 
These results suggest that a substantial share of the electorate of CiU in 2010 changed 
their preferences with regards to the organisation of the State alongside the party’s change in 
position, shortly after the 2012 elections. Modelling support of independence provides the 
same results, insofar as the marginal effect of having voted for CiU in the 2010 elections 
becomes a significant predictor of supporting independence from October 2012 onwards 
(Figure A1 in the appendix). Moreover, building on V.O. Key’s (1966b) distinction between 
types of voters, we can identify some of the elements that distinguish the voters that voted in 
2010 and again in 2012 for CiU —the loyalists (coded as 1)— versus those who changed 
party in 2012 —the leavers (coded as 0). If support for independence is a positive and 
significant predictor of loyalty, we can then conclude that CiU appealed most to the 
electorate that was either already in favour of secessionism or that became secessionist with 
the party’s change of position. Table 6.3 shows the results of various model specifications 
and confirms that those more in favour of secessionism decided to vote again in 2012 for 
CiU. 
The results suggest that that those who support independence are between 12 to 20 
percentage points (models 1-3, Table 6.3) more likely to have remained loyal to CiU in the 
2012 elections5. These results are robust through a number of different model specifications 
                                               
5 In terms of odds ratios, the results indicate that those who support independence are 3 to 4 times more likely to have 
remained loyal to CiU (as opposed to having switched) than those who do not (see table A2, models 2-4 in the 
appendix). 
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and controls, including leadership evaluation, party identification (PID), salience of the 
territorial reform, and national self-identification. Replicating similar models for other 
available survey data (CIS) provides similar results6. Given that the party only lost 7-8 
percent of the vote between 2010 and 2012, it is safe to conclude that a large share changed 
their preferences with regards to secession. Moreover, is it also possible to see the extent to 
which those who had not voted for CiU and did in 2012 —the newcomers— compare to 
those who did not vote for CiU neither in 2010 or 2012 —the opposers. The newcomers have 
a 5 to 9 percent higher probability of being pro-independence, depending on the model 
specification (models 4-6, Table 6.3), suggesting that the party also managed to attract new 
voters on the basis of its change towards secessionism, mostly from its competitor ERC. 
So far, I have shown that CiU’s change of position regarding secessionism was 
accompanied by a change in its electorate towards more pro-secessionist positions, and that 
those who stayed loyal to the party in 2012 were those most in favour of independence. It is 
important to note, however, that in order to establish the causality from the party’s change in 
position to the change in the preference, more sophisticated panel data would be required (not 
available to my knowledge). There is some additional evidence that supports this 
interpretation. First, Barrio and Rodríguez-Teruel (2016) show that the ethnic polarisation is 
likely to be an elite driven process by looking at national identification data from politicians 
and activist. Second, it is important to note that CiU held its XVI congress in March 2012, 
thus preceding the large shift in preferences observed in the following months, and that 
coincided with the September 2012 pro-independence demonstration. 
                                               
6 Results available upon request. 
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Table 6.3 Marginal effects of leavers versus loyalists and newcomers vs. opposers of CiU, 
2010-2012 
 
 Loyalists vs Leavers Newcomers vs. Opposers 
Variables (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6) 
        
Pro-Independence 0.197** 0.176*** 0.127**  0.086*** 0.044 0.054* 
 (0.082) (0.064) (0.065)  (0.032) (0.028) (0.031) 
        
Salience 0.076** 0.051 0.024  0.022 0.014 0.011 
 (0.034) (0.034) (0.039)  (0.017) (0.015) (0.017) 
National Sentiment 
(ref: Only/More Spanish) 
       
Dual 0.175  0.294  Ref.  Ref. 
 (0.228)  (0.228)     
More Catalan 0.365  0.420*  0.099***  0.074* 
 (0.246)  (0.240)  (0.036)  (0.038) 
Only Catalan 0.369  0.402*  0.023  -0.023 
 (0.248)  (0.243)  (0.034)  (0.036) 
        
Evaluation A. Mas  0.013 0.011   0.011** 0.013** 
  (0.012) (0.012)   (0.005) (0.006) 
        
PID  0.138*** 0.142***   0.050*** 0.053*** 
  (0.034) (0.036)   (0.012) (0.012) 
        
        
Controls ✔ ✔ ✔  ✔ ✔ ✔ 
        
Observations 221 222 221  549 618 521 
Notes: For models 1-3 the dependent variable is loyalists (1) vs. leavers (0). For models 4-6 the 
dependent variable is newcomers (1) vs. opposers (0). Standard errors in parentheses (*** 
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1). Controls include: gender, age, education, size of the municipality, 
province, left-right scale. In models 5-8 there are no observations for ‘Only/More Spanish’ in 
‘newcomers’. As such, the reference category becomes ‘dual’. 
Source: ICPS, 2012. 
Protest Voting 
Although most of the change came from the electorate of CiU, it was also hypothesised that 
the growth of support for independence was linked to the political grievances that aggravated 
in the aftermath of the economic crisis (H2). The change towards supporting independence 
could thus be associated with a second mechanism beyond following elite cues of CiU in 
activating ethnic-polarisation, namely a growing feeling of detachment from the central 
government, which substantially increased in average over time, especially from 2011 to 
2012 (see figure A4 in the appendix). In short, supporting independence could be a way of 
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voicing protest7. To test this argument, I check whether it is particularly among those with 
dual identities that political grievances drive the desire for an independent state. 
Figure 6.3a shows the predicted probabilities of support for independence over 
different levels of satisfaction with democracy. While the preference for an independent state 
is strongly correlated with national identity, especially for those categories of ‘only Catalan’ 
and ‘more Catalan than Spanish’, the mediating effect of political grievances in predicting 
support for independence varies significantly. More specifically, those who identify as ‘only 
Catalan’ only show a slightly higher probability to support an independent state as they are 
more dissatisfied with the functioning of democracy. By contrast, the slope is much steeper 
for those who identify as ‘more Catalan than Spanish’, increasing twenty percentage points 
from 30% to 50% as the self-reported satisfaction with democracy decreases. For voters with 
a Spanish identity or who equally identify as Spaniard or Catalan, political dissatisfaction 
does not make a difference at all. 
As pointed out by Guinjoan and Rodon (2016), the ‘dual’ category, ‘as Spanish as 
Catalan’, is associated with pro-Spanish identity positions, whereas ‘more Catalan than 
Spanish’ captures to a greater extent the duality due to historical associations with Spanish 
nationalism (Dinas 2012), which explains why the ‘dual’ category is associated with no 
support for secessionism together with the ‘only Spanish’ category. The results hold after 
controlling for several political (ideology, party identification) and identity-based variables 
(national identity) across a number of model specifications and using different data sources8 
(see table A3 in the appendix). Although we cannot be certain of the causal effect —i.e. 
whether supporting independence leads to lower satisfaction with democracy or the other 
                                               
7 Note that there are a non-negligible number of citizens who would vote for independence even if their preferred model of 
territorial organisation is a federal state, although this number declines over time (see figure A.2 in the appendix). 
8 Replicating the model for CEO and CIS provides similar results with regards to central government evaluation. Data 
available upon request. 
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way around—, the correlation suggests that there are strong protest dynamics at play in the 
changing support towards secessionism of this specific category of voters. 
Figures 6.3 Predicted probabilities of vote for independence by preference for the territorial 
organisation by political grievances 
 
Notes: Based on Model 4 in Table A3 in the appendix. 
Source: CEO, 2010-2013 
 
Towards Ethnic Alignment 
The crisis of representation and the change in position of CiU might explain the shift in 
preferences over independence, but what exactly triggered this change? Hypothesis 3 
suggested that ethnic polarisation became an increasingly important factor in predicting 
voting behaviour in Catalonia since the beginning of the procés (2012 –). Serrano and 
Bonillo (2017) show this to be the case at the aggregate level. In the context of growing 
political polarisation, they find evidence of ethnic voting alignment from the 2010 to the 
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2012 election. However, there are problems with using aggregate data, namely the danger of 
ecological fallacies (Przeworski and Teune 1970). As Serrano and Bonillo point out, they do 
not “aim at inferring individual behaviour as much as detecting patterns of change at the 
aggregate level”. I test this hypothesis at the individual. Using post electoral data, Figure 6.4 
shows the predicted probabilities of national identity on voting for pro-secessionist parties 
(CiU, ERC and CUP) in all regional elections from 2006 to 2017. 
The pattern is clear: national identity becomes an increasingly important determinant of 
the vote. The big change can be observed in the 2012 elections once the conflict has been 
activated. While in 2010 the probability to choose one of the same secessionist parties by 
identifying as ‘only Catalan’ is 65 percent, this probability increases to over 90 percent in the 
2012 elections. This pattern then holds for the following elections (2015 and 2017), 
suggesting that the ethnic polarisation is not limited to a single election, but sustained over 
time. The same finding applies to the category ‘more Catalan’, though to a slightly lesser 
degree. By contrast, the pattern for dual and Spanish identities follow the opposite pattern. 
Whereas the probability of voting for secessionist parties in 2010 for those having a dual 
identity was close to 40 percent before 2012, it is reduced to 15 percent in 2017. The same 
follows for those in the category of ‘only/more Spanish’, going from 25 percent probability in 
2010 to a 2 percent in 2017. If we consider the weight of national identity on voting 
behaviour by party-elections, the results are consistent (see figure A.3 in the appendix). 
Notably, CiU would have suffered significant losses amongst those in the categories of 
‘Only/More Spanish’ and ‘Dual’ in the 2012 elections. At the same time, Ciudadanos would 
have started gaining the vote for those categories, steadily increasing in 2015 and 2017. 
These results largely confirm hypothesis 3 by showing that there has been a process of ethnic 
alignment in Catalonia since 2012, thus also proving the consistency of the findings of  
Serrano and Bonillo (2017) at the individual level. 
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Figure 6.4 Predicted Probabilities of voting for a pro-secessionist party (CiU, ERC and CUP, 
or coalition JxSi/JxCat) by national identity in different elections. 
 
Notes: Controls include: Left-Right scale, gender, age, education, province and size of municipality. 
Regression results available upon request. 
Source: CIS post-electoral studies (2660; 2857; 2970; 3113; 3202). 
Stepwise Mobilisation 
The fourth and final hypothesis (H4) raised the question of political activation. The fact that 
electoral turnout increased in each election, especially from 2010 (58.67%) to 2012 
(67.76%), raises the question “as to what extent Catalan nationalism would have appealed to 
the population born in the rest of Spain, emphasizing welfare and civic aspects” (Serrano and 
Bonillo 2017: 375). In order to test H4, I check to what extent being in favour of “a State that 
recognises the possibility of autonomous communities to become an independent state” 
predicts the probability of having abstained in each of the elections9. Figure 6.5 illustrates the 
                                               
9 Only those who could vote but did not do so are included as in the sample as ‘abstainers’. 
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predicted probabilities of abstaining in the election as a function of support for independence. 
Figure 6.5 Predicted Probabilities of abstaining by preferences over territorial organisation in 
different elections. 
 
Notes: Controls include: Left-Right scale, gender, age, education, province and size of municipality. 
Regression results available upon request. 
Source: CIS post-electoral studies (2660; 2857; 2970; 3113; 3202). 
 
Overall, there is, as expected given the higher turnout, a significant decline of the probability 
of abstaining for both groups. However, we observe that in the 2012 elections the decline is 
significantly more pronounced for the pro-independence camp. In the 2012 elections, the first 
in which the mainstream right party CiU openly presented itself as pro-secessionist, we 
observe that the supporters of independence are less likely to abstain, although there is also a 
significant decline in the probability of abstaining for the non-independence camp as well. 
This pattern is then corrected in the 2015 and even more so in the 2017 elections, when there 
is no longer any significant difference between the two. 
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Further evidence of this two-step process can be observed by looking at a specific group of 
respondents who declared to have voted in the election, but who claim to rarely or never do 
so. I shall call this group the politically ‘activated’. Comparing this group to those who 
declare to always vote and indeed voted in the elections, which I shall call the politically 
‘active’, points in the same direction. In the 2015 and 2017 elections, the probability of being 
in the political ‘activated’ group significantly grows amongst those who did not vote for a 
pro-secessionist party. In other words, the politically ‘activated’, are, on average, less likely 
to have voted for a pro-independence party in the 2015 and 2017 elections (see figure A5 in 
the appendix). Not surprisingly, the same applies when instead of analysing the vote for 
secessionist parties we look at national identity (see figure A6 in the appendix). In the latter 
two elections (2015 and 2017), a higher proportion of respondents who claim to have voted 
but rarely or never did in previous elections fall within the category of dual and Spanish 
identities. This effect is not observed in the 2012 elections. 
The results of H4 point to a two-step process as a consequence of ethnic polarisation: it 
is those who favoured secessionism who got initially activated the most, but in the elections 
that followed those opposing it caught up. The fact that the latter group took longer to active 
as a response to ethnic polarisation can be explained by the fact that those supporting 
secessionism led the initiative and the political opposition took longer to consolidate (i.e. the 
consolidation of Ciudadanos, see Teruel and Barrio (2016)), but also by the fact that national 
identities, and thus support for secessionism is correlated with education (see Figure A7 in 
the appendix). As we know from previous literature, disadvantaged individuals are more 
difficult to mobilize (Persson 2015). As it turns out, they were more numerous in the anti-
secessionist camp. 
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Conclusion 
The activation of the secessionist conflict in Catalonia in the aftermath of the Great 
Recession raises important questions about representation, conflict and party competition 
dynamics to which this article has aimed to contribute. Theoretically, this chapter has 
advanced the understanding on how mainstream parties can engage in strategies of conflict 
displacement when faced with adverse political circumstances. Empirically, it has shown how 
such strategies can shape the public debate and ultimately transform political conflict as a 
result. 
The new political scenario in Catalonia after the procés towards independence is one 
of high polarisation over national identity in which the fundamental idea of the state is at 
stake. This process has resulted in an extraordinary degree of formal and informal political 
participation, as seen by increasing turnout from both camps but also in the mobilisations in 
the protest arena. While normatively speaking higher participation might be conceived as 
desirable, it has also been accompanied by extreme polarisation, which has increased as the 
conflict developed. 
While the secessionist conflict that activated in Catalonia is closely related to 
identitarian divides —and a much deeper historical cleavage over nation state-building—, it 
does not mean that it is detached from the Great Recession. This is because, as it also seems 
to be the case in several other European countries, economic grievances are translated into 
political grievances, often in the form of conflicts over identity. In the Spanish case, the 
economic crisis exposed the incapacity of mainstream parties to offer an adequate 
programmatic response to the management of the crisis. This produced a profound crisis a 
representation and a potential for alternative narratives to fill the new political void. 
Podemos, as advanced in the previous chapter, managed to combine opposition to austerity 
with a demand for new politics. In Catalonia, an alternative narrative proposed the creation of 
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a new state as a form of democratic renewal and reversal of austerity. This narrative became 
extended once the mainstream party CiU saw an opportunity to avoid the risk of political loss 
by embracing secessionism. 
One important implication stems from this analysis: more attention ought to be paid to 
strategies of actors in shaping the public debate for understanding the structures of conflict. 
Political conflict does not transform merely due to the aggregation of preferences from the 
demand-side of politics. It is political actors that shape the agenda and may activate or de-
activate conflict depending on their interests. After all, the power to shape the political 
agenda is ultimately in the hands of the political elites, and these have at their disposal a 
range of possibilities to influence the public debate. 
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Chapter 7. Conclusion: Towards a New Structure of 
Conflict in Southern Europe? 
 
The aim of this dissertation was to better comprehend the political transformations and 
political restructuring that the Great Recession triggered in southern Europe in the shadow of 
the Great Recession (2008—). For that purpose, two comparative analyses and three case 
studies analysed different aspects of the origins and consequences of such transformations. 
Before I lay out some of the conclusions that this study has to offer, it is worth highlighting 
two important limitations. The first of them is the magnitude of the phenomenon studied. The 
“political consequences” of something as colossal as an economic shock that affected several 
continents, especially given the many dimensions of politics and their interplay, is too much 
for any dissertation to tackle. Going into the specifics of the events, actors, strategies and 
their motivations as the crisis unfolded in comparative perspective for the four countries 
under study —i.e. Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain— would have been preferable, but also 
unrealistic. While trying to provide a bird-eye’s view comparative framework, I decided to 
focus on Spain as a paradigmatic case where the transformations of the party system were 
significant and not limited to the emergence of a populist left party as the theory would 
predict. This approach, in my view, allows to expose how external economic shocks can 
interact with domestic conflicts, providing some insight into the dynamics of politics in a 
real-world setting and allowing for a certain degree of extrapolation to the experiences of 
other countries facing similar contexts. 
The second limitation is that the subject of study deals with very recent phenomena, 
to the extent that some of the chapters were written as the events were unfolding. Even if 
some of the chapters have been somewhat updated a posteriori, it is impossible to disentangle 
where the political consequences of the Great Recession end exactly. To the misfortune of 
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analytical clarity, this is a path-dependence political world in constant flux. The cut-off point 
in the analysis of this dissertation has thus depended more on time limitations than on any 
solid theoretical reason. It could be argued that we are only now starting to see the real 
political consequences of the Great Recession, or at least an important part of them. Future 
research should pay close attention to the emergence and success of the radical right in these 
countries and the possible consolidation of a new cultural cleavage as established in north-
western Eruope. 
Despite these limitations, each of the chapters has some offerings, which taken 
cumulatively, give us some ideas on the effect of the economic crisis in southern European 
politics. Chapter 2 compared the economic and political origins and consequences of the 
crisis in Greece and Spain and argued that the ill-conceived institutional structure of the EU, 
together with prior political domestic developments, created a socio-economic environment 
in which the economic crisis could only have the disruptive political consequences that we 
witnessed. It was also shown that, while austerity packages were much harsher in Greece 
than in Spain, both countries suffered dramatic economic and social consequences, which 
triggered a severe distrust towards political institutions and bred the ground for the 
restructuring of their party systems. 
Chapter 3 took a bird-eye perspective of the macro-political transformations in the 
four southern European countries —Greece, Italy, Portugal, and Spain— and showed that 
political conflict is structured around economic and political issues at the European and 
domestic levels. These transformations were driven by new parties that combined an anti-
austerity platform with promises of democratic regeneration. Moreover, this structure was 
found to differ from the structure found to shape the Northwest of Europe, where the driving 
forces are the populist radical right and a new cultural cleavage is structuring the political 
space. 
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Chapter 4 focused on Spain to trace the evolution of domestic political conflict and 
analysed the specific types of issues that structured political competition before and after the 
crisis period in more detail. In the years previous to the crisis, cultural issues and security 
concerns dominated the public debate. Once the crisis struck, the issues in the political debate 
changed dramatically. Whereas economic issues dominated during the first stages of the 
crisis, political issues concerning democratic renewal and the nation-building dimension of 
Spanish politics rapidly became more prominent in later stages. An important takeaway from 
this chapter is that economic grievances can be rapidly channelled through other types of 
political conflict that do not necessarily involve economic issues. 
Chapter 5 focused on the emergence of the two new parties in the Spanish case —
Podemos and Ciudadanos— and tested several hypotheses about the underlying factors that 
led to their emergence by analysing the characteristics of their electorate. It was argued that a 
crisis of representation (i.e. political grievances) is a much more important determinant of the 
vote for these new parties than traditional issues. Moreover, it was shown that despite the 
emergence of the new parties, the structure of conflict remains unidimensional in the demand 
side. Finally, it was illustrated how a generational divide that cuts across the Spanish 
electorate also interacted with the dissatisfaction that drove the vote for both Podemos and 
Ciudadanos: voters of these parties represent a younger and dissatisfied share of the 
electorate on opposite sides of the political spectrum. 
Finally, Chapter 6 focused on the case of Catalonia to explore one of the main issues 
that dominated the Spanish political agenda in the later stages of the crisis, namely the 
nation-building conflict. This last chapter illustrates that the crisis was not limited to 
economic consequences but that the activation of conflict was strongly mediated by the 
interests of political actors. More specifically, the chapter discusses displacement strategies 
that parties can follow when they face the risk of losing power, as well as the consequences 
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that the activation had in the Catalan experience. It is shown that the electorate underwent a 
process of ethnic polarisation and a step-wise increase in participation by both camps. This 
chapter explores in more detail the idea raised in chapter 4 on how political grievances 
resulting from an economic shock can be politicised in different ways depending on the 
historical and political legacies of the territory. 
Parenthesis towards convergence or exceptionalism? 
Analysing ongoing political phenomena is a risky endeavour. By the time of writing, a new 
radical right party (VOX) has emerged in the regional Andalusian elections in Spain with the 
prospects of gaining representation at the national parliament in the next general elections. 
Speculating on the future of political conflict in Spain, one could argue that the emergence of 
a such a party in Spain is part of a ‘catching-up process’ of south European politics to the 
North-Western European structure of conflict. Following this perspective, the political 
transformations during the Great Recession would have merely constituted a parenthesis 
towards a more stable cultural divide represented by two poles: the populist radical right and 
the green or alternative parties. However, an argument could also be made for the 
exceptionality of the southern region for several reasons. First, the radical right parties in 
these four countries such as Golden Dawn represent more traditional far right parties rather 
than the ‘new right’ that is gaining strength in NWE. It is too early to tell for the Spanish 
case, though the leaders of the new party are radical factions of the mainstream right and 
there are no explicit rejections of its fascist past, quite the contrary. While Italy seems the 
‘best-fitting case’ with the Lega’s transformation from a regionalist party to PRR, Portugal 
has no populist radical right in sight. 
On the green pole, the equivalence is not so straightforward either. While Podemos, 
Syriza, and the Bloco de Esquerda in Portugal might eventually become the functional 
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equivalent of the north-European green parties, they are for now different animals, mixing 
elements of the new left with the traditional radical left. The story is even less clear for the 
M5S in Italy, which has evolved into a centre populist party, progressively abandoning any 
leftist tendencies it might have had when it first formed in 2013 and even adopting anti-
immigration stances when necessary. For now, it appears as though the opportunity structures 
that opened for these parties by combining anti-austerity claims with a new way of doing 
politics have allowed them to consolidate a new left identity beyond green parties, which in 
some cases such as Podemos (Equo) are embodied within these coalitions. 
Has the Great Recession constituted a parenthesis in the convergence of southern 
European politics towards the North, or is southern Europe exceptional and following its own 
path? To this question we can only speculate. It is reasonable to think that, once the crisis of 
representation has passed and new parties consolidate, these parties will be forced to better 
define themselves ideologically in more rooted structures of conflict. In other words, it is 
likely that the exceptionality of the crisis allowed new left parties such as Podemos and 
Syriza to capitalise on the discontent and feeling of detachment from politics, but once the 
storm is over, these parties will need to find ways to reposition themselves in a new structure 
of conflict. 
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Appendices 
Appendix Ch. 3: Old versus new politics: The political spaces in 
Southern Europe in times of crisis 
Data sources and coding strategy 
While media data come with certain biases, we think they offer ample opportunities to 
capture changes in the political space in times of crises. More precisely, we rely on media 
data because we are interested in publicly visible conflicts among the parties during the 
campaigns. In our opinion, media data are especially sensitive to political change and allow 
us to examine how the issues of the day map onto underlying issue dimensions. While this 
might lead to limited information about small parties (as they might be underreported in the 
media), it gives a good indication of the conflicts and actors that dominate the public debate. 
Alternative data sources do not come with the same biases. However, they are usually not 
linked to specific elections (especially expert surveys), do not contain positional and salience 
measure for all issues (especially manifesto data), and apply a rather rigid issue set of issue 
categories (which we tend to avoid by relying on a more inductive approach to new issues). 
As stated, we selected articles from two quality newspapers per country (the main 
center-left and center-right newspapers): Ta Nea and Kathimerini (Greece), La Repubblica 
and Corriere della Sera (Italy), Público and Diário de Notícias (Portugal), and El Pais and El 
Mundo (Spain). We selected all news articles that were published within two months before 
the national Election Day and reported on the electoral contest and national party politics 
more generally. Editorials and commentaries were excluded from the selection. The selection 
was done by an extensive keyword list including the names and abbreviations of political 
parties and key politicians from each party. In the case of early elections, we selected the 
period from the announcement of the election until Election Day. 
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We then coded a sample of the selected articles using core sentence analysis (CSA). 
Following this type of relational content analysis, each grammatical sentence of an article is 
reduced to its most basic ‘core sentence(s)’ structure, which contain(s) only the subject, the 
object, and the direction of the relationship between the two. The core sentence approach was 
developed by Kleinnijenhuis and colleagues (e.g., Kleinnijenhuis, et al., 1997). This type of 
quantitative content analysis allows us to study both issue positions and salience. The 
direction between actors and issues is quantified using a scale ranging from -1 to +1, with 
three intermediary positions. For example, the grammatical sentence “Party leader A rejects 
calls for leaving the Eurozone but supports a haircut on the country’s debt” leads to two 
coded observations (Party A +1 Eurozone membership; Party A +1 haircut). For this paper, 
we only focus on relations between party actors and political issues, that is we neglect 
relations between different actors. The following analysis are based on a total of around 
11,000 actor-issue statements, ranging from a minimum of 942 for the first Greek election in 
2012 to a maximum of 1,650 for the Portuguese election in 2011 (see Table 1A). 
Table 1A. Number of actor-issue sentences per campaign 
Country Election Number of sentences 
Greece 2012-May 942 
Greece 2012-June 1,027 
Greece 2015-January 1,058 
Greece 2015-September 975 
Italy 2013 1,521 
Portugal 2011 1,650 
Portugal 2015 1,345 
Spain 2011 1,151 
Spain 2015 1,406 
Total 11,075 11,075 
Note: The table shows the total number of actor-issue statements used for the analysis by campaign. 
We coded the function, party affiliation, and (if available) name of actors. For the present 
analysis, the actors were grouped according to their party affiliation. The issues were coded 
in even more detail (with more than 200 coded categories per election campaign). As 
described in the main text, the issues were aggregated into 18 categories that allow us to (a) 
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capture the broad conflicts described in the previous sections and (b) compare our results to 
previous results of Kriesi et al. (2008, 2012)(2008, 2012). Descriptions of the 18 categories 
can be found in Table 2A. Furthermore, we indicate what a positive position regarding a 
given issue category indicates. 
 
Table 2A. Issue categories 
Categories Description (a position of +1 stands for ...) 
Domestic economic  
1. welfare support for an expansion of the welfare state; objection to welfare state 
retrenchment; support for tax reforms with a redistributive character; 
calls for employment and health care programs 
2. economic liberalism opposition to market regulation, economic protectionism in agriculture 
and other sectors of the economy; support for deregulation, more 
competition, and privatization; support for a rigid budgetary policy; 
reduction of the state deficit and taxes without direct redistributive 
effects 
3. economic reform (vague) support for general economic reforms without a clear direction (e.g., 
fighting economic crisis; fighting unemployment) 
Domestic political  
4. democratic renewal support for institutional reforms to make the political system more 
democratic or transparent; opposition to corruption and political class 
5. democratic reform (vague) support for general reforms of the political system without clear 
direction 
6. regionalism support for regional autonomy or independence 
7. media diversity support for equal media access and coverage of parties 
European economic  
8. euro support for the single European currency; opposition to a country 
leaving the Eurozone 
9. anti-bailout opposition to the bailout 
10. anti-bailout (conditions) opposition to the conditions of the bailout; support for more favorable 
conditions (e.g., better interest rates, debt restructuring) 
European political  
11. europe support for European integration in general, deepening and widening 
Others  
12. cultural liberalism support for cultural diversity, international cooperation, gender 
equality, LGTB rights; opposition to national traditions and traditional 
moral values. 
13. anti-immigration support for restrictive immigration and integration policies 
14. security support for more law and order, fighting crime (except tax fraud and 
corruption) 
15. defense support for military interventions, the armed forces, a strong national 
defense, and nuclear weapons 
16. education support for education and research 
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17. environment support for environmental protection; opposition to nuclear energy 
18. infrastructure support for improving the country’s roads, railways, and other physical 
infrastructure; support for media 
 
Salience and polarization 
The systemic components of party competition that we are most interested in are 
operationalized by the salience and the polarization of the issues which represent the 
economic and political conflicts. Salience is measured by the share of core sentences on an 
issue category in percent of all sentences related to any issue. The indicator for the 
polarization of party positions is based on Taylor and Hermann’s (1971) index and ranges 
from 0 to 1 (=maximum degree of polarization). The polarization of positions on a given 
issue category is computed as follow: 
 
Where !" is the salience of a particular issue category for party k, #" is the position of party 
k on this issue category, and #$ is the weighted average position of all parties, where weights 
are provided by the party-specific salience of the issue category. 
Table 3A. Salience of economic and political issues by election and country 
 
Economic Political Others  
Domestic European Domestic European 
 
GR 2012-May 34.3 23.7 22.8 6.9 12.3 
GR 2012-June 27.3 36.5 9.0 9.5 17.7 
GR 2015-Jan 30.8 32.0 22.2 7.9 7.0 
GR 2015-Sept 29.1 27.9 29.3 4.7 8.9 
IT 2013 50.0 1.2 30.6 3.4 14.8 
PT 2011 53.7 14.1 18.2 0.3 13.6 
PT 2015 64.1 2.9 10.1 1.7 21.2 
ES 2011 58.6 1.9 18.1 1.1 20.3 
ES 2015 26.6 1.0 52.2 0.3 20.0 










 - 189 - 
Multi-dimensional scaling: procedure and interpretation 
To analyze the structure of the political space and the resulting actor configuration, we 
combine the visibility of the actors, their issue positions and issue emphasis. To do so, we 
follow Kriesi et al. (2006, 2008) and rely on multi-dimensional scaling (MDS). For this 
analysis, we excluded issue categories with less than three percent of all statements and 
actors with less than 20 statements. In the case of Spain, we also dropped all regional parties 
to concentrate on party competition at the national level. 
The aim of MDS is to obtain a graphical representation of the relative locations of a 
set of objects in a low-dimensional space. Starting from information on the proximities 
between pairs of objects, MDS finds the optimal space in which these objects can be located 
while distorting as little as possible the original proximities. In our case, we consider the 
distances between parties and issues, which were determined with the help of content 
analyses, and use MDS to construct a representation of the locations of these parties and 
issues in a (two-dimensional) space. It is not our purpose here to explain all details of MDS. 
Overviews of this statistical method can be found in Borg and Groenen (1997), Cox and Cox 
(2001), or Kruskal and Wish (1978). Rabinowitz (1975) also presents a good and simple 
introduction to the topic but limited to the case of nonmetric MDS. Rather, we simply want 
here to emphasize some of the peculiarities of the analyses we have performed, which differ 
from a ‘standard’ MDS. Most important among these are the unfolding technique and the use 
of weights. 
Unfolding models are special cases of MDS where information is available on the 
proximities between objects of two different sets, but not on the proximities between objects 
within each of the two sets. In our analyses, we used information on the distances between 
parties and issues. But we had no comparable measures of the distances between pairs of 
parties or between pairs of issues. Such data can be analyzed with standard MDS techniques, 
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but it means that at least half of the cells in the proximity matrix have missing values. When 
such data are analyzed with nonmetric MDS (which implies a transformation of the original 
proximities into rank orders, for instance), the solutions ‘are subject to many potential 
degeneracies’ (Borg and Groenen, 1997: 231). Metric MDS, however, is more robust and 
avoids the problems linked with nonmetric MDS in the case of unfolding (Borg and Groenen, 
1997: 245ff.).  
The second particularity of our MDS analyses is the use of weights. As explained 
above, MDS locates the objects in a space while keeping the distances between them as close 
as possible to the original proximities. However, as the aim is to obtain a representation of 
the objects in a low dimensional space, some distortion of the original distances is 
unavoidable. The degree of distortion is measured by a ‘Stress’ statistic, which is based on 
the sum of the squared distances between the original proximities and the proximities 
obtained in the solution. The higher the value of the Stress statistic, the worse is the fit 
between the solution and the data. The aim is thus to find the solution that minimizes the 
value of Stress. In our case, we want to obtain a configuration of parties and issues where the 
distances between them are as close as possible to those in our original data. By using 
weights, we allow for the possibility that some distortions of original distances have a larger 
impact on the value of Stress than others. In other words, we give much importance to 
representing some distances faithfully and less importance to the degree of distortion 
affecting other distances. The rationale for this is that not all relations between parties and 
issues have the same importance. In a campaign, parties address some issues very frequently 
while other issues play a minor role in their statements. Similarly, not all parties are central 
actors in a campaign. We account for such variation by computing weights that reflect the 
salience of a given party × issue relationship. These weights are calculated as the number of 
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core sentences corresponding to a given party × relationship, expressed as a proportion of the 
total number of relationships between parties and issues. 
As in any spatial analysis, it is important to note that the focus on dimensions comes 
at the expense of details. That is, MDS allows identifying main lines of opposition in the 
party system like under a magnifying glass. The tradeoff is that less salient issues and actors 
are less accurately represented. MDS configurations can only be interpreted regarding 
distances between objects. The orientation of a configuration is arbitrary, which implies that 
it can be freely rotated. To facilitate comparison of the spaces shown in the manuscript, we 
have rotated them in such a way that the issues ‘welfare’ and ‘economic liberalism’ are 
situated on a horizontal line. To focus attention on those aspects of these configurations that 
are most important given our hypotheses, we have added four graphical elements. First, we 
have drawn a line connecting welfare and economic liberalism as the supposed endpoints of 
the economic left-right divide. Second, we have introduced circles of varying size around the 
points identifying issues and parties to indicate their respective salience. Third, we added a 
line connecting ‘anti-bailout’ and ‘pro-euro’ for the Greek elections, and a vertical dashed 
line at the mid-point of the left-right divide for all other elections. Finally, we have added a 
circle that covers the main left-wing challengers and the issue of ‘democratic renewal.' This 
circle is added to facilitate the interpretation of our results regarding the alignment of 
opposition to ‘old politics’ and conflicts over austerity. 
Moreover, to systematically compare the alignment of conflicts over economic and 
political issues, we calculate a measure for the integration of ‘democratic renewal’ in the left-
wing pole of the left-right dimension. To do so, we divided the distance between ‘democratic 
renewal’ and ‘welfare’ (the left-wing pole of the economic dimension) by the distance 
between ‘democratic renewal’ and ‘economic liberalism’ (the right-wing pole of the 
dimension). We rely on such a relative measure because the distances in a MDS graph can 
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only be interpreted relative to each other. Moreover, to systematically compare situations in 
which ‘democratic renewal’ is more integrated in the left-wing pole with those where it is 
more integrated in the right-wing pole, we present the natural log of the division in Table 4A. 
Overall, the values in table 4A highlight the left-wing integration of calls for democratic 
renewal. The only exception is the Italian campaign in 2013 as indicated by the slightly 
negative value of -0.5. Moreover, the comparisons over time within a given country, support 
our third hypothesis as the left-wing integration is stronger in cases when the mainstream left 
has been in opposition (the most telling example is Portugal). 
Table 4A. Integration of ‘democratic renewal’ in left-wing pole 
 
Distance of democratic renewal to ln of  
welfare 
left pole (x) 
eco-liberalism 
right pole (y) 
y/x 
GR 2012-May 1.0 1.2 0.2 
GR 2012-June 1.0 1.5 0.4 
GR 2015-Jan 1.0 3.4 1.2 
GR 2015-Sept 1.0 2.8 1.0 
IT 2013 1.0 0.6 -0.5 
PT 2011 1.0 1.4 0.4 
PT 2015 1.0 9.0 2.2 
ES 2011 1.0 2.7 1.0 
ES 2015 1.0 5.7 1.7 
Note: The table shows distances in the political spaces presented in Figure 2. More precisely, it shows 
the distances between the issue ‘democratic renewal’, on the one side, and ‘welfare (left pole)’ 
respectively ‘economic liberalism (right pole)’, on the other. As the absolute measures make little 
sense, we standardized them so that the distance between democratic renewal and welfare equals 1. 
The last column shows the key indicator, i.e., the logged value of the division. It takes a value of zero 
if democratic renewal is equally distant from both poles, while it gets positive, the more integrated it 
is in the left-wing pole. 
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Appendix Ch. 4: Out with the Old: Restructuring Spanish Politics 
Table 1A. Overview of events and elections by legislature 
 
Legislature Government Main events during the legislature 
2000-2004 Jose Maria Aznar (PP) 
Decentralization of competences, including health care management 
Participation in the Iraq war as part of the Açores Pact 
11March Al-Qaeda terrorist attacks 
2004-2008 Jose Luis Rodriguez Zapatero (PSOE) 
Government pulls troops out of Iraq  
Advancement in civil rights (abortion, dependence, equal marriage) 
leading to high levels of conflict with Catholic Church 
Negotiations to surrender ETA 
Basque government proposes a renegotiation of autonomy (refused 
in Congress) 
Passing of the Catalan Autonomy Act   
PP encourages high levels of polarization in public debate (amongst 
others, they blamed Rodriguez Zapatero for the 11-March terrorist 
attacks as a strategy to steal the election) 
2008 - 2011 Jose Luis Rodriguez Zapatero (PSOE) 
Economic situation can be divided into two periods: 
• First half of the legislature: implementation of previous reforms 
• Second half of the legislature: plans to stimulate consumption 
(plan E, allocations to families) + refusal to recognize the 
economic crisis 
New party: UPyD 
ETA declares the ceasing of terrorist actions 
Constitutional Court declares unconstitutional the Catalan 
Autonomy Act 
15-M demonstrations (May 2011) 
2011 - 2015 Mariano Rajoy Brey (PP) 
Retrenchment and austerity policies 
Banking system bailout 
Corruption scandals 
Restriction of civil liberties (gag law) 
Intense period of demonstrations building on some structures formed 
after the 15M mobilizations (“mareas”) 
Situation with Catalonian government reaches a high point of 
tension after attempt to launch an independence process 
New parties: Podemos & Ciudadanos 
2015-2016 - 
Negotiations to form a coalition government fail  
Corruption scandals affecting mainly PP keep appearing 
New elections held on June 26, 2016 
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Table 2A. Spain 2004-2015: brief overview of the elections 
 



















No party is able to form 
government, new elections are held 
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Appendix Ch. 5: Challenging business as usual? The rise of new 
parties in Spain in times of crisis 
Table A.0 Descriptive Statistics 
Variables N Mean SD Min Max Categories 
       
Age 12,417 50.01 17.81 18 98  
Gender 12,417 0.517 0.5 0 1 0 = Male; 1= Female 
Size Town/City 12,417 3.774 1.664 1 7 1 <= 2000; 2 = 2-10k; 3 = 10-50k; 4 = 50-100k; 
5 = 100-400k; 6 = 400-1000K; 7 => 1000K 
Education 12,382 1.953 0.678 1 3 1 = Low; 2 = Middle; 3 = Higher 
Ideology (left-right) 10,547 4.626 2.004 1 10 1 = Left; 10 = Right 
Economic Liberalism 11,645 3.843 2.300 0 10 0 = More Public Services at the cost of more tax; 
10 = Less tax at the cost of less public services 
Multiculturalism 12,085 3.855 2.638 0 10 0 = Nativism; 10 = Cosmopolitanism 
Civil Liberties 11,811 5.304 2.460 0 10 0 = Law and Order; 10 = Civil Liberties 
Territorial Organization 11,502 3.183 1.191 1 5 1 = Centralization; 5 = Decentralization 
Unemployed 12,367 0.161 0.367 0 1 1 = Unemployed 
Income 9,456 3.833 2.010 1 8 1 = None; 2 = <300; 3 = 300-600; 4 = 600-900; 
5 = 900-1200; 6 = 1200-1800; 7 = 1800-2400; 
8 = 2400+ 
Interest in Politics 12,380 2.357 0.967 1 4 1 = None; 2 = Little; 3 = Quite; 4 = A Lot 
Abstention 12,417 0.120 0.325 0 1 1 = Abstained in Previous Elections 
Sociotropic 12,358 0.478 0.234 0 1 [Normalized] 0 = Good/V.Good; 0.33 = Average; 
0.66 = Bad; 1 = Very Bad. Weighted by 
Sociotropic Salience 
Sociotropic Salience * 
(concern Economy or 
Unemployment) 
12,417 4.468 1.691 1 7 1 = Neither mentioned; 2 = None and Third; 
3 = None and Second; 4 = Third and Second; 
5 = First and None; 6 = Third and First; 
7 = First and Second 
Pocketbook 12,367 0.304 0.264 0 1 [Normalized] 0 = Good/V.Good; 0.33 = Average; 
0.66 = Bad; 1 = Very Bad  
Political Crisis 12,320 0.375 0.271 0 1 Based on Factor Analysis (see Table A.1) and 
weighted by Political Crisis Salience 
Political Crisis Salience 
(concern of corruption) 
12,417 2.246 1.117 1 4 1 = Not mentioned; 2 = Third Problem; 
3 = Second Problem; 4 = First Problem 
Region 12,417 8.045 4.800 1 19 A dummy for each autonomous community in 
Spain 
Social Class 11,964 4.991 2.195 1 8 See Figure A.1 for details. 
       
Notes: * The question about the most important problem facing the country offers two answers on the 
economy: Unemployment and The Economy in General. Thus, salience considers both possible 
answers in hierarchical order (first, second and third most important problems), which renders 7 
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Table A.1 Factor analysis results 
Variable Factor Uniqueness 
   
Satisfaction with Democracy .77 0.41 
Trust in Parliament .89 0.21 
Trust in Political Parties .85 0.28 
   
Eigenvalues 2.11 
1.53 Variance 
Note: Principal-Component Factors after varimax rotation. All variables range from 0 to 10, where 0 is full 



































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Left-Right Scale 1     
Public Services vs Tax .16 1    
Multiculturalism .3 .34 1   
Security & Freedom .34 .21 .35 1  
Territorial Organization .36 .1 .2 .27 1 
Note:  All correlations are significant at p<0.01.  
Table A.3 Marginal Effects of Multinomial Logistic Regressions on Vote for Podemos 
 
DV: Vote for Podemos        
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 
        
Age -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.003*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Gender -0.038*** -0.042*** -0.040*** -0.026*** -0.026*** -0.026*** -0.026*** 
 (0.008) (0.009) (0.009) (0.008) (0.009) (0.008) (0.008) 
Size Town/City 0.015*** 0.015*** 0.015*** 0.013*** 0.014*** 0.013*** 0.013*** 
 (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) 
Education (Ref. Higher)        
Low -0.064*** -0.059*** -0.060*** -0.035** -0.032* -0.035** -0.034** 
 (0.015) (0.018) (0.018) (0.015) (0.018) (0.015) (0.015) 
Middle -0.022** -0.020 -0.020 -0.008 -0.007 -0.008 -0.008 
 (0.011) (0.013) (0.013) (0.011) (0.012) (0.011) (0.011) 
Ideology -0.086*** -0.087*** -0.086*** -0.080*** -0.079*** -0.079*** -0.079*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Unemployment  0.009 0.008  0.005   
  (0.012) (0.012)  (0.012)   
Income  0.002 0.003  0.002   
  (0.003) (0.003)  (0.003)   
Interest Politics    0.054*** 0.059*** 0.054*** 0.054*** 
    (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Abstention    0.010 0.008 0.010 0.010 
    (0.012) (0.014) (0.012) (0.012) 
Economic Voting        
Sociotropic  0.040**   0.066***   
  (0.018)   (0.019)   
Pocketbook   0.028*  0.034**   
   (0.017)  (0.017)   
Political Crisis    0.081*** 0.098*** 0.082*** 0.081*** 
    (0.013) (0.016) (0.013) (0.013) 
Political Crisis X Ideology      0.086***  
      (0.019)  
        
Political Crisis X Age       0.082*** 
       (0.014) 
 
Controls yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
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Observations 9,251 7,335 7,350 9,202 7,280 9,202 9,202 
Standard errors in parentheses (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1) 
Table A.4 Marginal Effects of Multinomial Logistic Regressions on Vote for Ciudadanos 
 
DV: Vote for Ciudadanos        
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 
        
Age -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Gender -0.002 0.004 0.003 0.002 0.007 0.002 0.002 
 (0.006) (0.008) (0.008) (0.006) (0.008) (0.006) (0.006) 
Size Town/City 0.003 0.004* 0.005** 0.002 0.004* 0.002 0.002 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Education (Ref. Higher)        
Low -0.067*** -0.053*** -0.051*** -0.058*** -0.043*** -0.058*** -0.057*** 
 (0.012) (0.015) (0.015) (0.012) (0.015) (0.012) (0.012) 
Middle -0.031*** -0.028** -0.027** -0.027*** -0.023** -0.027*** -0.027*** 
 (0.010) (0.011) (0.011) (0.010) (0.011) (0.010) (0.010) 
Ideology 0.031*** 0.032*** 0.031*** 0.031*** 0.032*** 0.031*** 0.031*** 
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) 
Unemployment  0.006 0.010  0.012   
  (0.010) (0.011)  (0.011)   
Income  0.006*** 0.005**  0.005**   
  (0.002) (0.002)  (0.002)   
Interest Politics    0.016*** 0.015*** 0.016*** 0.016*** 
    (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) 
Abstention    -0.001 0.000 -0.001 -0.001 
    (0.010) (0.012) (0.010) (0.010) 
Economic Voting        
Sociotropic  -0.010   0.002   
  (0.015)   (0.016)   
Pocketbook   -0.033**  -0.026*   
   (0.015)  (0.015)   
Political Crisis    0.030** 0.029** 0.030** 0.030** 
    (0.012) (0.013) (0.012) (0.012) 
Political Crisis X Ideology      0.096***  
      (0.026)  
        
Political Crisis X Age       0.031** 
       (0.012) 
        
Controls yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Observations 9,251 7,335 7,350 9,202 7,280 9,202 9,202 





Table A.5 Marginal Effects of Multinomial Logistic Regressions on Vote for PSOE 
 
DV: Vote for PSOE 
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 
        
Age 0.003*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.003*** 0.004*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Gender 0.044*** 0.045*** 0.042*** 0.036*** 0.034*** 0.036*** 0.035*** 
 (0.008) (0.010) (0.010) (0.008) (0.010) (0.008) (0.008) 
Size Town/City -0.006** -0.004 -0.004 -0.005* -0.003 -0.005* -0.005* 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Education (Ref. Higher)        
Low 0.099*** 0.093*** 0.097*** 0.097*** 0.094*** 0.097*** 0.097*** 
 (0.017) (0.020) (0.020) (0.017) (0.020) (0.017) (0.017) 
Middle 0.050*** 0.048*** 0.050*** 0.047*** 0.047*** 0.047*** 0.047*** 
 (0.012) (0.014) (0.014) (0.012) (0.014) (0.012) (0.012) 
Ideology -0.051*** -0.049*** -0.051*** -0.051*** -0.051*** -0.051*** -0.051*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Unemployment  -0.003 0.007  0.009   
  (0.013) (0.013)  (0.013)   
Income  0.001 -0.001  -0.001   
  (0.003) (0.003)  (0.003)   
Interest Politics    -0.004 -0.009* -0.004 -0.004 
    (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) 
Abstention    -0.124*** -0.131*** -0.124*** -0.124*** 
    (0.011) (0.013) (0.011) (0.011) 
Economic Voting        
Sociotropic  0.034*   0.027   
  (0.020)   (0.020)   
Pocketbook   -0.054***  -0.049***   
   (0.019)  (0.019)   
Political Crisis    -0.083*** -0.075*** -0.082*** -0.083*** 
    (0.015) (0.017) (0.015) (0.015) 
Political Crisis X Ideology      -0.06***  
      (0.023)  
Political Crisis X Age       -0.09*** 
       (0.015) 
        
Controls yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Observations 9,251 7,335 7,350 9,202 7,280 9,202 9,202 





Table A.6 Marginal Effects of Multinomial Logistic Regressions on Vote for PP 
 
DV: Vote for PP 
       
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 
        
Age 0.003*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Gender -0.004 -0.006 -0.007 -0.006 -0.009 -0.006 -0.006 
 (0.006) (0.008) (0.008) (0.006) (0.008) (0.006) (0.006) 
Size Town/City -0.002 -0.005** -0.005** -0.002 -0.005** -0.002 -0.002 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Education (Ref. Higher)        
Low -0.026** -0.024* -0.023 -0.015 -0.012 -0.015 -0.016 
 (0.012) (0.014) (0.014) (0.012) (0.014) (0.012) (0.012) 
Middle -0.008 -0.005 -0.006 -0.002 0.003 -0.002 -0.002 
 (0.010) (0.011) (0.011) (0.009) (0.011) (0.009) (0.009) 
Ideology 0.100*** 0.097*** 0.097*** 0.096*** 0.092*** 0.096*** 0.096*** 
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) 
Unemployment  -0.008 -0.004  0.002   
  (0.010) (0.010)  (0.010)   
Income  -0.003 -0.004*  -0.003   
  (0.002) (0.002)  (0.002)   
Interest Politics    0.014*** 0.013*** 0.014*** 0.014*** 
    (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) 
Abstention    -0.079*** -0.070*** -0.079*** -0.079*** 
    (0.010) (0.011) (0.010) (0.010) 
Economic Voting        
Sociotropic  -0.041***   -0.051***   
  (0.015)   (0.015)   
Pocketbook   -0.041***  -0.027*   
   (0.015)  (0.015)   
Political Crisis    -0.068*** -0.085*** -0.068*** -0.069*** 
    (0.012) (0.013) (0.012) (0.012) 
Political Crisis X Ideology      -0.156***  
      (0.029)  
Political Crisis X Age       -0.075*** 
       (0.013) 
        
Controls yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Observations 9,251 7,335 7,350 9,202 7,280 9,202 9,202 





Figure A.1 Average Marginal Effects of Social Class on Probability to Vote for PP, PSOE, 
Podemos, and Ciudadanos 
 
 
Notes: Results are based on Model 1 in Tables A.4, A.5, A.6 and A.7. The class scheme is constructed based on Oesch’s class 
divisions (see Oesch 2006). The results show that socio-cultural professionals, the social class usually associated with the New 
Left, are overrepresented in Podemos, while managers, who tend to vote liberal parties, are clearly overrepresented in 
Ciudadanos. Production workers, the class found to support the populist right in some countries remain overrepresented by the 




Appendix Ch. 6: Conflict Activation in Times of Crisis: The Case of Catalonia 
Tables and Figures 
Figure A.1 Predicted probabilities of support for independence over time and having voted for CiU 
vs. other parties in previous elections, 2008-2013 
 
Note: Model results not shown, available upon request. Main dependent variable is support for an independent state. 





Table A2: Logistic regression (odds ratio) of Deserters versus Loyals of CiU, 2010-2012. 
 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
Pro-Independence 11.054*** 3.674** 4.057*** 2.924** 
 (4.761) (1.893) (2.070) (1.539) 
     
Salience  1.756** 1.575 1.249 
  (0.459) (0.483) (0.448) 
National Sentiment 
(ref: Only/More Spanish) 
    
Dual  3.074  9.501 
  (4.774)  (18.323) 
More Catalan  10.523  27.315 
  (17.373)  (55.172) 
Only Catalan  10.820  23.138 
  (18.006)  (47.494) 
     
Evaluation A. Mas   1.122 1.111 
   (0.116) (0.120) 
     
PID   3.423*** 3.705*** 
   (1.236) (1.483) 
     
Left-Right 2.206*** 2.410*** 2.316*** 2.521*** 
 (0.426) (0.454) (0.525) (0.531) 
     
Age 1.033*** 1.037*** 1.033** 1.032** 
 (0.013) (0.013) (0.014) (0.014) 
     
Constant 0.003*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
 (0.005) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
     
Controls ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ 
     
Observations 222 221 222 221 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1). Other controls included (not 
shown): gender, education, size of the municipality, province. 








Figure A2: Share of ‘federalists’ that would vote ‘yes’ in a hypothetical referendum of 
independence, as % of federalists and total, 2011-2013 
 





Table A3: Regression results on support for independent state by political grievances, 2010-2013 
 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
Satisfaction w/ Democracy 0.068*** 0.030*** 0.029*** -0.001 
 (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.011) 
Salience    0.805*** 
    (0.0751) 
National Sentiment 
(ref: Only/More Spanish) 
    
Dual  0.014* -0.002 -0.006 
  (0.008) (0.010) (0.034) 
More Catalan  0.348*** 0.333*** 0.109** 
  (0.011) (0.012) (0.044) 
Only Catalan  0.734*** 0.730*** 0.635*** 
  (0.010) (0.012) (0.044) 
     
Left-Right   -0.013*** -0.012*** 
   (0.003) (0.003) 
     
Age   -0.002*** -0.002*** 
   (0.000) (0.000) 
     
Nat. Sent. * Stf. Dem     
(ref: Only/More Spanish)     
Dual * Stf. Dem    0.001 
    (0.012) 
More Catalan * Stf. Dem    0.079*** 
    (0.015) 
Only Catalan * Stf. Dem    0.033** 
    (0.014) 
     
Constant 0.051*** -0.083*** 0.152*** 0.237*** 
 (0.018) (0.016) (0.038) (0.047) 
     
Controls   û û ü ü 
Region F.E. ü ü ü ü 
Wave F.E. ü ü ü ü 
     
Observations 23,141 22,768 19,955 19,955 
R-squared 0.064 0.425 0.444 0.446 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1). Other controls included (not 
shown): gender, education, size of the municipality. 
Source: CEO, 2010-2013 
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Figure A3: Predicted Probabilities of voting for each party by national identity in different 
elections. 
 
Notes: 2015 elections not included for ERC and CiU because they went in a pro-independence coalition together 
(JxSI). ICV includes CSQP in 2012 and CeC in 2015. Missing categories (e.g. ‘only catalan’ for C’s) are due 
to low number of observations. Controls include: Left-Right scale, gender, age, education, province and size of 
municipality. Regression results available upon request. 
Source: CIS post-electoral studies (2660; 2857; 2970; 3113; 3202). 
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Figure A4: Average scores for central government evaluation over time in Catalonia 
 
Note: Scale from 0 to 10. Questions: “Evaluate the central government” (ICPS); “Trust in the Central Government” 
(CEO). 




Figure A5: Marginal effects of being an ‘activated’ vs an ‘active’ voter by having voted for a pro-
secessionist, 2006-2017 
 
Notes: Active voters are those individuals who claim to vote in every election, whereas activated voters are those who 
claim to never or rarely do so. Pro-independence parties include CiU, ERC and CUP (in 2015 coalition JxSI 
and in 2017 CiU becomes JxCat). Controls include: Left-Right scale, gender, age, education, national identity, 
province and size of municipality. Regression results (logistic) available upon request. 
Source: CIS post-electoral studies (2660; 2857; 2970; 3113; 3202). 
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Figure A6: Marginal effects of being an ‘activated’ vs an ‘active’ voter by national identity, 2006-
2017 
 
Notes: Active voters are those individuals who claim to vote in every election, whereas activated voters are those who 
claim to never or rarely do so. Controls include: Left-Right scale, party voted in last elections, gender, age, 
education, province and size of municipality. Regression results (logistic) available upon request. 





Figure A7: Predicted probabilities of belonging to each category of national identity by education 
levels. 
 
Notes: Education categories are recoded for simplification purposes. Professional training at medium levels (grado 
medio) is coded into Secondary II and higher levels (grado superior) in Tertiary. Controls include: Year fixed 
effects, gender, age, education, province and size of municipality. Regression results (multinomial logit) 
available upon request. 
Source: ICPS 1991, 2013. 
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